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For a considerable period it has been held by economists 
that the incidence of a general income tax is not shifted, 
and that such a tax has no tendency to raise or otherwise 
alter the prices of commodities. The most careful formu­
lation of this theory, which, for convenience, I refer to 
as the older theory, can be found in the writings of Professor 
Seligman" and Mr. Coates, and the same view of the matter 
was for the most part adopted by the Colwyn Committee on 
National Debt and Taxation which made its Report in 1927.
In December of 1927 however, a very important article 
by -Mr. D.H. Robertson appeared,^ which made it plain that 
the arguments on which the economists had relied to show 
that the incidence of a general income tax is not shifted, 
were erroneous. The whole matter was seen to require 
further investigation.
The following two Chapters of part I of this book out­
line the older theory of the incidence of a general income 
tax and go on to criticise this theory. When it has been 
made clean that the older theory is no longer tenable, instead
E.R.A. Seligman, "Income Taxes and the Price Level”, 
in his Studies in Public Finance, p.59 and republished as 
Appendix XLl In Append!ces~to the Report of the (Colwyn) 
Committee on National Debt and Taxation.
1. W.C. Coates, "Memorandum on the Incidence of the Income 
Tax", Appendix XI, in the same volume of appendices.
2* D.H. Robertson, "The Colwyn Committee, the Income Tax 
and the Price Level", Economic Journal, 1927.
of proceeding direct to a, reconstruction of this theory we 
deal in Part II with the incidence of partial income tax£S. 
This is partly on account of the interest and importance 
of such taxes in themselves and partly because an insight 
into the nature of these taxes seems likely to be helpful 
to an understanding of the incidence of a general income 
tax.
In Part III the problem of the incidence of a general 
income tax is again taken up: to construct a theory of the
incidence of a general income tax is the main object of this 
book. Part IV goes on to supplement Part III and deals with 
a number of related questions.
Parts I, II and III can be read independently of one 
another; and if the student chooses he may omit reading 
Part I or Part II; or else,.if his interest be mainly in 
the incidence of partial income taxes, he may read Part II 
alone, Part IV should only be read after Part III.
S
C H A P T E R  II.
The Three Arguments of the Older Economic Theory of 
the Incidence of a General Income Tax.*
1* Down to 1927 it was generally held by economists that 
the incidence of a tax on income is not shifted but remains 
where it has been placed. Such a tax, they believed, leaves 
the prices of commodities and the rewards of the factors of 
production, at the same levels as it had found them. The 
only difference introduced into the situation by the tax, 
according to this theory,is that each person hands over a 
portion of his income to the government for its uses, instead 
of using it on his own account.
The theory that the economists had put forward can be 
summarized as follows, in such a way as to show the relation­
ship between its different parts. There are three arguments 
in the theory :-
(i) An income tax that has been imposed leaves each
producer still a producer in the industry in which 
he had been to begin with.
(ii) The number of firms in each industry remains
constant.
(iii) Each firm places the same quantity of goods on the 
market as it had done to begin with#
Hence, the theory concludes, the total supply of 
each commodity is unchanged by the tax. Therefore the price 
of each commodity is unchanged.
Let us state each of the arguments of this theory in 
turn; afterwards we go on to examine and criticize them.
* The present chapter is much indebted to D. H. Robertson, 
art. cit., Economic Journal, 1927; to Cabiati's ?.Per 
nempire alcune Tempty boxes* finanziarie", Gionnale degli 
Economisti 1928; and to Fubini's nSullt influenza dell1 
imposta sulla domanda a sull* offerta”, Giornale degli 
Economisti, 1929.
1.
(i) The first argument, as the economists who use it 
are careful to point out, only applies to the case of a 
general income tax, which is imposed on all branches of in­
dustry. When a general tax of this kind is imposed it will 
not pay any industrialist to transfer his business from one 
branch of industry to another: because he could not escape 
the tax by doing so. Suppose that the entrepreneurrs income 
in his present branch is R; and that after payment of the in­
come tax he is left with 80$ of R. Then 80$ of R will still 
be a greater net income than it is open to him to obtain in 
any other branch. He will therefore remain in the same branch 
as he had been in initially. Thus the tax sets up no tendency 
to a transfer of resources between the different portions of 
the industrial field. It leaves each producer still a pro­
ducer in that industry in which it had found him to begin with.
(ii) The Marginal Firm or No-Prbfits -Firm argument is 
stated by Seligman as follows: 1 ...the question is how the 
marginal producer, the producer at the margin is affected ..
A tax on income is a tax on net profits; and net profits are 
not cost but the surplus over cost. A tax on profits cannot 
reach the man at the margin who makes no profits. But the man 
at the margin who makes no profits • . pays no tax because he 
makes no profits . . • If the man at the margin who at any 
time fixes the entire supply of the commodities that is sold 
in the market pays no tax, how can the income tax be added to 
the price ? The tax on profits is paid only by the man who 
makes profits, that is by the intra-marginal producer, not
by the marginal producer. But the tax paid by the intra­
marginal producer cannot affect the price which is paid by 
the marginal producer who pays no tax.tf"_______________________
* Seligman, art. cit ., Appendices to the Oolwyn Report,
p". 123: • " ””
The skeleton of this argument would be:
Price is determined by the marginal or no-profits firm.
This firm makes no profits and therefore pays no income 
tax. Since it_pays no income tax, its position is unaffected 
by the tax. Price therefore is unaffected by the tax.
That is, although a general income tax be imposed it 
will leave the price structure unaffected.
(iii) The Marginal Unit argument of this theory completes 
the proof. As well as there being a marginal or price-
determining firm, these theorists hold, there is for each
firm, a marginal or price—determining unit of production. This 
marginal unit for any firm is the last unit of production ohat 
the firm is just induced and no more to place on the market.
Sir Walter Layton states the argument briefly and effectively
thusj "If we consider any firm, he says, "production under
cont inues uL 6  t ha t  |w'iwt t h e  U sfr nn"ifr { \ r c i u c e 4competition^makes no contribution towards profit and therefore
nothing towards the revenue of the State. This is the unit 
of production which determines prices, which should therefore 
be unaffected by a tax on those units which yield some profit. 
On the same reasoning the amount of output should remain un­
change d.,f*
The argument can be illustrated very simply by the curve 
of marginal costs MC in the diagram. If the firm is producing 
in a competitive market, the price of the commodity remains 
unchanged whether the firm increases or reduces its output: 
price therefore can be shown bv a horizontal straight line.
«■ Minutes of Evidence taken before the (Qolwyn) Committee 
Qn HationalDebt and Taxation, p.177, g 11.
P rice /
0 * Oufrfi-*'Diagram I
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The producer, it is known front economic theory, rill 
in these circumstances continue production just up to the 
point at which marginal cost is equal to price, and no 
further. If he were to produce beyond M he would incur a 
loss on the extra units that he produced: if he were to pro­
duce less than OM units he would forego a gain on the units 
he had refrained from producing. The 0Mtla unit that he pro­
duces, fetches a return shown by the area of the very thin 
rectangle in the diagram. The cost of production of this 
unit i£ given by the same area. This unit just covers its 
cost of production and no more. It yields the producer no 
profit over and above its cost of production. The producer 
makes no payment of income tax on account of this unit, since 
he makes no profit from it. Hence the production of this 
unit is left unaffected by the income taxj the OM^1 unit 
will continue to be produced softer the tax as it had been 
before it. But if the OM^ 1 unit is produced the firmfs 
output must be unchanged, because the firm had initially 
produced OM units of output.
Thus the economic theory which we outline seeks to es­
tablish that when a general income tax is imposed, there will 
be no interchange of resources between the different branches 
of industry, that the number of firms in each branch will re­
main unchanged, and that the output of each one of these firms
will likewise be unchanged. If the logic of these arguments
be correct, then the theory holds itself to have established 
that commodity and factorial prices ?/ill be left unaltered 
by the tax. But are the arguments of the theory valid ?
That is what we now go on to discuss.
2. (i) The first argument of the theory we are describing
holds that since the whole of the economic field is taxed, 
each manufacturer will continue in the same line of production 
as before. An assumption underlying this argument is that the
4.
gross income of each percon in the new situation, i.e., hie 
income before he pays the income tax, remains the same as it 
had been initially. Let us to begin with grant this assunpti 
Even then the conclusion that the argument purports to arrive 
at will not follow. There will still be some transference 
of resources from one part of the field to another. One 
requirement that must be fulfilled in order that a condition 
of -equilibrium should exist is that the ”net advantages” 
offered to a person by his occupation, should be the highest 
on his scale of preferences that it is open to him to attain, 
when not only the monetary reward of the occupation, but also 
the social esteem, leisure etc., attaching to it are counted 
among its 1 net advantages”. The income tax reduced only one 
form of the net advantages of different occupations, the mone­
tary advantage. Consequently a person who v/as formerly 
hovering in choice between two occupations, one whose net 
advantages are largely monetary and another whose advantages 
are largely non-monetary, and so not taxed, may now tend to 
favour more strongly the class of occupation affording its net 
advantages more largely in the non-monetary form. Or even, as 
can be shown,* it is possible that the individual will, in the 
circumstances, be brought by the income tax, from a state of 
indifference in choice, to a decision favouring the occupa­
tion which will afford him the larger monetary income.
Again a person of certain psychological tastes may be led to 
retire earlier from business as a result of an income tax 
which swallows up part of the earnings that he makes: the
effort may then seem to him not worth while. Yet the same 
tax may induce another man to extend his business life over a 
longer period until he makes that accumulation of capital on 
which he had set his mind.
Changes and shifts of economic resources we know that
* See Chapter XI infra.
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there would he, even though we were to grant the assumption 
that the gross earnings of the factors of production would he 
left unaffected by the tax. The direction of the changes we 
do not here need to enquire into. It is sufficient for our 
purpose to establish the fact of changes. Thus even granting 
the assumption most favourable to it, the contention of the 
first argument of the older economic theory of the income 
tax would not be true.
A more obvious set of causes exists, which makes the 
event differ further from what this argument contends it 'would 
be. If we look at the matter from the sod e of demand, those 
taxpayers who have handed over a portion of their income to 
the Government, are now in possession of a smaller sum of 
money to spread over their saving and consumption. For this 
reason their demands for consumption goods, and also for pro­
duction or capital goods, will undergo alteration. Moreover 
the government of the country has now come into possession of 
a larger spending power; the goods that are dominantly con­
sumed by governments will be in greater demand. Corresponding 
to this altered structure of demand in the community, there 
will be a transference of resources between different branches 
of industry. As a result of this an intricate system of 
changes in the rewands of the factors of production will take 
place - the very thing that had been assumed away by the first 
argument of the older theory.
Thus we see that the first argument of the theory that
we are examining must be regarded as erroneous: the con-
evenelusions it drew did not follow from the premises: and then
eaaren these premises themselves had been unsuited to discussion 
of the case.
(ii) The argument of the older theory that relates to the 
no-profits firm falls under the same judgment. It collects 
together into itself a number of erroneous statements. The 
marginal firm of economic theory is not, as this argument
alleges, a no-profits firm. The marginal firm is, it is true,
6.
a firm that is just undecided as to whether or not it should 
in
continue/its present line of production: a slight increase
in the favourable factors would determine it to continue.
The profits of the firm at the moment, and in the short run, 
however, are by no means decisive in determining whether or 
not a firm is at the margin. The marginal firm may, at the 
moment or in the short run, be earning no profits; but it may 
also be a firm which is earning large profits; or perhaps 
even large negative profits, that is, be making a considerable 
loss. The case last mentioned might, e.g. occur, where a 
firm was newly established and expecting for some time yet 
to suffer losses, as part of a process of building up a 
business connection. Only, in this case the firm would 
look forward to a period inthe future at which it expected to 
recoup these losses out of profits it would make, once it 
had become fully established. Indeed, when the upholders 
of the argument that we examine pointed to one set of firms, 
and affirmed that because at the moment their profits or 
their losses were of a certain amount, therefore such and 
such was the case —  when they did this they were running 
counter to a fundamental tenet of economic theory, viz., 
that the facts of the past, even of the immediate past do 
not in themselves matter, ("byegones are forever byegones"): 
they have no significance except in so far as they are a guide 
to future expectations. It is in terms of expectations that 
our theory should reason.
The position of false eminence to which in some writings 
the no-profits firm had been raised, grew out of a misunder­
standing of Marshallian doctrine; and it was a misunder­
standing which at the- time was very widespread. Marshall, 
however, had never depicted the marginal firm as being the 
no-profits firm. He had intended his doctrine of the 
margin, when used to trace price and production changes through
time, to be taken in conjunction with his doctrine of the 
"representative firm", a conception totally different from 
that of the no-profits firm. "Our representative firm", 
said Marshall, "must be one which has had a fairly long life, 
and fair success, which is managed with normal ability, and 
which has normal access to the economies, external and internal, 
which belong to that aggregate volume of production; account 
being taken of the class of goods produced, the conditions of 
marketing them and the economic environment generally."-*
Among the costs which were covered by a representative 
firm were * interest and insurance on all the capital1, and 
"the gross earnings of management (including insurance against 
loss), of those who superintend the risks, who engineer and 
superintend the working.1
Moreover Marshall would have disliked saying that the 
margin determines price: he would have preferred to consider
the relationship as one in which the margin, like price, was 
itself governed by the general relations of demand and supply:^ 
and in long period supply price he would have included the 
costs mentioned above.
(iii) The third argument, that of the marginal unit, gives 
a, correct definition of what is meant by the margined, unit.
This argument could be stated in its correct form as follows:
•* Man shall, Principles of Economics, p. 317; and Robertson 
art. cit., p.568.
1. Marshall op. cit., p.343. The point is well illustrated 
■by Marshall's discussion of a tax on printing presses, 
op. cit. 9 p.41-5.
A discussion of the nature of the representative firm 
and its place in Marshallian doctrine can be found in 
the following: Robertson art. cit., Economic Journal 1927;
Robertson,Shove and sraffa^ "Increasing Returns and the 
Representative Firm; a Symposium," Economic Journal, 1930. 
Robbins, "The Representative Firm", Economic Journal,
1928; and Davenport, The Economics of Alfred Marshall, 
p.359, ety seq.
2* Marshall, Ibid., p.410.
if demand remains unchanged, (i.e. all demand curves in the 
system remain unchanged), and if all factorial prices remain 
unchanged, then the unit of output that had been the marginal 
unit before the tax will continue to be the marginal unit after 
the tax has been imposed. Let us illustrate and prove that
this is so by means of a diagram:
Diagram II.
We draw MQq the curve of marginal costs for a firm selling 
its commodity in a competitive market; the average and margin­
al revenue for the firm will be the horizontal co-incident
lines AR and MR in the diagram. If there were no tax the OM*'*1
unit, corresponding to the point of intersection of MC^ and MR, 
would be the marginal unit: for this unit marginal revenue
and marginal cost to the firm are equal. The firm!s output, 
were there no tax, would be OM.
After the tax the new curve of marginal costs must be of
the shape MOg shown: because the income tax absorbs a portion
of the profit from each unit of output sold. On the OM®*1 
unit of output sold there is no profit. Hence the new curve 
of marginal costs MOg, still cuts the curve of marginal revenue 
in the point Q, corresponding to the output OM. The firm 
therefore, will still market OM units as before.
An hypothesis on which this conclusion depends is that 
the supply curve of each factor of production remains unalter­
ed in shape. This is equivalent to supposing that, despite 
the tax, the factors are willing to accept the same gross 
rewards as before for the same services as before, even though 
they have now to pay to the government out of these gross
rewards certain sums by way of* income tax. An assumption of* 
this kind is very far-reaching indeed. But, and here is the 
point, so far as practical application of the argument is 
concerned, there is no reason to believe that in actual life 
the supply curves of the iactors of production remain unaltered 
in shape when a change takes place in the height of the tax. 
Indeed, as we go on to show there is reason to believe the 
contrary. Let us suppose that a general income tax has been 
imposed. It is then no solution of the problem to state what 
would have happened had it been the case that the supply curves 
of the factors had remained unaltered, when in fact, as we show 
later, they will have altered. What the solution ox the pro­
blem does require is that we should find out the changes in 
the shapes of the supply curves of the factors of production 
that accompany a given alteration in the tax. From the side 
of supply the shape of the curve of marginal costs to a firm
is a function of the height of the tax. It will alter in a
determinate way when the tax alters.
So also from the side of demand; the shape of the curve 
of marginal revenue of a firm is a function of the height of 
the tax.
What the argument that we have examined proves —  and it 
is in this third argument that the kernel of truth of the older 
theory is to be found —  is that if we know the shape of the 
curves of average and marginal revenue for a firm in the new 
situation, and also the shape of its curves of cost - excluding 
- tax in the new situation, we already know, without taking the 
tax into any further account, what price and output for the 
firm will be,(and since for each firm hence also for the in­
dustry ). The influence of the income tax on the situation 
is already sufficiently taken into account when we have 
determined the alteration that it induces in the shape of the 
demand and cost curves in the new situation. This theorem must
be borne in mind by the reader throughout the whole of the
The truth of this theorem oan.be seen by reference to 
diagram III. Suppose that, after the tax has been imposed, 
the curve of marginal revenue and curve of marginal cost, when 
cost is reckoned so as to exclude income tax, for any firm, 
become MR and MG respectively. The diagram again presupposes 
perfect compdbLtion in the industry so that the curve MR is 
shown as a horizontal straight line. An output of ON units 
would equate marginal revenue to marginal cost, if the tax
were to be disregarded.
-> Outfit.O
Diagram III.
When the income tax that has been imposed is taken into 
account the new curve of marginal cost to the firm, when cost 
is reckoned so as to include the tax payment by the firm, 
becomes MQ^. The tax absorbs a portion of the profit from 
each unit of output that is sold, so that the shape of the
curve MG is as shown. The unit of output yields no
profit: the curves MG, MO therefore coincide at a point cor­
responding to an output of ON units. And an output of ON units 
still equates marginal revenue for the firm to its marginal 
cost, when the tax Is taken into account in its cost reckoning. 
Hence if, in the following pages, we can find the influence of
a general income tax on the shape of the marginal revenue and
marginal cost curves for the different lines of industry, this 
will be sufficient to determine the effects produced by the tax 
on prices and outputs. No additional allowance need be made foi- 
the part played in costs of the general income tax itself.
The tax only affects price and output implicitly by causing an 
alteration in the shapes of the curves of revenue and of cost 
“ excluding - tax.
CHAPTER III.
The Discussion of the Colwyn Report on the Incidence 
of the British Income Tax.*-
1. A cardinal point in the Colwyn Committee’s treatment 
of the incidence of the income tax is the meaning that the 
Committee gives to the word Incidence, The Committee ex­
plains its use of the term thus. ’It adopts the meaning given 
to the term by economists,’ it says, ’and this meaning is fairly 
narrow.’ ’For them (the economists) ’incidence” is only con­
cerned with the question on whom the more immediate burden 
of the tax as a tax rests. This is the first thing to be 
decided about any tax. It is to be distinguished from the
1question of further effects, which may be exceedingly important.” 
How the suggestion of the phrase ’’more immediate burden of the 
tax” is that it is a trial immediary that the Committee has in 
mind. The Committee’s meaning turns out to be otherwise, how­
ever, for the passage continued: ”For instance the burden of
a tax may rest upon an employer, and in consequence he may cut 
down his staff* in such a case the effects of the tax may be 
more serious.to the employees than to anyone else, but the 
incidence of the tax is not said to be upon them.”® Thus it 
seems to be not an immediary in regard to time, but an imme­
diary in regard to persons, that the Committee has in mind in 
its distinction between the Incidence and the Effects of & tax.
What exactly the import of such a distinction is, I cannot 
pretend to say. After trying to fit several meanings to the 
terms Incidence and Effects as used later in its Report how-
“ Report of the (Colwyn) Committee on National Debt
" and Taxation, 1927, pp. 106-169 •
ever, I have come to the conclusion that the meaning of the 
Committee in its use of the terms is essentially as follows: 
When factorial supplies are taken to he given then the Com­
mittee refers to the consequences of the income tax as its 
Incidence* When factorial supplies are taken to he variable 
the consequences of the income tax as regards price are said 
to he its Effects. *
Although this expresses the central core of meaning of 
the Committee, it can be said without any doubt, firstly that 
this usage of the word Incidence does not correspond to the 
usual meaning given to the term in the writings of economists 
Economic discussions of the incidence of taxes recognise that 
factorial prices may change as a result of the tax.^ Secondly 
a more important defect of the use made of the term is that 
although this is the central core of meaning it appears to be 
giving to the word Incidence, the Committee is not itself 
fully aware of this. As a result, the argument and the import 
both of the section of the Report dealing with Incidence, are 
lacking in clarity.
2. It is possible that some people are prefer to place a 
time interpretation on the definitions of Incidence and 
Effects that we have quoted from the Report: it may appear
to them that by Incidence the Committee means the price
*■'* In regard to this interpretation of Incidence, Of. Ibid.,
§ 303_and the corresponding footnote, §295, §§ 310^314, 
especially ,fLet it • • same § 311, and § 314) and in 
regard to Effects, Of. Ibid., g 440-451. For the remainder 
of this chapter when the words Incidence and Effects are 
used in the meaning of the Colwyn Committee, they are printed with capital letters.
1. For example Of* Marshall, Principles, pp. 414-5.
2*
consequences brought about by the tax after the lapse of a 
short period of time, and by Effects, the consequences after 
a long period of time.
This interpretation however would leave the Report open to 
the same criticisms as before. The Incidence of a tax has not 
been taken by economists to refer to its short period conse­
quences. The Classical School of economists meant by incidence, 
the price consequences produced by the tax after the lapse of the 
long period. Marshall and Edgeworth used a time analysis in 
which incidence referred to effects produced by the tax either 
after the long period of time or after short periods of given 
length.-- But a number of passages in the Report make it appear 
very improbable that a time distinction of this kind is intended 
between the Incidence and the Effects of a tax. The previous 
interpretation appears the more probable, whereby Incidence 
refers to the consequences produced by the tax when the supply 
schedule of each factor of production can be taken to remain 
unaltered in position.
3* The Committee states its conclusions in regard to 
Incidence and Effects of the tax thus :
w We conclude that the broad economic argument is true over 
practically the whole field and for practically the whole of the 
time, any exceptions to it being local or temporary and in­
sufficient to invalidate it.ff̂
Then as regards Effects: nWe have seen that, with unim­
portant exceptions, the Income Tax is not passed directly into 
the price of goods and services. Whether prices are indirectly 
affected is another question, depending on the total effect of 
the tax on saving and enterprise. Saving and enterprise are 
undoubtedly diminished to same extent . . .  So far as the Income 
Tax, operating in these ways, has any tendency to reduce the
* Of. infra, Chapter
1. Report, p.119. § 324*
volume of production, it must also have a tendency to in­
crease prices . . .  It appears to us that over the whole 
field its influence has been of little relative importance.”2 
In its discussion leading up to the establishing of these
conclusions the main advance in analysis made by the Report,
£and it was an important one, had been to show the necessity 
for considering the time variations in the supply of labour, 
of capital and of enterprise caused by the tax. The Committee1 
discussion of savings in Great Britain, of the reserves of 
joint stock companies and of the time variation in the supply 
of labour and enterprise was particularly illuminating. To 
have done this in the face of the dogmatism of the economists, 
was no small achievement.
Still, in the important points of methodology relating to
the meaning of the word incidence and as to the taking Into
account the expenditure of the tax proceeds, the Committeefs 
Report was inadequate and unsatisfactory. In more than one 
place the Report essays to take into account the expenditure
of the resources raised by the tax. But nov/here does it
envisage the important movements towards redistribution of 
the national income that are in fact carried out in this way, 
and the effects on demand schedules and consequently on the 
prices of goods: the increased demand for battleships and
for roads that the government is enabled to make by an increase
in the rate of tax, the increased demands for food and clothes
and houseroom made by the poorer sections when purchasing power
rzis diverted away from the rich is only vaguely hinted at.
For example had the Committee been more aware of the factor 
in the situation, changing demand schedules then its analysis
2 * p.164. g 458.
5• The treatment of the expenditure of the tax proceeds
given by the Colwyn Committee is discussed later in Chapter , g
and conclusions regarding the "Incidence" of the tax —  
taking this in the sense intended by the Committee —  must 
have been very different. It goes without saying that its 
analysis of the "Effects" of the tax also would have been 
different•
4 . The task with which we ourselves are confronted in 
thishook is a different one from that which confronted the 
Oolwyn Committee. The object of the Committee was to enquire 
into the effects of the income tax and other taxes in Great 
Britain at the date at which it sat. Our object is to make a 
theoretical investigation of any income tax in a closed market. 
Our disquisition therefore will be purely theoretical and 
there should be room in it for the variety of all possible 
sets of circumstances that are compatible with the initial 
assumptions that we make. Whether the tax be in Great Britain 
or in Haiti so far as we are concerned, should be irrelevant. 
If, as sometimes we do, we use statistics that are drawn from 
the case of Great Britain, it will merely be in order to make 
a point clearer and not because the statistics in question 
have any particular relevance to the investigation.
In Part III of the book we consider the effects of a 
general income tax. Before doing so we proceed in Part II 
to analysis of the case of some partial income taxes.
The Incidence of Partial Income 
Taxes.
0 H A P.3T E R IV.
A Tax on the Income of a Monopolist.
1. Let us consider the case of a person who has a monopoly 
in the manufacture of an article, and let a tax be imposed on 
his income* We suppose that the monopolist is confronted 
with a perfectly definite demand schedule for his commodity, 
and that he knows the shape of it in the neighbourhood of the 
point of equilibrium5 also the shape of his cost curve in the 
neighbourhood of the point of equilibrium.
In this paragraph let us consider the case where the 
miFr17 ^  + ̂  private factors"''* of the monopolist are in fixed 
supply to the business concerned.
If the tax imposed be a proportional one then very simple 
reasoning shows that price will remain unchanged. He had fixed 
price before the tax so as to get the maximum possible reward. 
Let the tax be one of 20%. If he leaves price unaltered his 
net reward will be 80% of the maximum gross reward. But this 
is greater than 80% of any other reward. By leaving price 
unaltered therefore, the monopolist will get the greatest 
reward that it is open to him to achieve. Hence in the case 
considered^a proportional tax has no effect on either the 
price or output of the monopolist.-
Next, let us suppose .that the tax that has been imposed, 
is not proportional, but is progressive in amount. In diagram 
I let AR and MR be the average and marginal revenue curves 
respectively, to the monopolist, and let A0j_ and MGp be his 
curves of average and marginal costs before the tax.
This terminology is used by J.R. Hicks, in "Annual 









Over the range 0 to V curve MO^ is drawn as - ---  —
and MOg as ----- - . In the range beyond V both curves
are coincident•
In order to maximize the revenue to his private factors 
he will fix output gfc the level OM given by the intersection 
of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. The price 
corresponding to this output is PM.
In the diagram the d ^ h  increment of output is shown 
as affording a return kh to the monopolist. Of this return 
the tax absorbs a portion ks. This occurs for the revenue 
from each unit of output and the curve of marginal costs to 
the monopolist becomes displaced into the position MOp. Since 
for the OMth unit of unit, marginal cost had been equal to 
marginal revenue, the monopolist had gained no return on this • 
unit. He therefore will pay no income tax on it, and the 
curve MGp will intersect the curve MO-̂  in the point Q. Thus 
the curve of marginal costs for the monopolist after the tax 
has been imposed, will still intersect the curve of marginal 
revenue MR, in the point Q. /\n output OM therefore, will 
still maximize the revenue to the monopolist’s private 
factors. The corresponding price remains unchanged at PM. 
Price and output are the same for the monopolist after the 
tax as they had been before it.
Hence we see that when the private factors of a monopolist 
are in fixed supply, a tax on his income leaves the price
2
and output of his commodity unchanged. In the diagram 
the net revenue of the monopolist before the tax had been 
equal to area AQH. After the tax his net revenue is KGfcH. 
The exchequer has absorbed an amount of revenue AQK.“
* A case not envisaged in the above is discussed at some 
length by Amoroso, vizjjf where the marginal rate of the tax 
becomes sufficiently high as to absorb the whole of the 
monopolist’s profit from each unit of output. In this 
case there will be an equilibrium output to the left of 
the point M in the diagram and also, as can be seen from 
considerations of symmetry, an equilibrium output to the 
right of M. He may choose either of these two points of 
equilibrium. Of. Amoroso, Lezioni di Economia Mateihatica, 
p.226 et seq.
The case that we.have treated and also the case discussed 
by Amoroso, are both covered by the following mathematical 
proof•
Let the monopolist’s total revenue from an output of X 
units by R (x) and his total cost be 0 (x)
The reward to the monopolistic factors, which are in 
fixed supply, is
(I (x) = R (x) - 0 (x)
Denote the total tax payment, which is a function of I, 
by T (I)« T is also a function of x so that we can write 
it T (x).
Before the imposition of the tax the monopolist maximizes
I. In order that equilibrium should exist, it is required 
that
d R d 0 m
dlT “ d T
with the corresponding condition for differentials of the 
second order, for a maximum.
After the imposition of the tax the monopolist maximizes his 
net revenue I (x) - T (x) The necessary condition for
equilibrium therefore is that
d I _ 4 1  = o.d X d x
i.e. d I _ d T d I s=
& k d T  n r
d i ;1 i - d T \d I ] =
0
0T (2)
In equation (3) there are two factors: it is sufficient
that either of them should be equated to zero.
If d T _ ±
d I
then d T = d I
^ & x £contd)3.
2. The supply of the monopolist’s private factors to this 
line of production however, may not he fixed. T.o see what
to with ',5is meant let us supposeAthat the nature of the industry were 
such that the monopolist’s private factors ha^eto be applied 
either all-in-a-lump, or not at all. An instance of this 
might be where the monopolist had to superintend a process 
for 10 hours a day, say, or not at all.
In this case the net reward to the monopolist’s private 
factors is equal to area K Q H Ainstead of A Q U as initially. 
This net return to his private factors now, may have fallen 
below the return that they could get in some other part of th 
industrial field. If so he will withdraw entirely from the 
original line of production. The monopoly good^ will no 
longer be manufactured.
The more general case however, is that in which the 
monopolist can vary the supply of his private factors, labour 
and capital, as between the production of the monopolized 
commodity and other commodities. This is also the more 
important case for practice. Let us illustrate it by 
a diagram.
Footnote continued from page 3:
This is the case discussed by Amoroso, in which the 
marginal rate of imposition of the tax becomes sufficiently 
great to absorb the total profit from each unit of output. 
The curve MO2 in Diagram I, would intersect ME to the left, 
and again to the right, of the point Q.
In the text we do not envisage a marginal rate of taxa­
tion of over 100$, such as this would require, as being 
possible. Hence, for equilibrium in the case there dis­
cussed, it must be the other factor  ̂ j that is equatedd x «
to zero. This gives
• O -  = £-£ ... (3)d x d x
which is the same as equation (1). Therefore in this 
case output and price are the same after the tax as before it.
Diagram II*
The ourve MOg is drawn as —  — — - — , the curve
MC3 as ........ .
The curves A H and MR in diagram II, are the curves 
of average and marginal revenue respectively to the mono­
polist J M °1 is the curve of marginal costs to him before 
the tax is imposed. How, however, the monopolists private 
factors are in variable supply to the production of this 
commodity, e.g. he may be able to withdraw certain of his 
labour factors from this line of output and place them in 
others. Again he may be able to devote his capital either 
to this or to other lines of business. We take it that it 
is the whole of t'he monopolists revenue from this line of 
production, that is taxed.
When he is drawing up his schedule of costs of production 
for his business the monopolist must take into account the 
cost of his own labour and capital. Each unit of these he 
will charge to the firm at the figure that the unit would 
fetch in the most profitable other use open to it. In the 
case of his labour if the 7th unit of it, say, that he 
exerts per day, could fetch in its most profitable other 
use a sum of seven shillings, then he will charge this unit 
of labour in the cost schedule of the monojjoly, at seven 
shillings. In the case of capital his system of costing 
will be the same. If e.g. the normal rate of interest be
5.
4%, then he will always charge his capital to the monopoly 
at this rate.
Since the cost curve MOi includes payments to the 
monopolist’s private factors in this way, it is not possible 
to read off from the diagram what his total revenue is before 
the tax is imposed. He gets the return that his factors 
would yield him if employed in their most fabourable uses 
outside the business; and as well he gets a surplus return 
over and above this, equal to A Q H. His output before the 
tax is 0 M, at a price^ P M .
When the tax is imposed the curve of marginal costs
M G^, to the monopolist, will undergo two separate and
independent displacements. In the first instance the cost
that he charges to each unit of labour and each unit of
capital that he devotes to the business, must be raised.
Suppose, for example, that the tax be one of 10%. Then
10% of the return that he gets on the 7th unit of his labour
will be absorbed by the tax. He had formerly charged this
unit of labour, in his costing^at seven shillings to the
firm. Before his reckoning will be complete, he will
now have to charge the unit to the firm after the tax at
7 ( 1 + i2- ) shillings, that is at seven shillings,100
8*4 pence. Similarly each £100 of capital that he em­
ploys in this line of production he will now have to charge 
to the firm at 4( 1 )%> that is at 4.4%. Because he
has now to incur an additional cost on behalf of each unit 
of labour or capital that he devotes to this line of 
production —  a cost taking the form of an additional tax 
payment on the return that he gets from the unit.
In this way the monopolist’s curve of marginal costs 
M Ci is made to undergo an upward displacement into the
position M 0'2 as shorn. Since the costs incurred in the 
production of the 0 nth unit of output have increased, the 
new curve of marginal costs M 02 will not pass through the
point Q, "but will lie above it. Every point on the 
curve in fact must undergo a vertical displacement,.
As well, the tax absorbs a portion of each increment 
of monopoly surplus that accrues to the producer —  this 
being the revenue from his factors when employed in their 
monopoly use, over and above what they would fetch in their 
most favourable outside employment. The effect of this is 
to alter the position of the curve of marginal costs M Og 
into the position M Og. If, after the previous displacement 
of the curve into the position M Cg, it had intersected the 
curve of marginal revenue at the point D, corresponding to 
an output 0 E, then since the monopoly surplus from the 
0 Eth unit is zero, no tax is paid on the zero surplus 
corresponding to this unit, and the curve M Og will also 
intersect the curve of marginal revenue in the same point D.
In this case the producer’3 output, given by the point 
of intersection of his curve of marginal costs M Og, with 
that of marginal revenue, will be 0 E instead of 0 M as 
initially. 0 E is always less than 0 M. His output will 
have contracted and the price of the commodity will no 
longer be P M, but the higher amount R E.''r
Using the same terminology as in footnote p. ^4. supra, 
the monopolist’s costs are now a function both of output 
and the height of the Tax: so that we may write total 
costs now as C(x, T)
The monopolist’s gross reward 
I = R (x) - 0 (x, T)
If P be net reward after payment of the tax,
P = I - T
= R (x) - 0 (x, T ) - T
a maximum if
d _I_ - d _Td X d X
d _I_ - d__T d I
d X d I d x
d_ II 1 “ d T (d X d I I
Footnote contd.
7.
The extent of the resultant contraction in output and 
rise in price, depends on the amount of the vertical dis­
placement that has taken place between the initial and the 
new position of the curve of marginal costs. It depends 
also on the slope of the demand and cost curves of the firm. 
The more gentle the slope of the demand curve, i.e., the 
more elastic is the demand, the greater will be the falling 
off in output. If the monopoly operates under conditions 
of falling costs, then the steeper the slope of the curve 
of marginal costs, the greater will the contraction in 
output be. If the monopoly works under increasing costs of 
production, the more gentle the slope of the curve of 
marginal costs, the greater will be the contraction in 
output. The truth of these statements can be shewn by 
drawing the appropriate diagrams.
(Oontd. of footnote from previous page) 
i.e. if either of the factors in this equation is zero 
d T
a~r = 1
only if the marginal rate of tax is 100$
If d I =
d x 0
than d R = [ j 0 ., A.P d T d I )
dx ( & x &T dI ~cTxj .. (4)
The value of x, say x2, satisfying equation (4) is
less than the value of x, say xq satisfying equation (3) 
on p. XS supra• because the curve of d R has a negative
cTT.gradient; and the two curves y = d0_ and"y = \ q
dx y r
d T d I
a~r arr
have each got either a positive gradient or else a negative 
gradient greater than that of y = d R : and for every
value of x less than xq, the d x
d  0 4- ^  0 d T d Icurve y = ^  ^TIT
lies above the curve y = d C
d x
3. In the case where uncertainty exists the above 
treatment needs modification. The monopolist’s reward 
will then be in the nature of profit. Corresponding to 
each price that he may fix there will be for him an expected 
schedule of profits, no one size of gain being certain, 
but each different size of gain having a certain probability 
of occurrence.* Corresponding to the price pA, before the
tax, the probability schedule of gains is, let us suppose, 
as in diagram I* and the probability schedule corresponding 
to price pg, as in diagram II. Price pA may be either high­
er or lower than price pg.
Let us consider the case where the private factors of 
the monopolist are in fixed supply to the firm. Without 
the tax the monopolist would, let us suppose, have chosen 
price pA . The effect of the tax is to absorb a portion of
* Cf. J.R. Hicks, "The Theory of Uncertainty and Profit", 
Economica, 1931.
Chance
'T o ta l  r a t u f t a  
(net 0̂  inca*HC tajt JDiagram n c
Uncertainty Schedule for price p^ 
Cl\cut*ce 
A
t t K l  return
Diagram
Uncertainty schedule for price pg
whatever size of gain accrues. Thus the tax alters the 
shape of each probability schedule, ^.lthough without the 
tax the monopolist would prefer the schedule corresponding 
to price p , it is quite possible that when the tax alters
ir i.
the shape of each sche&le of net gains, he will prefer the 
new schedule corresponding to price pB , rather than that 
corresponding to price pA . In this case therefore, even 
though the private factors of the monopolist are in fixed 
supply to the business, the imposition of the tax will 
cause a change to take place in price. It is not possible 
to say whether the effect of the tax will be to cause a 
rise or a fall in price. Sometimes it will be the one, 
sometimes the other.
Likewise, ’when the private factors of the monopolist 
are in variable supply to the business, the presence of 
uncertainty when the tax is imposed, will ac£*'as a further 
tendency towards price change. Whether the effect will 
be towards a raising or a lowering of price, however, it is 
not possible to say.
♦
C H A P T E R  V.
The Incidence of an Income Tax on the Diamond 
Monopoly in South Africa.
1. The romantic story of the discovery of diamonds in 
South Africa is well known. Exploitation of the diamond fields 
had begun just before 1870* By the early 1890’s, due to the 
forceful personality of Cecil Rhodes, most of the diamond 
producing companies had entered into agreement to restrict 
the output of diamonds, so as to maintain their prices.*
From that date till the early 1920’s, nearly the whole of the 
world’s annual supply of diamonds came from South Africa. In 
the early 1920’s however, the monopoly of these companies 
began to be encroached upon; and before the end of the decade 
their monopoly had definitely been lost; many new sources of 
production had come into operation.
Diamonds are a luxury article; and it had frequently 
been shown in'the history of the industry that the demand 
for them was very rigid. No doubt the benefit derived by 
the South African producers from their monopoly, while it 
lasted, had been very great.
For a considerable time extending down to the present 
day, the diamond-mining companies of South Africa have been 
subjected to a higher rate of tax than the other companies 
in the Union: (gold-mining companies are excluded in this
statement: Of. Chapter 7 infra.) The extent of the differen­
tial taxation of the diamond-mining companies has varied in 
height at different times.1 Let us enquire into the economic
A Plant, "Economic Develoi3ment, 1795-1921” in The Cambridge 
History of the British Empire, Vol.VIII, South Africa. 
pp. 775-7.
1. n.h . de Kock, An Analysis of the Finances of the Union 
"orSouth Africa, devotes a chapter to the history of 
mining taxation in the Union.
1.
effects that such taxation would have produced in the
diamond-mining industry over the long period, had the
industry retained its world monopoly of production.
For the sake of definiteness let us enquire what economic
effects would have been produced in the monopolistic diamond
om incomeindustry by a tax 2-j-fo higher than that on other industries.A
2* The land owned by the diamond-mining industry was of
little or no use for other lines of production. The quantity
of diamond-bearing land therefore, was fixed in supply downwards
to the industry: it would not fall below the existing level
even though the rent payment for it were to diminish. Nor
was the quantity of diamond-bearing land that the industry
owned amenable to increase. Hence the quantity of diamond-
bearing land owned by the monopoly was fixed in supply; and
that land was purely a rent-factor.
The diamond industry formed only a small portion of the
total industry of South Africa. Over the long period
therefore, one would expect that both labour and materials
to it would be in perfectly elastic supply: and that in
the short period the elasticity of supply of both these
factors would be less than perfect.
Capital we will also regard as being in perfectly
elastic .supply to the industry."
Diamond-mining is concerned with the working out of an ,
exhaustible resource. We consider the process as if it
0were continuous and concerned with the working of an in-
Xexhaustible resource.
We are going to supjDOse also that in the initial and 
final state of the industry no uncertainty exists. Actually, 
of course, in the diamond industry uncertainty does exist.
The assumption that we make that no uncertainty exists will
Of. the discussion of the elasticity of supply of capital 
to the gold-mining industry, p. 5*6~7 infra.
1. Qf, fhr rnrmarh rrm d~ in fn^fn^fî-r— p-s  ----- infra.•
introduce a certain lack of correspondence between the -f|
conclusions we arrive at and reality.
It may be, it is true, that some of the hypotheses in
terms of which we reason, correspond to some extent inade­
quately with the real circumstances of the case: but at any
rate the hypotheses made have been openly stated and $o error 
should be the more easily detected. Making these hypotheses
we enquire first into the long period effects that the tax would
have •
Over the long period the netfi remunerations that the 
industry pays to labour and materials are unaffected by the 
tax; because these are in perfectly elastic supply to it.
Had there been no tax the diamond industry would have employed 
capital up to that point at which it yielded a return equal to 
the normal rate of interest, say R%. After the tax the in­
dustry will only employ capital in each direction until it
2iyields a (gross) return equal to R (1 +• )%, so as to
leave a net^ remuneration of to the capital. On this 
attount therefore there will be a contraction in the output 
of diamonds and a corresponding rise in the price of diamonds.
If we refer back to Diagram II, Chapter IV, p. ,
it is as if, over the long period, the curve of marginal cost 
to the industry had, through ihe change in the cost (gross 
remuneration) of capital to the industry, been raised from the 
position M 0q into the final position M Og. Labour costs, 
in the case of the diamond industry, are unaffected by the 
tax, and play no part in the displacement of the curve M 0q 
into the final position M G-*.*• tj
Since the price of labour to the industry has remained 
at the same level, while the price of capital to it has risen, 
a certain amount of substitution of the use of labour for 
that of capital will have taken place. The more readily is ; 
labour substitutable for capital in the diamond-mining industry,
the smaller will he the eventual fall in output and rise 
in price. Again we have said that the demand curve for 
diamonds is fairly rigid: this will he an influence tending
to curtail the contraction in their output, but not the 
rise in their price.
ifcew On the assumptions that we have made, over the long 
period the elasticity of supply of labour and of capital to 
the industry is perfect. These elements therefore will 
share none of the tax burden of the industry, which in the 
long period will have come to rest entirely on the owners 
of the diamond-bearing ground, and on the purchasers of the 
diamonds that the industry produces.
3* In the short period, we have said, the supply of labour 
to the industry will be to some extent rigid, i.e., less 
than perfectly elastic; and the same, though probably in a 
lesser degree, will be true of the supply of materials to the 
industry. In the short period therefore, both of these 
factors share a part of the burden of the tax, along
with the owners of the diamond-bearing land, and wittjthe 
purchasers of the diamonds. Their share of the burden borne 
by labour and the suppliers of materials to the industry,
tv <((w-etnbl take the form of lower wage rates and lower prices 
received for the goods that they supply to the industry.
The rate at which the output of diamonds will contract 
in the short period and the resultant rate of rise in price 
of diamonds, will depend on the time-variation of the 
elasticities of supply of these two factors to the industry. 
As well it will depend on the facility or difficulty of 
transfer of the plant that had been used in the diamond- 
mining industry, to other lines of production after the 
tax has been imposed; and on the rate at which the plant in 
the industry wears out. If the diamond-producing plant is
of but small service in other lines of production and 
wears out only very slowly, then the rise in price of 
diamonds and the contraction in output will tend to be
the slower./
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C H A P T E R  VI.
The Incidence of a Partial Income Tax.
1. An income tax which is imposed on the income of a 
particular indudtry, may be graduated according to either, 
a personal or an impersonal criterion. If the criterion is
a personal one, then the income tax will be graduated accord­
ing to the income and family responsibilities of the person 
who comes into receipt of the dividends paid by the industry. 
If the criterion is an impersonal one, then the tax will be 
assessed, not on the incomes of the persons receiving divi­
dends, but on the incomes of the firms themselves. In this 
case the height of the tax will depend on the size of income 
earned by the firm. The tax levied by the Government of 
South Africa on gold mining, for example, is graduated in 
this impersonal way.
We will suppose to begin with, that it is in this im­
personal fashion that the tax we discuss is graduated: the
rate of tax depends on the size of income of the firm.
2. The following are the assumptions that we make :- 
That firms in the industry are working under conditions
of perfect competition.1
* Some aspects of the theory of a partial income tax have
been finely treated by Fagiani in his article "Gontributo 
ad alcuni punti della teoria della tra^lazione delle 
imposte sui ’profitti* e sui *redditi,ff published in 
Studi Sassaresi for 1931 and 1932.
1« We do not envisage the production function as being 
homogeneous and of the 1st. degree.
1
That the tax is imposed on the income of each firm in 
the industry and the marginal rate of the tax is either 
constant or progressive.
That in both the long and in the short peeriod of time 
after the tax has been imposed, entrepreneurs in the in­
dustry affected are able to hire factors of production at 
constant prices* that is, that the suppliers of factors of 
production to the industry, in both the long and in the short 
period are perfectly elastic. This assumption we afterwards 
remove to make provision for the important cases in which it 
would not hold good.
That the proceeds of the tax are small enough for the
only
governments expenditure of them to causeAa disturbance in 
industry generally that is small enough to be neglected.
3. Let us consider how costs of production of any firm in 
the industry are affected by the tax. The firm hires its 
factors after t£e tax has been imposed, at the same prices 
as initially. Its cost for labour and for land for any 
unit of production after the tax, if the technical coeffi­
cients of production of the firm remain unchanged, are the 
same for that unit as they had been before it• Let us sup­
pose that the technical coefficients of the firm remain 
unchanged in this way.-*
In diagram I AVO^ and MVO-̂  are the curves of average 
and marginal variable cost respectively to a firm in the 
industry, and ATC-̂  is its curve of average total costs. This 
firm had, before the tax was imposed, been in equilibrium 
at the output 0 M, when the price of its commodity was O P .  
This price and output had just enabled it to cover its 
variable costs of production 0 M, Q M in amount, and to
* For a good discussion of the meaning of technical co­
efficients of production, see H. Schultz, "Marginal 
Productivity and the General Pricing Process", Journal 
of Political Economy, 1929.
earn over and above the normal rate of interest on the fixed 
capital it employed. The normal return on its fixed factors 
had amounted to 0 M# R
Diagram I .
To give an arithmetical example, let us suppose that the 
tax imposed on the industry concerned is at a flat rate of 
20$. Then in the period during which the firm whose cost 
conditions are represented in diagram I expects the price of 
its commodity to remain unchanged^it will expect the tax to 
absorb a portion, A Q 0 D in the diagram, equal to 20% of 
the total remuneration 0 M# R Q to its fixed factors.
4. A fuller representation of the case of which this is 
the end result can be given and in a way that applies to 
either a proportional or a graduated tax. This is done in 
diagram II wh|ch, like the previous supposes that the price 
the firm expects to receive for its commodity remains un­
changed at the initial level OP, and that the technical 
coefficients of the firm remain the same at each scale of 
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Diagram II•
0 The producers* expectation is that the price of the
commodity will remain unchanged at the point in time under
consideration.
The position of the average and marginal curves after the 
tax are shown by broken lines.
Area A = area B.
Curves MVC]_, jMVCg coincide over the range of production 
0 to D. So also for AVCp,^AVOg
Area GHRI = area RTK.
Over range of output D to V curves MVC^ ; ^MVCr,; AVC^;
IAVCg are separate and distinct.
For output OV and over curves MVĈ -j- -MVCgt AVO^jjAVCg 
are again coincident.
In the diagram MVCp and AVO^ are the curves of marginal 
and average variable costs initially; and ATC^ in the initial 
curve of average total costs. Initial price is OP. Area A = 
area B* the firm does not begin to make any return over and 
above its variable costs until its output has reached a level 
OD. After this output has been reached each additional unit 
of output fetches a balance over and above the variable costs 
for the unit concerned. It is on this return over and above 
variable costs that taxation has to be paid; an amount of 
taxation FGHJ being paid on the increment of output DE, and
4
and so on. The total amount paid in taxation when output 
is OM is shown by the area GHRJP. This is a cost that the 
firm must incur; it is an addition to variable costs. The 
marginal curve of variable costs therefore, is raised as 
shown over the range DM, from its initial position MOVj into 
the new position j_MV0g. To the new marginal cost curve 
ĵ MVCJg there will correspond a new average curve of variable ' 
costs iaV02
The suffix i is used in regard to the two curves j_MV0g 
iAVGp in order to impress that the positions shorn for the 
two curves are the positions that they take up at the end 
of a short period at the end of which no reaction towards a 
higher price level is expected by the producers to take 
place. Mien it is expected by the producers concerned that 
there will be a higher price level at the end of any given 
period then the positions of the new curves of variable cost 
•  including—tax for the corresponding period of time will be 
different from ^MVOg and iAtfCg and will lie above them; 
because then, for the increment of output DE say, in diagram 
II the labour and other costs will be the same as before, 
but the price received for the incremeht is higher and 
therefore will bear a greater amount of tax payment. As 
soon as the price expectation alters, therefore, -jMVGg and 
^AVOp are no longer the curves of cost - including tax - 
to the firm; new curves have to be drawn.
The curve of average total costs is referred to as 
^ATOi because the position of the curve shov/n is that' which 
it occupied before, and not after, the tax was imposed.
Referring to the state of affairs shown in diagram II 
after the output OM has been passed each additional unit of 
output brings a net loss to the producer instead of a gain. 
Each such unit in the new circumstances secures him a diminu­
tion in his total tax payment, because of the diminution it 
creates in the revenue to the fixed factors. Thus for an
output greater than OM the curve iM0V2 lies below the curve 
MVOi •
Shareholders in this industry now get a less remuneration 
from capital invested in it than would have been got had their 
capital been invested in other branches of industry. When the 
fixed capital comes to be worn out some of them will not renew 
their holdings of it until a reduction in plant has taken 
place, sufficiently large to enable a new price to be estab­
lished for the commodity that will afford the normal rate of 
return on fixed capital invested in the industry.
The rise in price will take place partly through some firms 
not renewing their plant and partly through some plant forsak­
ing this industry for others.
The expected return to the fixed capital of the firm in 
Diagram II is'now FJRI instead of FJRI 4-FGHRJ as formerly; 
the part FGHRJ has been absorbed by the income tax. It will be 
for the firm concerned to consider whether, taking this and 
other periods of time into account, it would not be possible for 
part or all of its plant to fetch a higher return in some other 
line of production. If, costs of transfer being taken into 
account, such a higher return could be obtained, then the 
transfer will be made. The higher the return the plant will 
fetch in other lines, and the lower the costs of transfer to 
such other lines, then the quicker will be the falling off in 
the output in the industry and the quicker the rise in the 
price of its commodity.
Diagram III depicts this other possible case of the same 
phenomenon as is shown in Diagram II. It shows the slightly 
simpler case where the curves of marginal and average variable 
costs do not cut the price line in the dov/nward part of their 
movement. The curves are named by the same symbols as before, 
and the reasoning is exactly parallel.
Diagram III.
nFurther, if the technical co-efficients of the firm re­
main unaltered over the long period, Diagram II (or diagram 
III) can he amended to show the higher price level that 
finally results. In diagram IV average and marginal variable 
costs - excluding - tax are given, as in diagram II, by the 
curves AVCj and MVO^.
The price that the firm receives for its commodity in the 
new position of equilibrium must be sufficient to cover these 
variable costs and to afford at the same time the normal rate 
of remuneration net of income tax, to the fixed capital that 
it employs. This fixed capital by hypothesis is the same after 
the tax as it had been before it and so the total net remuner­
ation on the capital must be the same as it had been initially.
To see how the gross reward to these factors must have 
increased as a result of the tax, suppose that the reward to 
the fixed factors had initially been K; then K must also be 
their final net reward.
Let the final gross reward of the fixed factors be K 4*1*
I will be the payment of income tax made on the firm’s 
total gross reward.
If the tax imposed on firms in the industry is at a flat 
rate of 20%, then I must be such that
I =
( K  4 - 1 )  ( 1  -  —  ) =  KT 100
20




In general, let the marginal tax payment by the firm on 
a gross revenue of i "be at the rate (i) • If before the 
tax the total fixed costs of the firm had been equal to K* 
then after the tax they will be equal to K 4r I where
{K + 1
(K -*-1.) - \ f (i) di = K
J O
fK I
that is, 1 = I f (i) di .....  C1 )/
an equation in K and I and therefore sufficient to determine 
I.
The curve of average final total costs ATGg will be raised 
correspondingly above the curve AVC^. The new price of the 
commodity must be at a level 0 Z (Of* diagram IV) sufficient 
to cover fixed costs to the firm on the new higher scale K 4*
I. Unless price does permit it to cover costs on this scale, 
the firm will go out of production. Thus in diagram IV, 
rectangle ab. On = K -f I, where I is defined by equation (1.)
Diagram IV
It is important to notice, when Diagram II and Diagram IV 
have reference, as we suppose, to the conditions of the same
firm at two points in time after the tax has been imposed, the
curves MVQi, AVOq are the same in the two diagrams: the
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curves iMVGg, iAVCg in diagram II represent the curves of 
marginal and average variable cost - including - tax to the 
firm at a point in time when it is expected that no price 
reaction will have taken place: and the curves gMVOg
fAVCg in diagram IV represent these curves of marginal and 
average variable cost - including - tax when price has 
attained its final equilibrium level. The curves ^MVGg, 
fAVOg, are higher at all points over the range, ON, than 
the curves iMVCg and iAVOg respectively.
Thus the diagrams II and IV afford some conception of 
the dynamics of the shifting process of the tax that takes 
place. If we assume that the tax is imposed suddenly and 
unexpectedly, then at the initial moment in time after the 
imposition of the tax, the price level of the commodity will 
be expected to show no change over its previous level: 
diagram II will give a picture of the state of affairs at 
this initial moment and for such subsequent points in time 
as price is expected to remain unaltered. The condition 
of affairs finally ruling will be as shown in diagram IV.
If a time axis were to be drawn perpendicular to the 
paper say, diagram II would give a cross section of the 
resulting 3- dimensional figure at time zero; and at the 
other end of the axis, representing the equilibrium situa­
tion, would be diagram IV. The total rise in price is 
seen by a comparison of the two figures. The rise should' s
of course, be pictured as taking place gradually through 
time. In the same way the curves of variable cost - including 
- tax should be pictured as gradually moving up during the 
period of time occupied by the shifting process, from the 
positions j^MVCg and iAVC2, into the positions fMVOg and 
fAVCg respectively.
5. The diagrammatic treatment that we have given, forms, 
as it were, a skeleton of the theory; but the assumptions on
which this treatment proceeded were, some of them, fairly 
drasticj and may now he gradually relaxed so as to get a more 
realistic treatment of the case.
An assumption that we made was that the technical co­
efficients of production at each scale of output were the 
same after the tax as they had been before it. The effect 
of the tax, however, has been equivalent to increasing the 
cost of capital to this industry, while the prices of the 
other factors to it remain unchanged. In these circumstances 
substitution of land and labour for capital in this industry 
will to some extent take place. The greater the extent to 
which it is possible to carry this substitution, the smaller 
will be the resultant rise in the price of the commodity.
A limiting case will occur when the diagram of substitu­
tability between the taxed factor capital and the untaxed land 
and labour factors is infinitely great. In this case the 
final equilibrium price of the commodity will be the same as 
the initial price; meanwhile a radical change will have been 
introduced into the method of manufacture. Ah infinite 
degree of substitutability of land and labour for capital in 
this wise, would never exist in practice. Some amount of 
capital, of such a kind as to be subject to the tax, would, 
in fact, be needed in the manufacture of the commodity.
Some firms in the industry will be able to substitute 
the use of land and labour for capital more readily than 
others: they may enjoy, for example, advantages in the em­
ployment of labour which others do not have. As a result of 
the change in factorial prices such firms will come to occupy 
more important places in the structure of the industry than they 
had done before.*
* See the arithmetical example given by Ricardo, Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation, dormer's edition, pp. 188-
In the process of transition between the initial and 
final state of the industry pome firms due to luck or 
errors in .judgment will make fortuitous losses, others will 
make fortuitous gains. From this cause again, some firms 
will find themselves better placed in the final equilibrium 
than they had been to begin with.
If the tax is graduated upwards according to the size 
of the firm’s profits, the smaller firms in the industry 
receive a differential advantage in the new state of affairs 
as compared with larger firms. Small firms will tend to 
capture a bigger share in the total volume of the industry’s 
trade•
6. Initially and finally the industry that we are consid­
ering is supposed to be in a state of equilibrium, with un­
certainty existing in the industry during the intervening 
process of change. Vtfhen we take into account this uncertainty 
that is created by the tax there will be two trains of conse­
quences to consid’er. Consumers for their part will cut down 
their consumption of the commodity that had been affected 
by the tax: some will diminish their consumption abruptly,
others will only diminish it gradually. Most of them will, 
for a time, experiment with substitutes, until their con­
sumption settles, down again to a new optimum combination of 
commodities. Likewise producers of the commodity will be 
experimenting. They will be running their works at new 
levels of output: only gradually will they exploit all the
possibilities of substitution among factors of production 
in the new condition of affairs, and manage to arrive at a 
new optimum set of relationships with other businesses.
The demand curve for the commodity therefore, will not 
remain unaltered in position as we had assumed; during the 
period of transition from the initial to the final stafee, 
its position will be altering throughout time. When the
purchasers of the commodity discover or anticipate that its 
price is going to alter then they will form estimates of 
probable future movements in its price, and adjust their 
subsequent purchases of the commodity accordingly5 e.g., they 
will accelerate their demand for the commodity at any moment 
if they expect a rise in its price just after this. The less 
perishable is the commodity, that is the smaller the costs of 
transforming it through time, the more play will be given to 
such anticipatory buying by purchasers: and this will be a
force tending to even out fluctuations in price.
In the same way there will be a changing flux of pro­
ducers* expectations as to the price that the commodity will 
fetch at the date in the future when it reaches the market.
His expectation as to price is one of the determinants of the 
output of any producer, and. producers* expectations, along 
with the technological and economic nature of the plant in 
the industry, will play their part in determining the course 
of the price and production changes that the tax brings about. 
Over the longer period of time producers* expectations will be 
superseded in importance and determined in pattern by events 
and by objective factors such as the actual historical course 
of price. Only, in the earlier stages of the process, i.e., 
during the short period, they may expect an influence of 
great practical importance.
7 . When constructing his theory, Adam Smith made one ex­
ception to the doctrine that a partial income tax is shifted. 
The exceptional case is where the tax is levied on the pro­
fits **of stock employed in agriculture". Such a tax, Smith
* When both demand and supply are varying through time, the 
path traced out by the resultant price charge will depend 
on the velocity of the movement of the demand curve in
relation to that of the supply curve. See Fasiani, 
”Velocita nelle variazioni della demanda e dell* offerta 
e punti di equilibrio stabile e instabile,” Atti della R. 
Aocademia della Scienze di Torino, 1952.
considered, could cause no rise in the price of agricul­
tural commodities nor would it be borne by the farmer 
himself, who must have his due profit; it must therefore 
be borne by the landlord in the form of a diminution in 
rent.*
This case of Adam Smith*s corresponds to a case not en­
visaged in the preceding treatment - the case where the in-
that
dustry/has been taxed employs an appreciable proportion of 
the total supply of one factor of production. Should this be 
the case, then when a rise takes place in the price of the 
commodity being produced, less of the factor of production 
concerned will be required to place the smaller output on the 
market. A fall in the price of the factor will therefore take 
place. The fall will be greater, the greater the proportion 
of the factor employed by this industry and the smaller the 
substitutability between it and other factors in outside 
industry. In this case the industry partially avoids a rise 
in the price of the commodity by sharing part of the tax burden 
with another factor. The longer the period of time that 
elapses however, the greater will be the tendency for the 
factor concerned to move into other industries and for a 
rise in the price of the commodity to take place.
8. In the case of a tax graduated according to the earnings 
of a firm, (and as well where the tax is graduated according 
to a personal criterion), typical phenomena of tax-capitaliza- 
tion will be called into existence. The tax on each firm 
will be capitalized or amortized in the form of a fall in 
the price of the firm*s shares.
-L-ater in the book it will be seen that changes in capi­
tal-values are also brought about by a general income tax.
* V/ealth of Nations, Cannan*s edition, Vol. II.
p .340.
None the less, Einaudi suggests,w we should not refer to
changes in share values that take place when a general income 
a s,tax is imposed,tef being instances of tax capitalization: we
A
should refer to them less specifically, he says, as being 
"changes in capital values"• The grounds for distinction be­
tween the two cases are purely pragmatic. For the term "cap­
italization of a tax" to be appropriate, says Einaudi, the 
fall in capital values should be concentrated on one group of 
firms: the amount of money collected by the tax should not
be so great as to cause, when it is spent by the government, 
an alteration in margins throughout the whole of industry: 
and the rate of interest should be left unaltered by the tax.
This usage would reserve the term "capitalization" to 
cases where the phenomena are clear cut. To effects that are 
wider and less clearly articulated it would apply the less 
specific term Tchanges brought about in capital values1.
The suggested terminology does call to mind a useful dis­
tinction between the two kinds of phenomena and will be 
adopted by us.
9. We have already mentioned that a tax may be graduated 
in either of two main fashions. Graduation in the case that 
we have considered has been in accordance with an impersonal 
criterion, the size of the firm’s earnings. The criterion may, 
on the other hand, be a personal one, according to which the 
height of the tax is made to vary with the income and family 
circumstances of the recipient. In the case of both types of 
tax the phenomena of tax capitalization will come about.
If the tax on the industry concerned is graduated in a 
personal way and is progressive in amount, then it will fall 
more heavily on the richer shareholders in the industry con­
cerned. There will therefore be an immediate sale of shares
* L. Einaudi "Osservazioni critiche intorna alia teoria dellf 
amortamento dell* imposta", Nota presentata alia R.
Acad, dei Lincei, 1918-19, section XIV.
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by these richer shareholders to individuals in lower income 
strata. The sellers of shares will, in each transaction, 
receive an amount equal to the former value of the shares 
minus the capitalized value of the tax; not, however, of 
the tax capitalized at the rate payable by the richer 
shareholders,but at the rate payable by the marginal buyer 
or seller: that is, the richest person who is just induced
and no more, at the existing scale of taxation, to acquire 
or retain the shares. This rule will apply whatever pro­
portion of the whole block of shares the taxed shares should 
constitute•
Thus a tax of this kind may prove an excellent instru­
ment for a government to use which wishes to cause the 
transfer of the capital in certain industry to the owner­
ship of a less wealthy section of the population.
C H A P T E R  VII.
The Incidence of a Proportional Income Tax and of 
the Present Income Tax on South African Gold 
Mining.**
1. Some preliminary explanation of the situation of the 
gold mining industry of south Africa in the period after 
1932 seems essential to the following discussion.
Gold mining occupies a position of cardinal importance 
in the structure of the national economy of the Union of 
South Africa. Without this valuable resource the national 
income of the Union would be considerably lowwr than it is. 
iGold mines, however, are a wasting asset; and the rate at 
which this asset wastes is such that, given a continuance of 
the existing trends, it had been expected, before the era of 
monetary disturbance set in in 1931, that the gold yield of 
the country would reach the peak of its development in 1935, 
and thereafter would enter on a period of decline.--*1 This, 
from the point of view of the economic structure of the Union, 
looked to be a very serious matter indeed.
A vital element in the determination of the length of 
the economic life of the union’s gold fields was going to be 
the mining of marginal ore, i.e., ore whose gold content was 
relatively small, or else ore whose content was fairly high 
but which had high costs of working. There were wide areas 
of ore which were of a grade just a little too low to render
-* Subsequent investigations on the incidence of taxation 
on gold mining, must be indebted to Dr. W.J. Buss chau’s 
work, The Theory of Gold Supply (Oxford)fand to his two 
articles, "Gold Mining Taxation, a Method of Analysis", 
South African Journal of Economics, 1935; and "The Future 
of Uold Supply,j> The Incorporated Accountants’ Journal, 
July, 1936.
--*1 See "The Rand’s Vast Resources" by J.G. Lawn, in Gold, a 
reprint of the Special Number of The Times, Tuesday^
June 20, 1933, at p.104.
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a paying proposition. Means therefore were frequently
\
discussed of the most feasible method of rendering the low 
grade areas of the Union economically workable.
The suggestions put forward for assisting the Union’s 
gold industry and in particular for helping to raise the low 
grade section of the field above the margin of profitability 
need not be considered here. Chance, however, came to the 
assistance of the Union when Gt. Bmtain left the gold standard 
in September 1931, and other countries followed suit. South 
Africa then experienced a period of indecision as to monetary 
policy, during which the economic position of the gold industry 
gained no added advantage. Late in December 1932 South Africa 
took the step of devaluing her currency and pegging it to the 
£• The country’s gold industry received a tremendous fillip.
The reasons for this can be seen from the following 
arithmetical example.
Suppose that initially the value of the south African £ 
had been £ = #5;
and that it is devalued so that finally £ = #4,. the # 
being supposed to remain of constant value.
We suppose the internal price level for south Africa to 
remain constant.
Initially let one oz. of gold be worth £4 (=$20), and 
cost £3.10.0• to recover; the company’s profit from the re­
covery of one oz. of gold = £0.10. = #2,50.
After the £ has been devalued by 20% the costs of recovery 
of the gold (from PUT hypothesis of an unaltered price level), 
are the same as they haicfe been initially.
I.e., costs of recovery of one oz. of gold = £3.10.
But the value of an oz. of gold is still #20 = £§2. = £5
4at the new ratio of exchange.
The producer’s profit from the recovery of one oz. now = 
£1.10 in place of 10/- initially; or in terms of foreign cur­
rency is now #6 in place of #2,50 initially.
For reasons shown by this arithmetic, the gold industry 
of the country derived a great advantage from the devaluation 
of the S. African currency.
The two main economic results of devaluation for the gold 
industry were that already existing mines from a given quan­
tity of production earned profits on a much higher scale than 
hitherto; and that much ore that had formerly been below 
the margin of production now began to be exploited. New 
shafts were sunk to open up low grade mines; some mines that 
had formerly been closed do?/n were reopened: existing mines
extended their workings to ore of a lower grade; exploration 
and prospecting for new gold areas was quickly begun.
The Gold Producers’ committee of the Union had estimated 
in the pre-1931 situation that a 4/- fall in working costs per 
ton would double the amount of ore economically workable*
Later bir Kobert Kotze Calculated that if an average price 
of 106/- per fine oz. of gold could be maintained, this would 
be equivalent to a lowering of working costs by the 4/- per 
ton that we have mentioned, provided costs for labour and 
materials for the industry did not increase.1 indices for 
the price of labour and the price of stores to the industry 
are not available; but the index number of general wholesale 
prices in bouth Africa has moved only very slowly since 1932.^ 
rvt the same time the price of gold has now risen above 140/- 
per fine oz. These facts serve to give some idea both of the 
causes of the very marked prosperity that bouth Africa has 
enjoyed since 1932 and of the very considerable extension in
* Report of the Low Grade 0re Commission (1932) y 28, p.25.
1. Sir Robert Kotze, ’’The Gold Mining Position,” South 
African Journal of Economics, 1933.
2* u.F. Richards, ”Whence bouth Africa’s Present Prosperity?" 
South African journal of Economics, 1935; also De Kock, 
The Economic Development of South Africa#, p.95?
et seq.
life that has been given to her gold industry by the mone­
tary changes that have taken place.
The south African Government has also considerably bu3ne_ 
fited directly'"* as well as indirectly from the prosperity 
of this industry. The Government had for a considerable 
time before this levied a special tax of 15% on the profits 
of gold mining companies, raised in 1932 to 20%. This was a 
partial income t'ax. so great however was the prosperity of 
the industry and so rapidly did the situation develop that 
after 1932 the Government altered its tax legislation in the 
industry year by year and sometimes even during the course of 
the financial year, in order to better adjust it to the devel­
oping situation. The Government realised at the time —  for 
the complaints on the score were numerous —  that tax measures 
which fluctuated rapidly were in all likelihood doing harm 
to the industry. it appointed a Departmental uommittee 
of six persons to go into the question of taxation of the 
mining industry and make recommendations of a tax system fa?* 
gold mining for a-oyatogt which would be able to stand with­
out amendment for a long period. The Committee drew up a 
report and its recommendations were accepted by the Government.
The tax on gold-mining down till 1932 had been a pro­
portional income tax: that suggested by the Committee and
i h H 2>Ladopted by the GovernmentAwas an income tax graduated after 
a special fashion which we later go on to explain. There 
is doubt and controversy however as to whether a proportional 
tax would not be better than the present form. We will 
examine in the following paragraphs, the incidence of a pro­
portional tax and then of the present tax on the gold-mining 
industry in bouth Africa.
* "Besides receiving a large revenue from mines in the form 
of direct and indirect taxation the atate owns valuable mines 
and mining claims in the far East Hand, xhese properti
on rieaLhoidWba^iVentUr0“S-COmpani83 tD develoP and work, a sehold basis, receiving a share of the profits
absence of mblneS P ^ ^ l e r e t u r n s  with entireaosence of capital ris>a w m „p.272. , Dawson, bouth Africa,
2. For the purpose of analysing the effects of these 
taxes we are able to regard the gold mining industry of b.
Africa as being a competitive one. There are a fairly 
large number of companies in it: in 1931 over 30, and con­
siderably more now. All of the companies, with few excep­
tions, fall under the control of half a dozen large corporations 
But despite this the most important decisions relating to the 
affairs of each company appear to be taken by its own share­
holders, only a small degree of coercion being applied from 
above by the controlling corporstion.*
Moreover, in the case of a gold mine it is producing a 
commodity, the price of which in the short period is fixed 
irrespective of the output of the mine itself: the demand for
the commodity of each company (and of the industry as a whole^ 
is perfectly elastic, in the long period it is less accurate, 
but sufficiently accurate for our purpose, to regard the 
demand for gold produced in b. Africa as being perfectly 
elastic over the relevant range of production; i.e., over the 
range lying between the output of the industry when there is 
no tax and the output of the industry when the tax has been 
imposed.
What is the position relating to the supply of the factors 
of production to the gold-mining industry ?
funds supplied to the industry from home sources will 
probably be in less than perfectly elastic supply: because 
the industry forms an appreciable portion of the total of
S. African industry; and local patriotism, a believed super­
iority of local knowledge, as well as ignorance of the oppor­
tunities of the wider market, will render the supply curve 
of capital to the industry an upsloping one.
* J. Martin, "Group Administration in the Gold mining
Industry of the Witwatersrand", an address before the 
Economic Section of the British Association in 
Johannesburg, 1929.
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4On the other' hand investors abroad have so wide a 
market in which to invest their capital that only a small 
fraction of the supply of this money will be absorbed by 
South African mining. The supply of capital to gold- 
mining from foreign sources will therefore be perfectly 
elastic•
The larger part of the supply of capital has in the 
past, actually been provided from sources abroad. Thus the 
Low Grade Ore Commission state in their Report: ,!The Com­
mission is informed that about three quarters of the divi­
dends, say, £6,500,000 per annum, are paid to overseas 
shareholders
The supply of capital from one source (foreign), is 
perfectly elastic; the supply from the other source (home) 
leas than perfectly elastic: it follows that the supply
from both sources taken together will be perfectly elastic.
Labour to this industry, which forms so important a 
part of the economy of South Africa, will be, in the long 
period, in less than perfectly elastic supply. The short 
period supply of labour to the industry will be more rigid 
than the long period supply; and the shorter the period 
the more rigid will this supply be.
The stores that the industry uses may be in perfectly
elastic supply: at any rate we should expect the elasticity
1©m±of supply to be fairly great over t]xĝ  period of time.l In 
the short period the elasticity of supply of stores to the 
industry will be less than that of the long period supply.
Since these are ^he circumstances the technique of the 
previous chapter appears quite well adapted to dealing with
* Report (1932) p*22. Lehfeldt had thought that the propor­
tion in which capital was supplied to the industry from 
home sources was greater than this. ”It is stated on 
good authority that more than half of the dividends from 
gold mining now go to South Africans”: The National Re­
sources of South Africa, (1921) by R.A.Lihf eldt,p.l2.'
The estimate of the Low Grade Ore Commission however is 
presumably based on information from official sources.
”Th6 LaWS °f Returns Competitive Conditions”
— --------------- . 1926, pp .540-1.6.
the case. In three major respects, hoy/ever, the analysis 
of a partial income tax that we give in the preceding 
chapter, and the analysis that we give now of a tax on gold- 
mining, may diverge from the reality of conditions through 
over-simplification. First an assumption that we make is 
that the productive process in the industry is a continuous 
one: in gold-mining actually, the process is not continuous,
but gradually runs down for each mine as its ore becomes ex­
hausted. Secondly, we assume that both initially and 
finally no uncertainty exists in the industry, and that un­
certainty only exists during the intervening process of 
transition from the initial to the final state. In reality 
uncertainty plays an important part in gold-mining at all 
times. The theory that we give therefore, in each of these 
two respects will be an adequate picture of reality.
In the third place, the theory of the incidence of a 
partial income tax was developed in the preceding chapter 
on the assumption that the industry affected was small 
enough for the effect of the expenditure of the proceeds of 
the tax, in disturbing the general economic equilibrium, 
to be neglected. On the other hand the proceeds of the 
income tax imposed by the South African government on gold- 
mining, have for long constituted a considerable portion of 
the total revenues of the state. In discussing the incidence 
of this tax in the following paragraphs, we disregard the use 
made of its proceedsj by the government; we do so hnr r̂rrrj- €111 tt 
in order to avoid the difficulties that would be entailed in 
the more proper course of taking these tax proceeds into 
account. In this respect again, the procedure that we 
follow is only of qualified accuracy.
3. We discuss now the incidence of a proportional income 
tax on Bouth African gold-mining; and for the sake of 
definiteness we suppose that the tax is one of zo%.
In exact terms the question that we ask is this: If
7
there has previously been mo income tax on the South 
African gold-mining industry, and if, after the industry 
has attained a state of equilibrium, a partial income tax 
of 50/£ is imposed on it, what will be the economic effects 
produced (disregarding the effects prodic ed by alterations 
in the amount and structure of the government’s public ex­
penditure ) ?
The new capital entering the South African gold-mining 
industry after the tax has been imposed, must be able to 
obtain the normal rate of return, which is, let us say, a 
net 5%. New capital therefore, must be placed in lines of
sufficiently high productivity to yield a gross product of
/ n 50 x ^5( 1 •V* 100^ “ 6s$*
The volume of output over the long period therefore, 
will now be cut down as compared with what it would have 
been without the tax* The lands which are now worked will 
not be worked so intensively as they would have been had 
there been no tax. And some lands, in part^ low grade 
lands and in part high grade lands whose costs of working 
are also high? which, in the absence of the tax, would have 
been worked, will now not be worked at all.
Let us consider how the curves of cost and of revenue 
of a gold-mining company, are affected by the tax. Since 
the demand for gold is perfectly elastic, the horizontal, 
curve of marginal revenue to the firm, MR? will remain un» 
altered in height after the tax has been imposed. (See 
diagram I). The curve of marginal variable costs to the 
firm before the tax is iM̂ TÔ ? of average variable costs 
before the tax is j_AV0i* These variable costs include all 
costs entailed in the production of the commodity (among 
others the cost of land), with the exception only of the 
cost of fixed capital. The return to the fixed capital of 
the firm is 0 M, R ft; and since no uncertainty exists, 
this will represent the normal rate of interest on the
capital involved
When the tax is imposed, if we assume that technical
coefficients of production for the firm are the same at
each scale of production as before the tax, and that the
price .of each factor of production remains unaltered, then
the new curve of marginal variable costs after the tax, wil-L
lomerbe j_MVG2 as shown: because all of the firm's lower costs
of production have to be incurred, and as well, after the 
output 0 D has been passed, 50% of the return to the firm 
over and above its former variable costs, have to be handed 
over to the government in income tax.
In these circumstances, the return to the fixed factors 
of the firm will now, after the tax, be an amount BRI instead 
of GRI (= OM, RQ), as formerly. This, however will not give 
a possible state of long period equilibrium: the fixed
factors of the firm had initially been getting just a 
normal return: after the tax has been imposed, if the firm
is to continue in existence in the long period, the fixed 
factors again must get a return not less than normal. Prom 
which source therefore, can the tax payment to the government, 
G R B, be forthcoming ?
We have said that over the long period the supply of 
gold-bearing land to the industry, can be taken to be per­
fectly rigid. This land will in fact consist of a number 
of different classes of gold-bearing land; the supply of 
land in each of these classes is perfectly rigid. Labour 
to the industry will be in a supply that is less than per- 
factly elastic; and stores to the industry ina supply, that,
nearly
over the long period, is probably on ly perfectly elastic.
Let us suppose, for the moment, that labour and stores 
to the industry are both in perfectly elastic supply• This 
will enable us to make clearer, by assigning definite magni­
tudes to the other variables, the main effects that are 
produced by the tax over the long period.
The factors^ labour and stores, are, on this supposi­
tion, in perfectly elastic supply: their prices therefore,
will bear none of the burden of the tax. Again the price 
of the commodity produced by the industry cannot rise.
Hence, if the firm whose cost schedule is shown in Diagram I, 
is to continue in production into the long period after the 
tax has been imposed, the whole burden of the tax —  which on , 
these suppositions can be borne neither by capital, by 
labour, nor by stores —  must be thrown on to the factor 
gold-bearing land. For the firm whose cost position is 
represented in Diagram I, the rent it pays for its land 
must fall by the amount B G R. Only thus will the fixed 
factors employed by the firm be able to get their normal 
rate of return and only thus will the firm be enabled to 
continue production into the long period.
Consider how this affects land in the three possible 
modes of ownership: (a) Some companies own the land which they 
work; (b) some buy or lease land from other companies or 
individuals: and (c) some again buy or lease land to work
from the Government. (We consider here both distributional 
and production effects).
(a) Those companies which own the land which they mine, 
bear the burden of the tax in full. If the company whose cost 
schedule is shown in diagram I owns its own land then the rent 
of that land will, in the long period after the tax has been 
imposed, fall to the figure equal to the value that it would 
have had had there been no tax, minus an amount GRB supposing
that technical coefficients remain fixed). If the rent that 
it would have had, had there been no tax, were less than 
G R B, then the firm will not renew its plant as it wears 
out and will go out of production.
All those areas of marginal ore which the company itself 
owns, the working of which would yield between and 6j$ f 
would have been worked had there been no flat-rate tax; but 
on account of the tax it will now not pay to work them. Thus 
the production of the industry, or, to be exact, of both the 
low grade section of it and of that portion of the high grade 
section which is attended by high costs, will, as a result of 
the tax, go out of production. In this way the tax cuts down 
the activity of the industry.
0>) Since new capital that is invested in the industry 
must get its normal net return (5%), companies which buy new 
land to exploit will, once equilibrium has been re-established, 
offer a sum for such land, smaller to such an extent as still 
to allow them a net return on capital neither more nor less 
than normal. The tax, in this instance, is capitalised, 
and the whole burden borne by the landowner in the form of a 
fall in the price of the land which he owns. The tax in 
effect, for such lands as still change hands after it has 
been imposed, transfers a sum equal to the capitalized value 
of the tax from the landowner to the Government. The land­
owner would have received this money in a Jump sum for the 
sale of his land. The Government receives it instead of 
him,in the form of a series of taxes that the mining company 
pays to it over a number of years. The capitalized value of 
this series of taxes is equal to the sum of money which the 
landowner loses when he sells his land.
As in the previous case, under this head a number of 
low grade areas which would have come into operation had there 
been no Income Tax will not now come into operation at all.
All those lands which could have been bought for a small
price, (in fact a price amounting to less than 1- j o f  the 
profit obtained from their exploitation), would formerly 
have been worked and would have yielded the normal return of 
5% on the capital invested in them. But now, however low 
the price at which it would be possible to purchase these 
lands, it will not pay to work them. Under the head (b) 
therefore, production is again cut down.
(c) If the land is owned by the Government itself then 
the Government loses from the lands over which it holds mining 
rights, and which it still finds it possible to lease out for 
working, an amount of rental exactly equal to the sum which 
it gains from them by way of taxation, both being equal to 
area G R B. For such lands a transfer of money from one 
revenue heading in the budget, to another, is brought about; 
a book-keeping change this, that leaves total Government 
revenue unaffected.
But just as it will no longer pay mining companies to 
make an offer for certain of the low grade leases owned by 
private individuals^so it will no longer pay them to make an 
offer for the same class of leases which are in the ownership 
of the Government - viz; leases which afford a return of less 
than 6-jfS, but more than 5% on the capital used in their work­
ing. This class of areas owned by the Government, would have 
come into production had there been no tax, but now will not 
do so. Promthem the Government would have received a revenue 
from mining leases had there been no tax. Now it receives
by w«y pC (6AS€«nothing, -en their a-ooount, and nothing from tax revenue.*
* Since it is realised that an increase in taxation will have 
the effect of reducing the return from the enterprise the 
mines have in many cases made allowance for this in the 
terms they offered for leases from the Government. Many 
leases contain a clause to the effect that if there be an 
increase in taxation above the existing level the amount 
extra that the mines have to pay will be offset by a 
reduction of equal amount in their payment for the lease.
The.South African Mining gear Book. 1955-56. pp.15-19. 
Through clauses of this type in their leases in 1933 com­
panies got a reduction of £384,000 in their lease payments 
and in 1954 of £527,000. (Report of n 
.Committee on Hlnlng ^
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Under head (a) and under head (h) government revenue 
is increased by the tax: under head (c) it is diminished.
On balance, needless to say, government revenue is increased.
Under all of the heads (a), (b) and (c) the output of 
the gold-mining industry is reduced, through marginal lands 
being forced out of production by the tax. This is note­
worthy in view of the emphasis always placed by South Africans 
on the necessity for prolonging the life, and increasing the 
output of, the gold mining industry.
This shows how the most essential step in the process of 
movement towards long period equilibrium comes about. In the 
long period the firm must be earning the normal rate of in­
terest on its fixed capital. It is enabled to do so by the
curve of marginal cost - excluding - tax moving from the
—  pn
position iiiV01 into a new
(no diagram is drawn), which is lower at all points than 
iMVOq. The curve of marginal cost - including - tax to the 
firm will likewise, at the end of the long period move into 
a new position £MVQ2 lower at every output than jMVOg- 
Through this lowering of costs some firms - viz: those whose 
rent payments had initially been high enough to permit a fall 
of the requisite amount —  will be enabled to remain in pro­
duction into the long period. The firms whose rent payments 
had initially been less than this amount will go out of pro­
duction.
We have been assuming so far however, that technical co­
efficients of production for this firm of necessity remain 
fixed. This will not, in fact, be the case. When the 
price of capital has risen, the price of labour and of 
stores remaining the same, and the price of land has fallen, 
producers will substitute the use of the factors labour, 
stores and land for capital in some of its uses. On account 
of this alteration in technical co-efficients of production
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the cost curves to the firm will, over the long period, under 
go a further fall. ^
Another supposition that we have temporarily made, viz: 
that labour over the long period is in perfectly elastic 
supply to the industry, is too extreme: its elasticity of
supply over the long period, will be less than perfect. To 
the extent that it and the factor stores to the industry, are 
in less than perfectly elastic supply, these factors will 
share part of the burden of the tax with the factor gold- 
bearing land. let in the final equilibrium it will un­
doubtedly be on this factor gold-bearing land that the great 
part of the burden of the tax comes to be concentrated.
We may therefore summarize the effects that will be pro­
duced by a proportional income tax as follows:
Long Period Effects.
The greatest part of the burden of the tax will come to 
rest on the factor land which is in rigid supply to the in­
dustry. Marginal lands whose rents would have been too low 
to absorb the fall in them that would have been necessary* 
to render their working profitable, will not now come into 
production.
If the supply of labour to the industry is less than 
perfectly elastic, the wage rate of this factor will be lower
so also in the case of the factor stores to the industry 
But the supply of this factor is more likely to be perfectly 
elastic, than ig the supply of labour.
Short Period Effects.
The plant of the industry had been invested in it on the 
assumption that it would fetch the normal return of 5%, This 
plant has been laid down in the industry and much of it is 
difficult to disinvest or transform to other uses. Those 
parts of the gold-mining plant that will fetch a higher net
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return in other lines of production, taking costs of transfer 
into account, than they would do in gold-mining, will be trans­
ferred to these lines.
While in the short period the supply of gold-bearing 
land to the industry is perfectly rigid, the supply of labour 
and jxrrhrtrf’* of stores also, will be to some extent rigid.
Hence in the short period these factors, gold-bearing land, 
plant already in the industry, labour and stores, will share 
the burden of the tax among them. The more rigid the supply 
of any one of these factors to the industry and the shorter 
the period for which contracts have still to run when the 
tax is imposed, the greater will be the share of the burden 
that the factor bears. *
44 . Next let us consider the incidence of the present day 
tax on South African gold-mining companies.
The tax imposed on South African gold-mining companies 
at the present day (1936-7) is equal to (50% of the company’s 
profits - 5% of its working costs) with a minimum rate on 
profits of 15fo*
To recapitulate we wish to examine the economic effects 
that would be produc ed by the imposition of such a tax in 
an already existing system of economic equilibrium. And we —  
again for reasons of the difficulty attaching to the more 
proper course and without any justification in pure theory 
for doing so —  are going to neglect the effects produced by 
the government’s expenditure of the proceeds of the tax.
Following Dr. Busschau the effects of this can can be 
elucidated by means of mathematics as follows
* See Busschau, op. cit., p.123.
1 See Ibid., Chapter VI.
Let total cost of producing x units of output (gold) = C
M w receipts from tf 11 " 11 ” " = R
IThen average rate of tax = \ average rate of profit - —Q 
average rate of cost of production.
. •. Total amount of tax = -| (R - G ) - 0
d 1 dCMarginal rate of tax = |r dx (R - 0)
20
^ )—  20 dx
. Marginal cost of producing x units of output
52. +  i § R _ i  £2. _ i. ao
dx ^ dx 2 dx 30 dx
Production ceases where
Marginal revenue = marginal oost of production, i.e. where
dR = i dC _ i. dR 1 d£
dx 2 5x 3 dx r 20 dx
dR _ dC _ 1 dO
i.e., 3x 3x To dx .  ...... (1. )
We are regarding the firm as producing gold. The marginal 
revenue per unit for this is constant since the price of gold 
dees not vary with the output of the firm. The marginal re­
venue of the firm therefore can be shown, as a horizontal 
straight line. The cost of producing gold at the margin must 
be increasing.
dQ-i dOflkLet the curve ab (or  j- ) and cd (or — =— ) representSF" dx
two possible rates of increasing costs where 0^ (x) and (x) 
are different cost functions. For simplicity the curves are 
shown in the diagrams as straight lines. With no tax in 
existence the equilibrium output in each case would be Oe.
When the tax comes into existence the equilibrium output 
is given by equation (1.)
Diagram II.
dRDraw a straight line bd parallel to ~  and at a distancedx
g- P e above it, cutting ĵ£i. , £̂s. at b and d respectively.
Erect the perpendiculars bf, dg on to the x axis.
Then for a marginal cost curve of shape ab, Of is the& /
equilibrium output.
1 1£
Because bf = hf ■+• 9 hf = 9 h f
. • • hf = — bf = bf - bf* • m  10 10
and equation (1), is satisfied at the point b.
Thus for marginal costs increasing at the rate ab, there 
results an extension in production of ef as a result of the 
tax.
If the line of marginal costs be rising more slowly, as the 
line cd, then the extension in production brought about by the 
tax is greater, being eg in the diagram instead of ef.
This analysis bears a simple economic interpretation.
The greater be the amount of ore in the mine which on account 
both of its gold-content and its cost of working it almost 
pays to mine then the greater will be the extension in the 
output of the mine brought about by the tax. As a result of 
the tax each mine will, in the short period at any rate, extend 
its production beyond what it would have been had no tax 
been imposed. But the amount of increase in production will 
vary considerably from mine to mine.
5. Before commenting on Dy.Busschau*s method of analysis 
let us attempt an analysis of the case by means of diagrams.
We suppose as before, that technical coefficients of
f .
ft?-
production for the firm remain unchanged after the tax has 
been imposed.
The height of the curve of marginal revenue MR, to the 
firm, is unaltered after the tax has been imposed (See 
diagram III).
Before the tax is imposed let the curves of marginal and 
of average variable costs to the firm be ^MVC^ and iAVCi 
respectively; variable costs are here taken to include the 
cost incurred by the firm on account of the land and labour 
factors that it hires, but to exclude the cost of capital to 
the firm. Before the tax the return to the capital factors 
of the firm was equal to area I G R = OM, RQ in amount. The
gold output of the firm was 0 M units.
Adopting the same terminology as before lejf us denote 
the total of the variable costs incurred by the firm when 
its output is x units, by 0 (x), and its total revenue from 
this output of x units by R (x).
The total amount paid by the firm in taxation
= * (H - 0 ) - iQ 0
. *• the marginal rate of tax
_ CdR - dO) - 1 dG= i T x  50 ax
When the firm’s output is 0jD (diagram III), the firm
just covers its average variable costs of production and no 
more. Up to this output therefore, it gets no return on its 
capital and so pays no income tax. After the output 0 D has 
been reached the firm pays income tax on each increment of 
income that accrues to it over and above its variable costs.
On the Oh^11 increment of output for example, the firm is
getting a return to its fixed factors at the rate In and pays 
tax on such return at the rate ml, where
ml = h nl - — lh,2 20 ,
corresponding to the equation -
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Thus the curve of marginal variable costs to the firm im­
mediately after the tax has been imposed, has the shape
xMV02> shown in the diagram
v
Diagram III•
iMVOg will not intersect the curve of marginal revenue M R
in the same point R as does the curve iMVO^ —  the point
which corresponds to an output 0 M. Because when output is
0 M the curve -?MVCp will lie at a distance L R 11 below the 1 ^ 20
point R. iMVCg indeed, will not intersect the horizontal
curve of marginal revenue M R until an output 0 R, greater
than 0 M has been attained, such that in the diagram,
i t u = |0 t N
1 ,that is t u = (t u 4-u R)
and tu = u N
* This will be seen to be the same condition as that 
stated earlier of raising the curve of marginal 
revenue hfc in diagram II through l/9th of its own 
height, and finding the resultant point of inter­
section of the curve raised in this with ab or cd. 
Diagram III is, in fact, a fuller representation of 
Diagram II•
Diagram III shows that the firm in question will, 
immediately after the tax has "been imposed, produce on a 
greater scale than formerly, extending its production beyond 
its previous level by an amount M N. M N will be greater 
the more gentle the slope of the curve of marginal variable 
costs iMVO^ to the firm. The units of output between M and 
N are now produced because their production is now subsi­
dized out of government funds.
We can find out the point at which subsidization of out­
put by the government begins by finding the point after which 
marginal variable cost to the firm in the new circumstances 
falls below the former cost of production of these units to 
the firm.
Marginal variable cost of the xth unit after the tax = 
former marginal variable cost plus marginal rate of tax,
_ do +  i i“ dx dx) 20 dx
This becomes equal to marginal cost of production ex­
cluding tax, at the point at which
dO = dC 4- 4- (dR - dO) - 1 dG
3x 3x (3x cE) &  a?
i dC = 10 dR = dR - 1 dRi.e. at whi ch —  —  —— —  — —
dx 11 dx dx 11 dx
Through the point w on the y-axis at a height Ow = 10H O P
draw the horizontal straight line ws to intersect j_MVCi in 
the point s, corresponding to an output Ov. Until the output 
Ov is reached the curve iMV02 lies above iMVO^j after the 
output Ov, iMVOg lies below ^MVO^s. Hence units of output 
lying between v and N, when ON is the new output of the firm, 
are subsidized out of government revenue; and their cost 
of production to the firm is less than the cost of the land 
and the labour employed in producing them.
The total amount of subsidy paid to the firm —  or
perhaps since no money actually changes hands it would be 
plainer to say "permitted" to it by the government —  is 
equal to area Rsu.
The total net payment of tax by the firm to the govern­
ment is equal to (area B G s - area R g u )
The total net return to the fixed capital of the firm now, 
after the tax has been imposed, will be equal to area I B s u. 
This is less than the previous return and less than the return 
to these factors that had been expected, by the amount (area 
B G s - area R s u ) .  The price of gold is fixed: the
prices of labour and stores to the industry will bear some 
part of the burden of the tax. But it will be on the factors 
land and capital already invested in the industry that the 
burden of the tax will mainly fall. The extent to which in 
the case of each gold mine, the loss is borne by the owners 
of the gold-bearing land and the extent to which it is borne 
by the owners of the fixed capital, will depend in the short 
period - if the land and the capital are in separate owner­
ship —  on the outcome of the bargaining between the two groups
of individuals concermed. Hence the outcome is fixed to
within a certain range but is not completely determinate.*
In the cases of many companies land and capital will be 
in the same hands. Then the total loss borne by. the owners 
of the factors will be determinate and no need will arise to 
apportion the loss as between the two factors.
These pieces of capital, that, taking into account the 
costs of their transfer, have a higher productivity in other 
lines of production, will be transferred to such lines.
In the short period immediately following on the imposition 
of the tax, the effect on the industry will be to extend its
* See A.L. Bowley, Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, 
p.l
output as typified "by the extension M N in the production 
of the firm in diagram III. But as plant is transferred 
to other lines of production and, more important, as 
capital in the industry which no longer fetches a normal 
return in it, is not renewed, and as capital that in the
Vt© l©n««rabsence of the tax would have been laid down is not in' fact 
laid dovm, then the output of the industry, instead of being 
extended by the tax, will, in fact, be contracted.
If the firm whose cost situation is represented in 
diagram III is going to continue production into the long 
period, it will have to find some means of lowering the 
positions of its curves of costs ^MVC^ and -jMVOg, into 
‘g t̂ac new positions not shown in the diagram. If it is 
unable to do this it will go out of production. How can 
this lowering of costs on the part of the firm come about ?
To see more clearly how this fall in the costs of the 
firm can come about, let us temporarily assume that all of 
the factors except gold-bearing land are in perfectly 
elastic supply to the industry over the long period.
Since in the circumstances that we now hy^thesize 
the price of the commodity that the industry produces cannot 
alter, nor the prices of the factors other than land, there­
fore the total burden occasioned by the tax, will, in the 
long period, come to be concentrated entirely on the shoulders 
of the owners of the gold-bearing land. For the firm whose 
revenue and cost conditions are depicted in the diagram, if 
the rent payment that it made initially had been X say, then 
finally the rent payment that it makes will be X - (area BGs 
- area Rsu). Through this the firm will be able to bring 
about the fall in its costs of production necessary for it 
to remain in the industry over the long period —  provided 
that the rent the firm had originally been paying for the 
factor gold-bearing land had originally been great enough 
for a fall of this amount to take place in it. The rents
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of some lands would not, in the first instance, have amount­
ed to as much as the fall in them that we name. The mines 
that would have worked these lands will now, after the tax 
has been imposed, be unable to get a sufficiently large 
reduction in their rent payments to enable them to get the 
normal rate of return on the capital involved. They will 
therefore not work the lands. In this way the output of 
the gold-mining industry will be reduced.
As regards the long period effects on output and as 
regards the rents of land, let us, as before, distinguish 
land in the three possible ownerships: (a) land owned by
the gold-mining companies themselves; (b) land owned by 
individuals outside the gold-mining companies; and (c) 
land owned by the government.
(a) If the land is owned by the gold-mining company it­
self, the whole loss of the amount stated falls on the 
company. If the value of the gold-bearing land in the 
ownership of the firm would not in total have amounted to 
a value as great as this loss, then the rent of the gold- 
bearing land will not be able to absorb the whole loss: 
the firm will not renew its plant as it wears out and in 
time will pass out of production.
On this account therefore there will in the long period 
be a diminution in the total output of the industry, a 
portion of the marginal land in the industry going out of 
production, which, but for the taxfwould have continued to 
be worked. The entire loss in this first instance (a) is 
borne by the firms already in the industry.
(b) Land sold in the market to gold-mining companies and 
corresponding to the output 0 N in diagram III, will fetch 
a price smaller by the capitalized value of an income equal 
to(area B G s - area R su), than land corresponding to the 
smaller output 0 M would have done in the absence of the 
tax. If the price of the larger area of land corresponding
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to the output 0 N would originally have had a rent greater 
than the capitalized value of an income equal to (area B G s 
- area R s u ) ,  then the land will still change hands and will 
eventually come into production. If however, the price of 
this land would originally have been less than the amount 
named, then the land factor will be unable to absorb the 
whole loss occasioned by the tax and the land will not now 
come into production.
Again under heading (b) there will be a certain amount 
of marginal land which is forced out of production or else 
never comes into production at all. The entire loss under 
this heading (b) is placed on the shoulders of those firms 
outside the gold-mining industry who own the gold-bearing 
land.
(c) Prom lands owned by the Government and which it still 
finds it possible to lease out after the tax, it will gain 
an increased yield of taxation: but from the land that it
leases out in this way the Government will lose an exactly 
equivalent amount in mining leases.
All those lands employed in the production of 0 N units 
of gold, which the Government would have leased out for a 
rent less than (area B G s - area. R s u), it will now be un­
able to find people willing to hire. Government revenue 
frogi this class of leases will drop to zero. Again, and for 
thiSjthe third time, there will be a corresponding falling 
off in the output of the gold mining industry.
It follows from wha,t we have said that diagram III does 
not represent a position of long period equilibrium for the 
firm concerned. In fact it represents nothing in regard to 
the incidence of the tax except the conditions that hold 
good in a period of time following the imposition of the tax 
short enough for all factorial prices to have remained com­
pletely unchanged in it, E.g., the curves jMVOi and iMVCg
were drawn on the supposition that the cost of land to the 
firm had remained unchanged after the tax was imposed. Such 
we have seen, could not be the case^ for any length of time. 
Had it been the case that the price of land to the industry 
like the prices of the other factors of production, labour 
and stores, had been perfectly rigid, then all the firms in 
the industry would, in the long period have gone out of 
production: because the fixed capital of these firms would
no longer be able to obtain the normal rate of return.
When the price of land alters, however, the shape of 
both the curves of cost - excluding - tax to the industry, 
and the curves of cost - including - tax to the industry 
alter and assume different shapes from what they had had 
in diagram III. It was for this reason that we used the 
suffix i in naming the curves jMVG-L and iMVOg respectively. 
There will in the final position of equilibrium be a differ­
ent marginal curve of cost - excluding - tax to the firm of 
a shape that we may denote, let us say, by ^MVGi; and a 
corresponding curve of marginal cost - including - tax that 
may be denoted by ^MVCg.CHo diagram is drawn).
The preceeding treatment, although it has been arrived 
at on the basis of several far-reaching assumptions, repre­
sents the essential features of the long period effects of 
the tax - viz: a fall in the rental values and prices of 
gold-bearing lands, and a falling off in the output of the 
gold-mining industry. Let us now remove some of the assump­
tions that we temporarily made in the discussion.
Technical coefficients will not remain fixed. Capital 
as a result of the tax has risen in price: land has fallen in 
price. Land, labour and stores therefore will be substituted 
for capital in some of its uses.
Labour will not, in fact, over the long period, be in
perfectly elastic supply to the industry: its supply will
be less than perfectly elastic. Over the long period the 
output of the industry will be less and a result of the tax 
the quantity of labour less, and the wage rate lower. Further 
substitution of labour for capital will take place on this 
account*
The price of stores, if their supply is less than per­
fectly elastic, will also fall; though the fall, at most, 
will be of small amount•
6* If the above analysis be correct then it develops a 
criticism of the analysis given by Dr* Busschau, both in 
regard to a proportional income tax and with regard to the 
present form of income tax on gold-mining. Dr. Busschaufs 
analysis appears to be an analysis of the short period and 
not of the long period.-*
7 . We explained in the initial section what roughly, the 
position of the gold-mining industry was in South Africa 
to-day. In the following portions of this chapter we have 
shown what both the long period and the short period effects 
of a tax on the income of that industry would be* From the 
point of view of choice of tax policy for South Africa, what 
matters is the set of effects produced in the long period: 
because we know the present position of the industry: if
we know the final position of equilibrium then we know the 
• path of development that the industry will follow: it will
be the path connecting the initial with the final position.
Let us suppose that the choice of tax has been narrowed
* At one or two places Dr. Busschau partially corrects 
the short period nature of his analysis and takes 
into account the effects of the longer period. See 
for example the passages "Obviously . . • exploitation", 
op. cit., p* 145; and Taxation will . . . gold mining", 
art. ciF., Incorporated Accountants* Journal, p*fl72.
down to one between a flat rate income tax on the industry 
and an income tax graduated in the fashion of the present tax* 
Then in order to obtain a portion of the knowledge on the 
matter that is most essential to the making of a rational 
decision, the long period analysis of the taxes that we have 
given above would require to be employed: and it would be
necessary to develop this analysis statistically in conjunc­
tion with geographical and technical information, in such a 
way as to determine quantitatively which areas would be 
worked under the one, and which under the other.of the two
7 7
taxes. Such information it is suggested, might be prepared 
by the Government Department of Mining Engineering.
The fact that our analysis given above had fcsgn taken 
no account of the expenditure of the proceeds would be no 
disadvantage from the point of view of trying to arrive at 
a decision as to which of the two taxes is the better. The 
heights of the two taxes would have to be adjusted in such a 
way that their yieldswere the same: and the distribution
of the proceeds would be the same in each case, giving iden­
tical economic effects.
Prima facie and in the absence of the information that 
we mention, economists must, I think, feel a prejudice against 
the present form of taxation. In it firms are subsidized 
to produce portions of output that, had there been no tax at 
all, would have been sub-marginal output and not worth pro­
ducing. To subsidize some portions of output in this way 
by the tax, represents a transfer of resources from occupa­
tions in which they could get the normal rate of return, to 
others in which their yield is sub-normal. Most economists 
will look on such a proceeding with some abhorrence.
8. Perhaps neither of the two forms of taxation that we 
have discussed will be the best that it is open to the
COUh truQOfflTrm,nifty to achieve. Certainly in the simplified condition
of affairs in which no uncertainty exists, forms of taxation 
can be devized which, while collecting the same amount of 
revenue as either of the two preceeding forms, will still 
do nothing to cut down the output of the industry as each 
of these two taxes does. We can see how such forms of taxa­
tion can be devized in the following way. Let
L = the rent of any area of gold-bearing land 
worked by a company,
R = the gross revenue of the company,
A = its total costs for labour and stores in earn­
ing this gross revenue,
n = the norma}, rate of interest,
K = the amount of capital employed by the firm, 
and T = the tax paid by the firm.
Then L; R - A - n K - T
If we desire to secure maximum production in the industry 
then we will wish to adjust the height of the tax so as to 
secure that any piece of land that would have been worth 
developing before the tax was imposed will still be worth 
developing after it has been imposed. That is, we require 
that when
L is just equal to R - A - n k,
T will be zero.
This condition is satisfied for example if 
T = R - A - n . K .  In this case the whole of the 
rent of the gold-bearing land will be absorbed by the taxa­
tion and (theoretically), production will not be curtailed 
at all.
If T were equal to say, ?. j R - A - n.Kj, then owners
of gold-bearing land would still be left with 1/3 of the
rent that the land would have borne if no tax had been im­
posed, and the production of gold would not be at all 
diminished below its level in the no—tax regime.
The tax on the rent-element that we describe, might be 
"assessed" either on the profits of the gold-mining company 
concerned or else on the rent payment that had been made by 
this company to the owners of the land.
The size of the fraction in the tax formula (2/3rds in 
the above case), could be adjusted according to the govern­
ment’s need for revenue and such other criteria as it was 
desired to take into account. Or a more elaborate tax 
formula migjht be used.
'i. Ur; ,r; i
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The Incidence of* a General Income 
Tax.
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The Conditions Assumed and the Method to he followed.
1. What do^£ the terms "incidence of taxation", and 
"effects of taxation" signify in economic discussion ? 
Difficulty over the meaning of these terms has caused a 
great deal of confusion in some of the more recent discus­
sions, so that we will discuss the matter at some length.
Seligman expladns his use of the terms thus: "First a
tax may be imposed on some person; secondly, it may be 
transferred by him to a second person; thirdly, it may be 
ultimately borne by this second person or transferred to 
others by whom it is finally assumed. Thus the person who 
originally pays the tax may not be the one who bears its 
burden in last instance. The process of the transfer of the 
tax is known as the shifting of the tax, while the settlement
9of the burden on the ultimate taxpayer is called the incidence 
of the tax . . Incidence conveys to the mind the notion of the 
ultimate result of the sifting."* "Incidence . . emerges 
only when the tax finally settles, or comes to rest, on the 
person who bears it."
Again, Seligman says, "By effects of taxation we may 
mean two things. In the narrower sense, it denotes the imme­
diate consequence of each of the above-mentioned steps £of 
shifting and incidence, that isj. Thus shifting is an effect 
of impact, incidence is an effect of shifting, and the 
pressure of the tax is an effect, in turn, of the impact and 
of the shifting as well as of the incidence. In the wider 
sense, effect denotes any of the subsequent results of




taxation. A tax may have a great many effects. It May 
diminish industry and impoverish individuals; it may 
stimulate production and enrich individuals; it may be an unm 
mitigated curse to society; it may be a necessary evil, it 
may be an unqualified boon to the community regarded as a whole 
When defining 1 effects”, to speak of the term being used 
in a narrower and in a broader sense, as in the above passage, 
certainly seems to be very confusing. No exact distinction is 
drawn between the two. Again it appears to be impossible on 
Seligman1s definition, to draw any definite line between 
the incidence of a tax and an effect of the tax. None the 
less he wishes the two, incidence and effect*, to be kept 
separate.
2. The definitions of incidence and effects given by the 
Golwyn Committee are somewhat similar to those of Seligman.
For convenience we repeat the passage in full:
" We may explain the meaning we think it convenient to 
attach to the term "incidence of taxation". In general usage 
the term covers not only the initial burden of a tax, but also 
the whole range of consequential effects. Economists, however, 
have given it a narrower meaning. For them "incidence is 
only concerned with the .question on whom the more immediate 
burden of the tax as a tax rests. This is the first thing to 
be decided about any tax. It is to be distinguished from 
the Question of further efxecty^ which may be exceedingly im­
portant. For instance the burden of a tax may rest upon an 
employer and in consequence he may cut down his staff; in 
such a case the effects of the tax may be more serious to the 
employees than to anyone else, but the incidence 01 the tax
Ibid., pp.15-14. Gelgiman explains his meaning in the 
same sense in his article "The Effects of Taxation," 
Political Science Quarterly, 1923, p.l.
2.
is not said to be upon them.,,'“*
Similar again, is the definition of incidence and effects
given by Silverman:
ft Under the head of incidence we ask, Who actually bears 
the money burden of a tax ? Under the head of effects we 
ask, What are the ultimate economic conditions to which a 
tax gives rise ? In studying the practical problems of 
particular taxes it is sometimes very difficult to separate 
the two questions, especially as the nature of the incidence 
nay have a considerable bearing on the determination of the 
ultimate effects. But the distinction has to be made if one 
wishes to obtain a clear view of the money burden of taxation.nl 
As a result of the distinction that he draws between 
the incidence and the effects of a tax, Silverman is led to 
devote separate chapters of his book to a discussion of the 
incidence of the income tax and the effects of the income 
tax respectively. If, however, as we suggest is the case 
in Silverman’s definition above, the distinction between 
incidence and effects is vaguely drawn, this diminishes the 
clarity and the value of such a discussion.
3. On the other hand Gannan had suggested that the term 
incidence of taxation should be cast overboard altogether 
and only the effects of taxation spoken about in the theory 
of Public Finance.2
In the discussion that follows, while we retain both 
terms, incidence and effects, our usage of them will almost
# Report of the (Gffilwyn) Committee on National Debt and 
Taxation, p.106. i?or a criticism of this definition 
see Ohapter 3, supra.
*
1. H.A. Silverman, Taxation, its Incidence and Effects, 
p . 89 •
2- Edwin Canncjn, in Memoranda relating chiefly to the
m  ̂ ■■■!. ^ Hi ill "«.i I' I I I _ i i. m  i i ■■ .i —i i ■ ii i i -im  1 'Classification ana Incidence oi Imperial and Local 




amount in practice to the adoption of Canmn's proposal: 
because we will use the term incidence to refer simply to 
the group or genus of effects of taxation. Effect is the 
particular term: incidence is the general term.
The incidence of a tax is the group of economic effects
that it brings into existence. These economic effects will 
mainly consist of alterations in commodity prices and in the 
flows of commodities per unit of time; in alterations in 
factorial prices and in the flows of the factors of production 
into the production processs the economic effects, (and 
therefore also the incidence) will consist also of changes in 
revenue and cost schedules of firms, and in changes in the 
distribution of wealth brought about by the tax. The theory
of incidence is concerned with all of these topics.#
4* It may have been gathered from the previous chapters 
that the element of time is going to play an important part 
in the discussion. In their theorizing on the topic of in­
cidence the Classical School of economists in England concerned 
themselves only with the long period of time. It was for the 
most part, indeed, with the long period of time that they were 
concerned in their other branches of theorizing as well. 
Following the same tradition^Bastable says^ orthodox
theory of incidence professes to explain what will happen 
in the long run." He continues, "*But taxes1, as ^eslie 
well remarks, are paid immediately under the real conditions. 
of life and out of the actual wages and profits or other 
funds, of individuals, not out of hypotheses or abstractions 
in the minds of economists .,fl
* This view of the meaning of incidence agrees with the 
usage of Marshall and Edgeworth. Edgeworth says at 
the beginning of his paper on Urban Rates, "Incidence 
here denotes all those effects of taxation with which 
the economist is concerned." Papers Relating to 
political Economy, Vol. n . p.lgf. l fSl
.jicksell^ also ha,d pointed out tha,t the meaning of the 
worn incidencef, is wider than that of ’shifting. 
Finanztheoreti s che Untersuchungen, p .5• °
s t a b l e ,  Publi^inance, 3rd. edition, p.367.
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The usage of Marshall and Edgeworth however, was more 
general than that of the Classical School. They use the 
words "incidence", "burden" and "weight" of a tax, to refer 
to the effects produced by the tax after the lapse of periods 
of time of' different lengths; the incidence of a tax will 
of course, in this case vary according to the length of time 
allowed to elapse after it has been imposed. These authors 
sometimes discuss the incidence of a tax in the long period 
of time, and in other places they discuss its incidence after 
the lapse of a short period of given length.* It is this 
usage that we will endeavour to follow in this book.
5. The problem the theory of incidence to which we will 
address ourselves, is one in which there are a large number 
of economic variables; and the method par excellence for the 
solution of such problems, is general equilibrium analysis of 
the type of the School of Lausanne. In this type of analysis 
the related movements in all of the variables dealt with are 
shewn; and full account is taken of the effect that each 
variable exttfts on the others during the process of change. 
The partial equilibrium method of Marshall,on the other hand, 
proceeds on the assumption that only one variable alters 
at a time, while the others are supposed to remain constant, 
being impounded in "Ceteris paribus". When a number of 
variables of the same order of importance are in question, 
the Marshallian method is, by comparison, very inferior.
See Marshall, Principles, pp. 414—5 and Appendix G.
See also his wMemorandum on the Classification and 
Incidence of Imperial and Local Taxes" (1897) in 
Official Papers of Alfred liar shall, p . 327 .
Edgeworth’s treatment of the time element is more 
explicitly rigorous than that of Marshall. The reader 
who will mark es,ch reference to the period of time, 
given by Edgewohth in the first 25 pages of his 
"The Pure Theory of Taxation", Papers, Vol.II, will, I 
think, find the number very striking.
Yet in the present instance we are, out of limitations 
of intellect, driven back from application of general 
equilibrium methods. An attempt to use these methods in the 
case of this problem, it is true, was made by Sensini, who 
applied mathematical methods to trace the effects of a general 
income tax.* Despite the care and brilliance with which he 
applied the tachnique, the outcome of the investigation was, 
even in the author’s own estimation, of little positive value< 
In the first instance the simplifying assumptions underlying 
his treatment were altogether too drastic: the firms were
assumed to have no overhead expenses and to have fixed co­
efficients of production: it was assumed that no use was
made of the proceeds collected by the tax. Then there wa,s 
the further difficulty, as he pointed out, that the solution 
of the large number of simultaneous equations that the 
Lausanne method yields, is not as a rule possible.
In these circumstances, for a solution of the problem 
of- the incidence of the income tax, we are impelled to the use 
of the methods of partial equilibrium analysis, in which we 
suppose things to vary one at a time. However defective the 
logic of the method as compared with that of Lausanne, ex­
perience of it has shown it to be often the more suitable 
method for obtaining information about the real world. At 
the same time the realization of the interdependence of 
variables that the Lausanne method gives, assists the mind 
in an indirect way to the solution of the problem, even when 
application is being made of the methods of partial equili­
brium •
* Sensini, "Le equazioni dell’ equilibrio nell* ipotesi di 
sottrazione di richezza operate dal governo su 
determinati individui della collettivita”, Giornale 
degli Eoonomisti, 1930.
1. See Ricci’s discussion in "Pareto and Pure Economics", 
Review of Economic Studies, Oct., 1933.
6. In the following pages we are going to consider only 
the very simplest type of economic community* It will be 
a closed community carrying out no transactions with commu­
nities outside itself: there is no international trade.
We picture our community as being, to begin with, in a 
condition of complete,stationary equilibrium. All tendencies 
to change have worked themselves out: there are, year in, 
year out, the same flows of goods from the productive processes 
at the same prices.
In this stationary community we suppose that there already
exists a tax system which includes a general income tax —  gener
3,1 in so far as it affects income drawn from all of the in­
dustries and professions in the community. This income tax
may be either proportional or else graduated in height. And 
we suppose that a very small increase takes place in the rate 
of this income tax* The rise in the rate of Tax need not be 
uniform as between all sizes of income. The rise in rate for 
an income of £1,000 a year may be by the rise in rate
for an income of £10,000 a year may be by -Jfb: also some
sizes of income may be unaffected by the tax.
From this small change in the height of the income tax 
a series of economic effects will follow. We are going to 
suppose that the change that is brought about in each variable, 
gradually works itself ou:t to a state of equilibrium: so
that eventually, on this supposition,the community will again 
attain a condition of stationariness similar to that from 
which it started out. We will enquire What is the size of 
population ? What is the level of real wages ? What is the 
volume of capital ? and What the exchange ratios between 
different goods ? in the new situation as compared with the
* The importance of assuming a small or infinitesimal 
change in the height of the tax is well argued by 
Einaudi, in "Osservazione critiche . . " cit.
old* When we have shewn what the level of each of these
things is in the new state of affairs as compared with what 
it had been in the old„we will have shown the economic effects 
of the rise in the income tax. The method employed, that is, 
is to be that of Comparative gtatics.
The method that we follow we may describe in general 
terms, as we have said, as the method of Marshall and of the 
English Classical economists. The main assumptions will be 
that there are no wasting natural resources in the community$ 
that population gradually works itself out to a stable level 
as the state of stationary equilibrium is appro ached ; that 
the system of wants, or scale of preferences of each individ­
ual, gradually works itself out to a stable configuration as 
the stationary state is approached; while knowledge or 
technique remains unaltered once the stationary condition of 
things has been attained.
The breadth, as well as the narrowness of the method^, 
deserves comments because although once the state of stat­
ionary equilibrium has been attained each personas scale of 
preferences remains unaltered, yet in moving from one state 
of equilibrium to another this scale of preferences may 
fluctuate. When the initial spell of stationariness for 
examplei,. is broken, a person may for the first time consume 
new commodities which in the old conditions he had never 
tasted; and on finding the actual utility of these goods 
either greater or less than he had anticipated he may consume 
either greater or smaller quantities of them.
The foregoing is an instance of a change in the indi­
vidual s scale 01 preferences as between one stationary state 
and another. It also furnishes an example of a case in which 
it would be true to say that knowledge has altered as between 
the two sets of circumstances: the individual’s knowledge of
consumption, goods was altering in the process pointed out.
When we open the door to the possibility of such changes taking
place from the side of consumption we see the possibility 
of invention and technological change to come in also.
Because if we grant that the individual may re-arrange his 
consumption in experimental ways,it will presumably likewise 
be open to a manufacturer to rearrange his production methods. 
After a period of transition from one stationary state to 
another a manufacturer through the experimentation that hacf 
been forced upon him by the changing industrial structure, 
might choose to employ in the second condition of affairs, 
even though factorial and commodity prices were the same as 
before, a different arrangement of productive resources 
from what he would have done in the first instance. Thus 
a theory of Comparative Statics worked along the Marshallian 
pattern, appears to include the possibility of technological 
change, another name for which is invention or development 
in the state of the arts. The change in knowledge and 
technology, however, that takes place during this process 
of transition, need not be a positive one and in the direction 
of progress. The change may also take the form of a for­
getting, pf processes, for example, and be in the direction 
reg r-eSSion.of technical rcS sedation* Change of knowledge in either 
direction therefore, is possible between one state of. 
stationary equilibrium and another5 though none is possible 
once a condition of stationary equilibrium has been attained.
The method we follow indeed, will be in some ways (vizf^ 
with regard to uncertainty and changing wealth structure), 
more general than would be the method of Lausanne. The 
method of Lausanne would envisage, when a tax was imposed,
beiwo.a jumpAmade instantaneously from the initial point of 
equilibrium to the final position; or at least the process 
of transition from the initial to the final stage would be 
disregarded. No cognizance would be taken by it of the 
changing wealth or changing tastes of the members of the
communityJ nor regard paid to the chance losses chance 
gains that would inevitably arise during any such process
of transition.
The method that we follow however, does trace price 
changes throughout time: it is an economics of the transi­
tion process as well as of the initial and final stages of
equilibrium: and it does take into account uhe uncertainty
Jurinn -fA-e. _ t rans i t ion  recess.
that would be expected to arise sraoh time's-.
7 . The industries in the community that we envisage are 
taken to be working under conditions of perfect competition.':*'
By this we mean that
(a) the demand for the commodity supplied by each firm 
is infinitely elastic, and
(b) each firm places only a negligibly small portion 
of the total production of the commodity on the market.
Knowledge of prices in the market whether of buyers or 
of sellers is not assumed to be perfect. When stationary 
conditions have emerged —  i.e. both initially and finally 
in -the analysis that we make —  the knowledge of each individual 
relating to prices is also taken to be stationary, though not 
necessarily, even then, perfect.
• The industries in the community are supposed to be suf­
ficiently large for some of them to employ appreciable fractions 
of the total supply of certain of the factors of production.
An expansion or contraction of such industries therefore in­
fluences the prices of these factors.
Chi k<y to the selutl<nt ef the ftroblem $̂  t h e  incidence
Once these conditions have been hypothesized^the incomeA ""
x would appear to lie in an analysis of the supplies of the- 
ouppilloe of the factors of production, when this analysis is 
taken in conjunction with the theorem which vre have already 
established on pages U -ts supra.
Joan Robinson, in the article "What is Perfect Competition^" 
Quarter!y Journal of Economics, Nov. 1934, discusses some 
of the meanings that may be given to the term.
CHAPTER IX.
How Expenditure of the Tax Proceeds came to he 
Disregarded in the Theory of Incidence.
1. If ten million pounds, say, be collected by a 
government in taxation, this sum is not only collected but 
is disbursed in the expenditure that the State, makes on 
social services, payment of interest on the national debt 
and in other ways. There is therefore a double aspect of 
every tax, collection of the tax on one hand, which inflicts 
a burden on the taxpayers, and disbursement of the proceeds 
on the other. Prima facie there is no reason to expect
|»r*that one of these aspects, in the economic effects it feaduces, 
will be more important than the other. Yet, by a certain one 
sidedness of economic reasoning in discussions of the subject, 
only one of these aspects, that connected with collection of 
the tax proceeds, has received consideration in the theory of 
incidence. For example Marshall or Edgeworth in considering 
the incidence of a tax on a commodity, say, would suppose the 
demand schedule for the commodity to remain unchanged and the 
supply schedule to be raised throughout its length, through 
a vertical distance equal to the height of the tax. Cost of 
manuf act lire had been increased by a specific amount, but al­
terations in demand schedules were taken to be negligible.
It is interesting from the point of view of the general 
theme of this book, to trace the various forces and causes 
that gave rise to this type of treatment of incidence which 
took no account of the economic effects induced by expenditure 
of the tax proceeds. Of these causes the main were perhaps 
historical in their nature. The theory of Marshall and 
Edgeworth was the direct descendant of the theory of the 
Classical School. This school of writers approached the 
subject of taxation from, the point of view of costs: much
of iihare work was of an exact nature and such that it couldA
he taken over and developed by subsequent writers* On the 
topic of public expenditure however, the work of the Classical 
economists was less satisfactory. Let us consider the
reasons for this.A<lam Smft h f.[
'&L. Adam Smith, the great founder of the school, treats the 
subject of public expenditure at some length* But his treat­
ment of it is iiever brought to a focus\and much of it falls 
within the sphere of political philosophy rather than that of 
economics•
In Smith* s view ,fthe sovereign has only three duties to 
attend to; first the duty of protecting the society from the 
violence and invasion of other independent societies; second­
ly, the duty of protecting as far as possible, every member 
of the society from the injustice or oppression of every 
other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact 
administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting 
and maintaining certain public works and certain public in­
stitutions, which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and 
maint ain *n1
Defence against external enemies and the internal ad­
ministration of justice, he considers, a government must 
undertake* The public works he considers it desirable that 
the government should set up are few in number: maintenance
of roads he reckons among them: and he emphasizes the im­
portance of the government providing educational facilities 
for the people* The children of the poor should be taught to 
read, write and count in order to counteract the terrible 
effects of division of labour on the minds of these people
The following §§2-6 were suggested by Tivaranifs article 
"Vecchie e nuove teorie relative alia spesa pubblica,* 
Giornale degli Economist!, 1934.




of the working classes. The public accounts should bear 
most of the expense of this education; only^to ensure the 
efficient working of the system^a small contribution^ well 
within their reach of paying, should be forthcoming from the 
parents towards the education of their children. A govern­
ment might also maintain high roads and levy tolls —  though 
such a system would lend itself readily to abuses. And it 
might give protection to its own merchants in barbarous countrie 
by permitting them to build forts; i.e. by delegating to 
them some of the minor rights of sovereignty.
So that his words shall have the greater destructive 
force on the mercantilism of the times, he speaks as if he 
regards none of these functions additional to maintenance of 
external defence and justice, as of much importance. His 
treatment of them, it must be said, throws but little light 
on the interplay of costs and benefits —  the grand economic 
categories —  entailed in government finance.
For Smith*s desire to narrow down governmental functions 
to the extent that he does, a number of reasons, all of some 
cogency, can be offered. In the first place, there is his 
doctrine of the "invisible hand". Each individual, he con­
siders, is a better judge of his own interest than the 
government would be; and left free, each individual will 
seek his own good. In seeking his own good the individual 
though "he intends only his own gain is in this led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention [viz<* the public goodj. Nor is it the worse for 
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it."#
* 9 Vol. II. p.421. Smith belies that there
are certain exceptions to this rule.
3.
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A system of freely competing individuals in Smith’s view 
therefore, tends to maximum production in the society; and, 
what is the same thing, to the maximum welfare of the 
society.
Another source of4&P Smith1 s pref erai ce for ’natural 
liberty” as opposed to governmental interference had a phil­
osophical origin: it arose from the distinction between
that which is ”by nature” and that which is not. This dis­
tinction had been taken over by early modem philosophy from 
the Greek thinkers, and the Stoics. Smith appears to have 
considered governmental activities with few exceptions as 
’contrary to nature” The distinction was important to 
the mind of Smith and probably helped him to discover and 
to fill in, parts of his system. Yet in the completed 
thought of the Wealth of Nations views of so distinctively 
philosophical a character play but a minor part. His 
economic system was sufficiently self-complete for his 
successors to render it, with little effort, independent of 
any views of so specious a kind.
Again he considered that almost of necessity ‘ther,@ was 
a lack of efficient management in corporate organization: there
is profusion and there is dishonesty in both the main types 
of corporate administration, that by government and that by 
a company, whether it be regulated or joint stock. Regulated 
companies had been shown by history to be thoroughly ineffi­
cient and very often positively vicious as well. ”To be ; 
merely useless indeed, is perhaps the highest eulogy that 
can ever be justly bestowed upon a regulated company.!”
* Of. W.R.Scott, ”Adam Smith”, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, Vol.X. 1921-25, p.435 et seq.
Also Cf. Viner,MAdam Smith and Laissez Faire”, in 
Adam Smith, 1776-1926 (a collection of essays published 
By the University of Chicago Press); see especially
Section V of Viner’s essay, on Adam Smith’s view of the functions of government.
1. W. of H . Vol.II, p.224.
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Save in a few cases where business procedure can be reduced 
to a routine (of which the main instances are banking, some 
branches of insurance, canals and water supply), joint stock 
organization is likewise inefficient. The company’s servants 
are ever ready to neglect or to plunder the interests of their 
employers. While. In the management of such a company ”negli- 
gence and profusion always prevail.” * 1776 was a date not so
far distant from the collapse of the South Sea Bubble but “fehat 
this opinion would find a sympathetic response in many minds.!
Adam Smith’s view of governmental administration bore a 
strong resemblance to his view of the joint stock system. The 
government in its decision-taking, as compared with the indi­
vidual, was incompetent and stupid. Moreover governments were 
corrupt. On one occasion he mentions that he had had to rely 
for his evidence on the matter under discussion, on the 
”printed debates of the House of Commons”, which, he says 
parenthetically, are ”not always the most authentic records 
of truth.”2 His opinion of politicians as a class is well 
known from his aphorism: ”that insidious and crafty animal,
vulgarly called a politician, whose councils are directed by 
the momentory fluctuations of affairs.”3 His judgment was 
based on the governments of his own day. Concerning these 
Viner has said: ”Smith had encountered few instances in
which government was rendering intelligent and efficient 
service to the public welfare outside of the fields of 
protection and justice. The English government of his day
* Ibid., Vol.II. p. 233.
1. Smith’s sources of information in regard to the earlier 
joint-stock companies also played an important part in 
determining his attitude to them. See W.R. scott, The 
Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish 
Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, Vol.Iy pp.445-9.
2# w * of H ., Vol.II, p.230.
3. Ibid., Vol.Ij p.346*
was in the hands of an aristocratic clique, the place- 
jobbing, corrupt, cynical and class-biassed flower of the 
British gentry, who clung to the traditional mercantilism, 
not so much because of a strong faith that it met the problems 
of a growing trade struggling to burst its fetters, but be­
cause they did not know anything else to do. Even when 
Smith was prepared to admit that the system of natural liberty 
would not serve the public welfare with optimum effectiveness 
he did not feel necessarily driven to the conclusion that 
government intervention was preferable to laissez faire. The 
evils of unrestrained selfishness might be better than the 
evils of incompetent and corrupt government.1 *
Smith1s conversations with various members of the Phy- 
siocratic School during his stay in Prance and such acquaintance 
as he had with Physiocratic writings, invoking the maxuaM^ 
laissez faire, laissez passer ,would confirm and strengthen 
his distrust of action by governments.1
One thing and one thing only governments were quick to 
learn from one another - that was the art of extravagance 
which so impeded the beneficent progress of capital accumulation 
lfThe whole or almost the whole of public revenue," he thought, 
"is employed in maintaining unproductive h a n d s " T h i s  is 
equivalent to capital wastage. The main cause of such wastage 
in the past has been the carrying on of wars by governments.
But for this;the improvements of lands, manufactures, rosid.s 
and houses would have been much greater than it had actually 
been. He regards these countries as most fortunate which 
enjoy "prudent and parsimonious governments", capital left 
in the hands of individuals goes on fructifying and increas­
ing. Capital taken by the government yields no return. This
# Vinerfs article in op. cit. p.142.
1. The extent to which SmithTs views were influenced by 
the Physiocrats, will remain, however, a matter of some doubt.
g- W. of Vol.I. pp.326-7.
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reasoning relating to capital wastage by governments, as 
against the capital accumulation made by individuals, was to 
reappear and to grow in the writings of the later Classical 
economists* It was to become a main plank in the platform 
of those who advocated that government action should be re­
strict ed.
3. Ricardo*
When Ricardo was writing his Principles of political 
Economy and Taxation, the state of the government finances was 
highly peculiar and must have greatly influenced his theoriz­
ing on the matter.* The Napoleonic Wars had been a period of 
an unprecedentedly high level of taxation. Notwithstanding, 
between 1793 and 1816 the size of the national debt had multi­
plied by four. Worse than either of these things there was
hr*the greatest confusion and uncertainty as to what efejects shouldf Aa. Abe financed by the government, a*idto what extent: and there
was a complete absence of agreement as to what tax measures 
were best adapted to raise a revenue of a given amount. Ex­
perience of governmental finance had only begun to furnish 
the evidence, which, gradually accumulating, was eventually 
to furnish some basis for reasoned practical judgments on the 
matter.
The Parliament of the day was in the control of the 
dominant agricultural interest; all suggestions of agricul­
tural protection received its solicitude. Outside Parliament 
the industrial and commercial classes clamoured for equality 
of treatment with the agriculturists and for the abolition of 
the income tax, the portion of the tax burden that rested 
most heavily on them. To Ricardo it appeared that it was on 
the profits and prosperity of these industrial classes that 
the prosperity of England depended. He always was a stout 
defender of their interests, and as such distrusted the
* Of. J.H. Hollander, David Ricardo, a Centenarv Est.im«t.»,P*13> et* seq. “------ — ----— — 9
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Parliament of the day.
During the years preceeding the writing of the Principles, 
(1817), a considerable part of the country*s income had been 
diverted to the purposes of warfare and had left no benefits 
of a tangible and enduring nature. There had been a des­
truction of the capital that the Classical economists were so 
keen to see increasing. "The revenue of the sovereign seldom 
maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expense of 
the capital of the people, which maintains none but produc­
tive,"* says Ricardo, echoing Adam Smith. And though it was 
true that "notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the 
English government during the last twenty years, there can 
be but little doubt that the increased production on the 
part of the people has more than compensated for it . . .
Still • . it is certain that but for taxation this increase 
of capital would have been much greater. There are no taxes 
which have not a tendency to lessen the power to accumulate•"1 
After the war the main government service in the land 
was the Poor Law. To Ricardo*s mind, which had been deeply 
stirred by the dangers of an increasing population, as 
pointed out by Malthus, the Poor Law seemed to strengthen all 
the tendencies to evil. "It is a truth which admits not a 
doubt," he says, "that the comforts and well-being of the 
poor cannot be permanently secured without some regard on 
their part, or some effort on the part of the legislature, 
to regulate the increase of their numbers, and to render 
less frequent among them early and improvident marriages.
The operation of the system of poor laws has been directly 
contrary to this. They have rendered restraint superfluous, 
and have invited imprudence, by offering it a portion of the 
wages of prudence and industry."2 These laws, intended to
* Ricardo Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
Gonner s edition, p.I35 . ------ - ------------ -— —
1# Ibid** PP-132-3*
2. Ibid., p.84.
improve the position of the poor, had VigMVrtefc hurt both 
rich and poor alike. They had increased the birth-rate 
and the number of improvident early marriages: they had
robbed the poor of their resource and forethought and had 
reduced their productive effort.
His attitude to the poor laws of his time was there­
fore, quite unambiguous. ”No scheme for the amendment of 
the poor laws merits the least attention, which has not 
their abolition for its ultimate object; and he is the best 
friend to the poor and to the cause of humanity, who can 
point out how this end can be attained with the most security, 
and at the same time with the least violence.”•*
The cumulative effect of these factors was that Ricardo 
came to believe firmly that 1 the produce of taxes is generally 
wastefully expended.”3- And more than once he approvingly 
quotes $a>y*s dictum that f,The best of all plans of finance 
is to spend little and the best of all taxes is that which
pis least in amount.
The practical attitude taken up by Ricardo when he sat 
as a member in Parliament is not in itself important; but it 
emphasizes in an interesting way his attitude of mind. He 
voted against all increases in taxation, says Professor Gannan, 
and in favour of all remissions of taxation. He did so, as 
he said ”Twith a view of compelling the observance of strict 
economy in the administration of government1. He only drew 
the line at voting for such a reduction as would have caused
rran actual deficit.”0 Public expenditure Ricardo had in 
effect come to regard as misdirected expenditure: ahd he
made no allowance in his theoretical scheme for State
Principles, p.85.
Ibid., p.204 (my italics).
3. E.£., Ibid., p.219.
3« E. Cannan, ”Ricardo in Parliament”,Economic Journal 
1894, p.420.  — ---’
expenditure of the moneys collected in taxation. The depth 
of the Ricardian impress on later economics, and particularly 
on the theory of incidence, must have meant that the whole 
of the later theory suffered from an incompleteness in its 
attitude towards State expenditure.
4 • Malthus.
The economic writing! of Malthus, in so far as it relates 
to the (faj5t to be played by the government in the economic 
affairs of the community, is close in spirit to that of Adam 
Smith. Like Smith he has a general belief in the virtues of 
laissez faire. But even more than Smith he is willing to 
admit exceptions to this rule. To determine whether govern­
mental intervention is desirable he is always willing to appeal 
to practice and the widest reading of it of which he is capable. 
He does not seek to constrain events so that they appear to 
happen within the limits of the existing economic science: 
rather he would seek to discover how that science should be 
extended so as to cover events as they are understood to 
happen in thenwidest reading of experience. The strain|f of 
empiricism is much stronger in him than in Ricardo or the 
Mills.
His principle of population led him to oppose the poor
laws of his day, which he believed were creating a harmful
class,
proliferation among the peasant/ jssl± that they were designed 
to assist, and were sapping their spirit of independence.
But his attitude to governmental expenditure and taxation was 
very different from that of Ricardo. A principal cause of 
the post-Napoleonic depression in the eyes of Malthus, was the 
remissions of taxation that had taken place in the post-war 
period, "it is scarcely possible to doubt that at the end 
cf the war, when so large a mass of taxes would be at once 
restored to the payers of them, the just balance of produce 
and consumption would be completely destroyed, and a period 
would ensue, longer or shorter, according to circumstances, in
which a very great stagnation would he felt in every 
branch of productive industry, attended by its usual 
concommitanjr general distress • The evil occasioned by 
imposing a tax is very rarely compensated by the taking 
it off.’1*
He considers that "An expenditure which would have 
absolutely crushed the country in 1770 might be little 
more than was necessary to call forth its prodigious powers 
of production in 1816.ttl In circumstances like those of 
the post-Napoleonic period,schemes of roadmaking and 
public works set afoot by the government and unproductive 
schemes for beautifying their grounds carried out by land­
lords fwould be the best remedies for the u n e m p l o y m e n t  that 
had been occasioned by the disturbance of the balance of 
production and consumption.2
Malthus*s views on the economic functions of the 
government in a community were an integral part of his 
economic views; but nowhere in his writings did he 
elaborate them into a systematic whole. "His views must 
be inferred from scattered hints," says Bonar. On the 
other hand, as we have seen, Ricardo’s views of govern­
mental intervention, of governmental expenditure and of 
taxation raised by the government were nothing if not 
definite; and it was from Ricardo rather than Malthus 
that the subsequent views of the Classical School on 
this matter, were to trace.
Malthus, Principles of Political Economy Considered with 




3- Bonar, Mafchus and his Work, 2nd. edition, 1924, p.344. 
These scattered "hints are gathered together and 
shown in their relationship to one another in 
Book III, "Malthus* Moral and Political Philosophy," 
of Dr. Bonar’s work.
5. McCulloch.
The more general aspects of McCulloch*s thought need 
not be considered here,-* but it is noteworthy that in 
discussing the incidence of a tax on profits he realizes 
that the expenditure of Hietax proceeds should be taken into 
account. ''The means of purchasing possessed by those whose 
incomes were derived from profits would indeed be diminished 
an income tax],” he says, "but as the means of purchas­
ing possessed by the government and its dependents, who 
receive the tax, would be proportionally augmented, the 
aggregate demand of the society would continue the same.111
McCulloch sees that the problem exists; but his 
treatment of it amounts to no more than this passing refer­
ence. In the same paragraph he says that such a tax on 
profits would Occasion no variation in the supply or demand 
of commodities1. He makes no effort, that is, to consider 
the changes in the demand structure to which the tax would 
obviously give rise.
6. John Stuart Mill.
It was, I think, a true instinct which made John Stuart 
Mill aim in writing his treatise, a &  "a work similar in its 
object and general conception to that of Adam Smith, but 
adapted to the more extended knowledge and improved ideas
oof the present age.” The main innovation in this regard at 
which he aimed, related to the influence exerted on the 
distribution of wealth and income by the government.3
* For McCulloch1s views on governmental interference see 
Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, Vol. II, 
pp.334-5.
1. McCulloch, Taxation and the Funding System, 1845, p.75.
2• J•S• Mi11, A Treatise on Political Economy with some of
their Applications to Social Philosophy, Ashley1s edition. p. x x v m .  7
3. J.S. Mill, Autobiography, p.234; cited by Ashley at
p.xxi of his Introduction to the Principles.
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”The laws and conditions of the production of wealth,” in 
his view, ”partake of the character of physical truths..
There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them • • . It is 
not so with the distribution of wealth. That is a matter 
of human institution solely. The things once there, man­
kind, individually or collectively, can do with them as 
they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomso­
ever they please, and on whatever terms • . • The distribution 
of wealth, therefore, depends on the laws and customs of 
society. The rules by which it is determined are what the 
opinions and feelings of the ruling portions of the com­
munity make them, and are very different in different ages 
and countries; and might be still mbre different, if man­
kind so chose . . .  We have here to consider, not the 
causes, but the consequences of the rules according to 
which wealth may be distributed. Those, at least, sire as 
little arbitrary, and have as much the character of phy­
sical laws, as the laws of production.”^
In the latter portions of his book the reason for its 
longer title Principles of Political Economy with Some of 
their Applications to Social Philosophy, becomes evident.
Here Mill advocates taxation^ of the unearned increment in 
land v a l u e s a d v o c a t e s  that the State undertake elementary 
education;2 would be willing that in certain circumstances 
the government should enforce restriction on the length of
the working day;3 and would even institute a taxation of
inheritance more thorough-going than the suggestions of 
RicpJano.^ Laissez faire however, should be the general 
rule, save when the case made out for State intervention
is overwhelmingly strong.    _
* Principles, pp. 199-200*
1. Ibid., p.819.
2 * Ibid., PP- 954-5.
3. Ibid., pp. 963-4.
4. Ibid., p.  228.
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Mill1a discussion of these things is valuable for the 
wisdom that it contains. But his discussion does not fall 
within the domain of economic sciencej it is Social 
Philosophy and his work here is of a part with his other 
writings on Utilitarianism and Representative Government.
Since it is philosophical in its nature it cannot be ta&en 
over by subsequent writers and extended and refined as a 
permanent branch of economic science; it could have been 
had it been scientific.
7. Thus we see that the tendency to regard money spent 
by the government as money wasted, had been present in the 
work of Adam Smith; and though he did say that money could 
be usefully spent by a government on certain objects of 
policy, his doctrine of incidence made no provision for changec 
brougiht about by government expenditure. In the work of 
Ricardo this tendency to take an unfavourable view of 
government expenditure was confirmed; in his work the 
Classical doctrine of incidence took its definite shape 
and Jhere again the effect of the expenditure of the 
proceeds of the tax was disregarded.
When we come to the later writers of the Post-Classical
m of*or Neo-Classical School,Aparticular^AMarshall and Edgeworth, 
we are more at a loss to account for the continuance of this 
same type of one-sided analysis. A fairly definite view of 
government, which tended to minimize the importance of its 
place in society, had been common to Smith and Ricardo; but 
certainly Marshall and Edgeworth were far from sharing in 
such a view. That they realised in some measure the one­
sided nature of their doctrine cannot, we think, be doubted.
Edgeworth in fact, at one point alludes to the problem 
when he is discussing a tax on house rent. He says; "Rates 
on houses when expended in improving the neighbourhood tend 
to increase the demand for houses. Yet in measuring the 
burden of the tax to the owner it is allowable in pure
14.
theory to abstract its influence on demand."* Doctrine 
is allowed to retain its incomplete Classical form. Again 
he refers to the matter in connection with an income tax:
"In so far as it [“the income tax] strikes those who are 
entitled to a fixed payment from the proceeds of a going 
concern, it affects economic margins only in so far as the 
reduction of income may cause an alteration in the consu­
mer^ scale of demand."! But Edgeworth did not develop 
these allusions.
Probably Marshall*s well-known regard for tradition and 
his very high esteem for the writings of the Classical 
economists did much to determine his choice in the matter. 
"The present treatise," he had said in the Preface to. his 
Principles, "is an attempt to present a modern version of. 
old doctrines with the aid of new work, and with reference 
to the new problems of our age."2 Marshall*s tendency to 
avoid ̂  systematic discussion of the methodology of the 
subject would permit the importance of the subject we are 
dealing with to remain hardly noticed. His own awareness 
of the question is made clear in his discussion of the 
incidence of local rates. He distinguishes two classes 
of such rates: "Onerous rates are those which yield no .
compensating benefit to the persons who pay them . . . O n  
the other hand beneficial or remunerative rates are those 
spent on lighting, draining, and other purposes: so as to
supply the people who pay the rates with certain necessaries 
comforts and luxuries of life, which can be provided by 
the local authority more cheaply than in any other way.
Such rates, ably and honestly administered, may confer a
* Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy. Vol.II, p. 70. My italics. —
1. Ibid., p.76.
2. Marshall, Principles. 8th. Edition, p.V.
net benefit on those who pay them; and an increase in them 
may attract population and industry instead of repelling it.”* 
Bastable also realized the limitations in this regard 
of the current doctrine of incidence. The doctrine of the 
time, he says, is a development of the Ricardian doctrine.
As such, it starts out from certain "unduly simplified" 
assumptions such as mobility of capital and labour, and on 
the basis of these seeks to determine what the long run 
tendency to shifting will be. What the theory of incidence 
and indeed of Public Finance as a whole, is aiming to do, 
however, is to illumine the facts of everyday life in the 
departments of which it treats; its real intention is to 
show all the implications of any change that is introduced 
in the conditions assumed, e.g., through the introduction of 
a new tax. And in this respect "a doctrine of incidence 
that is confined to the receipt of income without regard to 
its expenditure is so far defective."1
While Bastable and other writers might regret the existent 
of this gap in the theory, they did not feel equal to the 
accomplishment of the difficult task that had been left by 
Ricardo, Marshall, Edgeworth and the other "tool makers", 
to use Pijpu’s phrase. A main difficulty confronting them, 
must have been that when any given tax is collected, its 
proceeds are lumped together with those of all the others 
in the common fund of the Exchequer. The funds from the 
tax, e.g., from a tax on beer, are not?as a rule, allocated 
to particular objects of expenditure; they are not^as a 
r u l e ,  " e a r-marked",2 How, therefore, can we be able to
name exactly the purposes to which the proceeds of the tax
* Ibid., Appendix G, p.794.
See also Marshall’s "Memorandum on the Classification 
and Incidence of Imperial and Local Taxes", in Official 
Papers by Alfred Marshall.
1. Bastable, Public Finance, 3rd,, edition, p.367.
2* Before 1936 in Great Britain motor car licences were to 
some extent an exception to this rule, being ear-marked 
for the Road Fund.
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on beer, or of the income tax, have been put ? This is 
a statement of the problem at issue.
8. When the Oolwyn Committee came to discuss the inci­
dence of the income tax, it felt the importance of this 
aspect of the problem: and believing it to be too important
to gloss over, they alluded to it, rather uncomfortably, at 
several places in their Report.
” In particular,” they say in one place”: so far as it 
is applied in payment of pensions, unemployment relief etc. 
it (the income tax) supports the purchasing power of the 
worker and increases the total effective demand for neces­
saries . ”#
Again they say: ’Especially in the lower ranges of
liability (to British income tax), the individual and his 
family may benefit directly from the expenditure on health, 
pensions, education, etc.,”-*-
And in another place: ’’The income tax clearly levels
down the higher incomes, although there is a counteracting 
movement so far as it is applied in payment of debt interest. 
Thus, to this extent, it redistributes saving power in 
favour of the moderate and lower incomes.”^
But the Committee quite fails to take any systematic 
account of the expenditure of the tax proceeds in its theory 
of incidence.
In the ’’Memorandum on the Incidence of the Income Tax” 
that Hr. Coates had prepared for the Qolwyn Committee he 
alludes to this aspect of the matter thus. When a tax is
& Report of the Qolwym Committee on Rational Debt and 
Taxation, Majority Report, g 459.
1. Ibid., § 343•
2. Ibid., § 380.
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levied on the profits of a firm, he says, "As for demand, it 
is often hastily supposed that- the purchasing power taken by- 
taxation simply disappears into the void. The national 
balance sheet makes it clear however, that all the revenue 
collected is disbursed again."" When the Government collects 
the money from a firm and then spends it, the whole process, 
he points out, is just the same as if the number of share­
holders in the firm had been increased. At this point he 
has drawn a demand and supply diagram and holds that 
"Certainly no change in the equilibrium of price indicated 
by the diagram would be anticipated from an increase in the 
number of share-holders in the companies concerned."'1- Yet 
surely Coatesfs theory is here essentially in contradiction 
with itself. If the number of "shareholders" in the 
companies has been increased the scales of preference of the 
new shareholders will be different from those of the former 
shareholders; and so their money expenditure will be dis­
tributed, over the various goods, in a different way from 
formerly. Alterations in the demand curves for the various 
commodities will take place in both the short and in the 
long period and corresponding price alterations ought there­
fore to be expected. But Mr. Coates^ Ifliew is that the 
income tax leaves prices unaffected.
9. In 1930 Kendrick argued that in discussing certain 
cases of incidence, the use made of the resources collected
11 Memorandum . .. " g 37 •
1. Ibid., § 37.
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by the tax ought to be taken into account, ^.g., he said, 
if a tax were to be levied on petrol and the proceeds used 
to improve the condition of the roads for motor travel, 
through this the number of cars in use and the amount of 
petrol consumed might be increased. In such a case, he 
said, it would be desirable to include consideration of the 
expenditure of the tax proceeds in discussion of the inci­
dence of the tax.*
Later Pagan has also pointed out this gap in the exist­
ing Anglo-Saxon theory of incidence,1
10. °n the Continent, however, writers were earlier
aware that consideration of expenditure of the proceeds of
a tax constituted a definite problem for the theory of tax 
incidence. Credit for having been first to see the issues 
involved and for having seen them clearly, belongs to 
Wick3ell,2 There are, he showed, two distinct and sep­
arate questions that may be asked.
If it is a question of levying either one tax or
another tax, each with the same yield, public expenditure 
will be left unchanged whichever is levied: and in this
case we may logically enquire what the economic effects of 
either tax will be, irrespective of how the tax proceeds 
may be expended. If the problem we are dealing with be of 
this kind, then the type of discussion given by the Classi­
cal School is the logical one.
If, alternatively, the problem we are dealing with 
is one, where,if a tax be remitted (imposed), at the same 
time the expenditure of the state will be reduced (increased)
* Kendrick, "Public Expenditure, a Neglected Consideration 
in Tax Incidence Theory,t American Economic Review, 1930*
1. Pagan, ”Tax Shifting and the Laws of Cost”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August, 1933.
2• Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, 1896, p.6.
See also Einaudi s review article on the appearance of 
the Italian translation of the book, Riforma - Sociale, 
July - August, 1934. 1 — ~ —
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by an amount equal to the yield of the tax, then in this 
case our treatment of incidence must take the expenditure 
of the tax proceeds into account.
In fact when we are trying to assess the effect of the 
income tax or of the complex of existing taxes, it is on 
this broader type of enquiry and not on the preceeding 
narrower type that we must embark.
Since there are these two separate types of enquiry, 
the word Incidence may possess either of two distinct mean­
ings: and it behooves us to be clear in which-sense we
use it. As we have said, in this book we use it in the 
broader sense so as to include under it, effects brought 
about by the expenditure of the tax proceeds.
11. Although Wicks ell’s words bore no fruit in Anglo- 
Saxon literature, their importance was better understood 
by the Italian writers. Einaudi, De Viti and others dis­
cussed the incidence of taxes in such a way as to take 
into account the effects produced by the expenditure, as 
well as by the collection, of the ta,x proceeds.* Never­
theless, the doctrine that the expenditure of the tax 
proceeds should be taken into account in discussions of 
incidence was not worked into the theory of taxation in a 
definite and systematic way. A new beginning to this 
attemptAwith the appearance of the 1928 edition of De Viti's
* Cf« Einaudi, Osservazioni critiche intorno alia teoria 
dell1 amortamento dell* imposta e teoria delle 
variazioni nei redditi e nei valori capitali susse- 
quenti all* imposts,," Atti della Reale Accademia delle 
Scienze di Torino, 1910-19, where he considers the 
expenditure of the tax proceeds in order to discover 
the effects of an income tax, Einaudi gives an important 
bibliographical note in "Contribute alia ricerca dell* 
"Ottima Imposta" Annali di Economia, 1929, pp.78-81. 
See also Einaudi*s Introduction to De Viti*s First 
Principles of Public Finance, p.29.
great work I Primi Prinoipii dellf Economla Finanziaria.
De Viti says in a notable passage of this book s
n The current theory (of incidence) rests on two
traditional errors of classical economists.
The first of these, is the practice of considering\;he
problems of Public Finance as if they were completely inde*
pendent of the phenomena of Private Economics. As a result
no attempt is made to see what happens to the tax once it
has left the budget of the taxpayer; on the contrary,
there is a general disposition to suppose that the tax
represents a loss of wealth for the taxpayer and for society.
The other error consists in treating all economic
phenomena, and therefore also taxes, from the point of view
of the producer, who is directly subject to the tax and
translates it into an increase in cost or a diminution in
»profits; whence it is supposed that the immediate effect 
of the tax is to increase prices, through a reduction or a 
threatened reduction in supply.
The combination of these two erroneous propositions 
leads to the assertion that the tax disturbs the preceeding 
equilibrium to the extent that it influences supply."#
De Viti’s work has proved of enormous stimulus to 
writers on Public Finance. A majority of the Italian 
writers now appear to accept a view similar to his on this 
aspect of the theory of incidence. As a result this aspect 
of the theory has been further elaborated and systematized 
since the appearance of the work.
In this book we accept and apply the thesis of De Viti, 
which we believe to be thoroughly scientific. An analytical 
discussion of the topic however appears to fall within the 
other branch of the theory of taxation, the Theory of the
* De Viti de Marco, First Principles of Public Finance, 
pp . 148-9. ------------------ - ---
©
Distribution of Taxation, rather than within the Theory 
of Incidence. Since we hope to treat this in another 
book discussion of the topic will not be carried further 
here •
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O H A P T E R  X.
The Effect of the Income Tax in Direct Alteration 
of Demand schedules.
1. We take it for granted that it can he shown by the 
theory of Distribution of Taxation that the government of 
the community will allocate the money collected from the 
increment in the income tax that has been imposed, on 
determinate objects, e.g., defence, justice,etc., and that 
the quantity of money spent on each one of these objects 
will itself be determinate.*
2. Let us consider the money that the government distri­
butes directly to individuals in the community, to be spent 
by these individuals themselves. The money may have been 
distributed, e.g. in the form of old age pensions, widows1 
pensions and in health insurance payments. There is no 
difficulty of analysis in this case in regard to the econ­
omic changes set up by such governmental expenditure. The 
usual analysis of marginal utility shows that in equilibrium 
each person concerned will distribute his total income be­
tween the different lines of expenditure in such a way as to 
make the utility per unit of expenditure, (e.g./per penny), 
the same in every direction.
A very concise analysis of such a case, where the in­
come of the individual is either increased or decreased, has 
been given by Hicks and Allen.1 Their analysis shows how 
the distribution of the income of the individual between a 
number of different commodities alters, when his income
* In regard to the topics^that follow see De Viti, op.cit., 
p.152 et seq.; (jabiati's review article, ”La ”Finanzah di 
Antonio de" Viti de Marco”, Giornale degli Economisti,
1928, and Filbini, ,,3ullt influenza dellf imposta sulla do- 
manda e sull1 offerta”, Giornale degli Economisti, 1929.
1. Hicks and Allen,”A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value” 
Economica, 1934: and for a fuller explanation of some 
parts of this section, see Allen and Bowley, Family
Expenditure. p.97, etseq.
1
itself alters. The oase that they deal with is that in 
which no uncertainty exists. The diagram shown supposes 
the existence of only two commodities A and B: indifference
curves are drawn for the consumption of these commodities 
by the individual concerned: these indifference curves are
supposed, since no uncertainty exists, to remain unaltered 
in position throughout the whole process. in the initial 
state of equilibrium the income of the individual at the 
existing prices would be just sufficient for purchasing either 
a total quantity 0 Aj of the commodity A, or else a total 
quantity 0 Bj of the commodity B. All possibilities of con­
sumption open to the individual, it can be shown, so long as 
the conditions of the problem remain unchanged, are given by 
the co-ordinates of points on the line A^ B^» The individual 
achieves the most desired consumption of commodities at that 
point where the line A^ B]_ just touches one of the indifference
curves: his consumption then lies on the highest indifferenceQuantity . ̂  ̂ .
te iM v rye t l ib  y  8. g sv \  \
curve that it is open to him to achieve. In equilibrium, the 
diagram shows, his consumption of the commodities will be Oa^ 
of A and 0 b-j_ of B.
Let the individuals income now be supposed to be increas­
ed so that he would be able to purchase an amount 0 Ag of 
commodity A and none of commodity B, or else an amount 0 Bg 
of B and none of commodity A. In the same way as before it 
can be shown that if the prices of A and B remain constant, 
the individual will now purchase Q&g of ^ together with Ob 
of B (see diagram I )• In fact the equilibrium combination
II it'
of commodities for the individual as his total income 
either increases or decreases, will be given by the co­
ordinates of points on the curve P Q.
The case where the individual purchases more than two 
commodities, can be dealt with in a similar way by supposing
t h e r e  a r e  * t c o m m o d i t i e s j
the diagram to be extended into n dimensions^ or dealt with 
on the same principle, by an algebraic treatment instead of 
a purely geometrical one.
The case where savings exist is covered by this treat­
ment, also, by regarding savings as one of the commodities 
that the individual desires.
The more general case is that in which uncertainty exists. 
(It is this more general case that the theory of the income 
tax that we give attempts to cover), in this case the dia­
gram given would only apply at each instant of time. The 
shape of the indifference curves would be altering from moment 
to moment: the shape of the curve P Q would therefore like­
wise alter from moment to moment. If a time axis were to be 
added to diagram I in addition to the axes 0 A, OB, the 
diagram would then show the variation in the individual’s 
consumption of the commodity through time.
Let us suppose that this time-axis has been added to 
diagram I. We would still be able to go behind the diagram 
and explain in more general terms the phenomena that it 
represents. The explanation would show how the individual, 
when his income circumstances alter^^ must feel uncertain 
as to the proportions in which he can best combine the 
consumption of commodities A and B. Only after a period of 
experimentation in which he consumes the two commodities in 
varying proportions, will he come to feel assured that the 
combination of commodities that he consumes ia the optimum 
one. Once this stage has been reached, he will always, 




3. The preceeding analysis of the case has been purely 
formal, if we look at the problem in a concrete way, then 
we will envisage the changes that have been explained 
analytically, as going on in the consumption of actual 
commodities, cotton shirts, wheat, milk, housing, etc., If 
e.g., the increase in the income tax leads to an increase 
in the incomes of old age pensioners, or of men who are out 
of work on account of sickness, then we will envisage an 
increase in the purchases of cotton shirts, of food, of 
housing and of the other goods that are usually consumed by 
the working classes. We should expect to find an improve­
ment in the grades of food that these classes consume; and 
we should expect the amount of money saved by them to in­
crease •
At the other end of the income scale, among the richer 
persons on whom the payment of the tax rests, we should 
expect to find a falling off in the consumption of the 
commodities that they customarily consume. There would be, 
presumably, a falling off in the demand for country houses, 
expensive flats, boxes at the theatre, yachts, the more 
expensive kinds of foods and wines, and so on. Perhaps 
instead of going to the Riviera —  to take a colloquial 
example —  and hunting and shooting, all in one year, certain 
of these people would now hunt one year, in the next go to 
the Riviera, and shoot in the next again. If this were the 
case the falling off in demand would be to some extent con­
cealed from the observation of the readers of pictorial 
journals: but evidence of the change during the short period 
would still be visible in yachts that were laid up and in 
falling prices of country houses. There is reason to believe 
that this represents what has actually happened in regard to 
the wealthier sections of the population of Great Britain, 
since the heavy increases in the income tax were imposed 
during the last twenty years'.
Wr'
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On balance therefore, on account of the increase in 
the income tax and the corresponding increase in the type 
of public expenditure that we have mentioned —  viz., a 
direct distribution of money to certain classes of 
individuals in the community —  there would take place an 
alteration in the demand schedules for the various goods 
in our imaginary community. A larger proportion of the 
national income would now be consumed by the working classes 
in the form of clothes, food, housing and amusements, and a 
smaller proportion of the national income would now be 
consumed in the form of expensive luxury goods by the rich.
4. As well as an alteration in the demand schedules of 
the individuals in the community as a result of the tax, 
there will equally be an alteration in the demands made by 
the government for different commodities and services. The 
government may increase its demands for certain commodities 
and reduce those for others. The demand for educational 
services (which are, let us suppose, paid out of government 
revenues), for defence, for health and welfare clinics etc. 
may have altered.
Discussion of the case of defence is perhaps easiest 
to follow; and it is sufficient to show most of the issues 
involved. The government has decided, let us suppose, to 
increase the size of its navy; orders will be placed with 
the various shipbuilding firms. The firms already in the 
industry and with an established reputation will in this 
case, tend to benefit from the diversion of purchasing power 
on to naval defence. In the case of some other types of 
governmental expenditure, new firms might perhaps tend to 
benefit equally with the firms that had previously been in 
the industry. Such a case might arise, e.g., where a
government has undertaken a policy of introducing certain
v€ry bastechanges gradually. If so there will be no rmok to have
A
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orders carried into effect. New firms may, owing to the 
increased demand for a particular commodity, be induced to 
enter the industry in question. If the industry is one in 
which a long established reputation —  such as is essential 
in ship-building -- is not essential, this will facilitate 
the entry of new firms. In general terms, the lower the 
costs of entry into the industry, for whose produce, as a re­
sult of the tax, demand has increased, the greater will be 
the advantage to those factors which, before the tax, had been 
employed in other industries. This is true for labour and 
capital factors both.
To give an example, the costs of entry of new factors 
into the heavy industries are high: labour requires a long
training before it becomes skilled; firms require a long 
existence before they gain a reputation. If a government 
hastens to rearm, to build a railroad, etc., it will be the 
already existing firms, and the labour 'factors already in 
the industry, that will benefit most.
It is plain therefore, that the alteration in the 
structure of demand in the community, through the alterations 
in the consumption of service and commodities on the part of 
the government, may play a large part in determining the path 
of the change towards the new equilibrium.
5. In the resulting process of economic change that is 
set in motion from the side of demand, the time element is 
likely to be of considerable importance. If battleships be 
ordered in a hurry, the already-existing firms and the factors 
that they employ will very quickly enjoy increased remunera­
tions. To begin with these benefits will accrue perhaps, to 
the ship-building firms and producers of steel: after that
perhaps, to ships* joiners, painters, electricians and 
suppliers of ships* furnishings. Positive quasi-rents accrue 
to ship-yard owners and to steel companies in the first
instance, and to all the factors employed by them.* As 
the.se positive quasi-rents reach their peak and begin to 
fall, the quasi-rents for the second group, ships!̂ furnishers, 
etc., will begin to grow. In time the quasi-rents of these 
ships *-furnishers will also subside, and those of the people 
who constitute the personnel of the navy and man the battle­
ships that have been built, will begin to rise. The waxings 
and wanings of these different series of quasi-rents further
illustrates the importance.of the time element in the whole 
1process•
If the firms benefitting from these increases in govern­
ment demand bid away factors of production from other employ­
ments, then the capital-owners in these other lines of 
production (e.g. the building of merchant vessels, the
building of steel bridges etc.,) will tend in the short period 
vieg*t'*veto experience mi gratis quasi-rents which will vary throughA
time •
Perhaps, however, the extension in governmental functions 
will be of a type more closely related to the system of pro­
duction than say, military preparations. It may be, for 
example, that additional road-making or road improvement 
is undertaken. In such a case the factors engaged in 
making roads will benefit. In addition some of the 
factors of production which are best in a position to make 
fullest use of the roads will benefit: the process of
production has been facilitated for these and they will now 
be able to produce at a lower cost. Not all c?f such 
factors need benefit, however. For some of the factors
* Using the term^positive quasi-rent’ to denote a return 
greater than normal.
1. Pugliese, MUn imposta sul reddito lordo delle imprese
speculative e i suoi effetti,'1 Giornale degli Economisti, 
1933, gives a good discussion of the time element in 
such economic changes.
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when the change takes place, there may he a reduced demand.
To show both these possibilities of betterment and improve­
ment of the position of different factors, we may imagine 
the case in which some of the road transport firms extend 
their business, capturing part of the traffic of the rail­
ways* But even so, these road transport firms, if the 
passage of their goods have been rendered much easier, may 
now employ fewer units of certain types of labour than they 
formerly had done. The position of these labour factors 
will, in the short period at any rate, be worsened.
6* In the long period it will still be the case that as 
a result of the income tax the country!s income is spent to 
a greater extent by the poorer classes, and also by the 
government on defence, justice etc., than would otherwise 
have been the case* The proportion of the communityfs 
goods that these classes consume will have increased: the
proportion that the rich classes consume will have diminished* 
In regard to prices over the long period, by then the 
plant of the community will have become adapted to the new 
state of demand: some industries will be on a greater scale
than initially, others on a smaller. The industries for 
whose commodities demand is relatively greater, will have 
drawn factors of production away from the industries for 
whose commodities demand has fallen off. If in the long 
period factorial prices have come to stand at the same levels 
as initially, then those goods that are consumed by the poder
Andclasses and by the government?Athat are produced under the
law of decreasing costs, will have fallen in price: those
iwcre«S***<fc •produced under the law of di.inin.jLaflfi-ng costs will have risenA
in price: those, and they are likely to be the most important
classes, that are produced under the law of constant costs*,
* See Sraffa, Economic Journal, 1926, pp.538-541*
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will be at the same prices as they had been initially. In 
the same way the most important classes of goods consumed 
by the wealthier classes will be likely to be the same in 
price as initially.
Actually, we go on to show, over the long period the 
supply of the factor labour and the supply of the factor 
capital will alter. One of these will become more plentiful 
relatively to the other than it had been initially .«• In this 
case a good, whether consumed by the rich or by the poor, will 
fall in price relatively to another good, if it uses in its 
production a greater proportion of the factor which has become 
more plentiful.
A simple algebraic proof of this can be given.
Consider the manufacture of two commodities a and b.
Let anJ and anc be the number of units of labour and 
capital respectively, both before and after the tax, employed 
in the manufacture of a; and let bn2, bnc be the number of 
units of labour and capital respectively employed in the 
manufacture of b.
Let the initial price of labour and of capital be ip* 
and xPc respectively; and their final prices jgP£ and 2^c 
respectively.
Let the initial price of a be iPa, its final price 2PaJ 
and the initial price of b lPb, its final price 2Pb.
The ratio of the price of a to the price of b initially 
= IP a
p s -
= anE^ lPl -I- ano iPo
bne jpt +  lpc
The ratio of the price of a to the price of b finally =
3Pa
SPb
* Neglecting in the meantime, differences between differentclasses of labour.
e>
anl g>Pi ■+ ano 
bne 2Pl +  l^o 2Pc
Prom the above,
f a  $  € ±
lPb S^b
according as
an£ • bno • lpt . 2P0 anc - bnt - lpo • 2pt
^  anc - iP-l ■ . 2P0 4- anJ. * bnc ' )J?c • 2P0
i.e., according as
|an£" bno - »no- b11*)! lVf  2pa - lpc 2pi) ^  ° ($).
This expression will be o if either both factors 
are positive, or both negative.
This is if
ant . b“£
  > ~f ....  (1)anc b e
and ■ v *
IPZ  2Pt





lPt <  2Pt
lPo 2Po   (4)
f e
m.-
Let us suppose that labour has become relatively more 
plentiful than capital, so that the price of labour in 
relation to that of capital is lower than in the initial 
situation* Then condition (2) is satisfied. And the
condition that the price of a in relation to that of b will
be less than it has been initially is that (1) will be 
satisfied, that is that
ang
n n fa c b o
that is that the manufacture of a employs a relatively 
greater proportion of labour to capital than does the manu­
facture of b.
The other cases of the inequality yield conclusions
that have hx&H the same import*
7. The populace of each community consumeE^iot one but two 
sets of commoditjf,5 divisible goods and indivisible goods.A
Divisible goods are those goods that are bought by individuals 
in the market, and for which a market price exists. The other 
type of commodity, indivisible goods, consists of goods which 
are not demanded and supplied in the market by individuals in 
this wayi they are the goods supplied by the government and 
consumed by the people in the community* Instances of such 
goods are justice as administered by the law-courts, and 
defence against an external enemy.
As a result of the increased income tax the government 
out of its increased revenues may supply more" of such 
indivisible commodities to the community* At any rate the 
constellation of supplies of such indivisible commodities 
will have altered* The navy may have been strengthened, let 
us say, and more law courts built. This shows that people
* "More" is intended simply in the sense that the total 
cost of rendering such services has increased.
11.
now consume these indivisible commodities supplied by the
government to different extents from formerly. This in­
deed may have been one of the most important economic effects 
of the increase in the rate of the income tax.
C H A P T E R  -fS-s
The Effect of the Income Tax on the Supply of 
Labour per Individual.
1. We will suppose in this Chapter that the number of 
individuals in the community remains unaltered; and that 
the industrial and employment opportunities with which each 
individual is confronted also remain unaltered after the 
tax in imposed.
When the increment in the income tax is imposed the 
people in the community who have to pay it, experience a 
reduction in the amount of income that they receive from 
each unit of their labour output. For example a doctor who 
formerly had received ten shillings for a visit to a patient 
may now receive after paying two pence in income tax to the 
government, only a net nine shillings and tenpence. A 
barrister for the last or marginal brief prepared by him 
in the initial state of equilibrium perhaps had received £30. 
Now, after payment of income tax he may only receive for the 
same brief £29*15.0. A worker again, may perhaps now receive 
for a day’s labour nine shillings and elevenpence in place 
of ten shillings as formerly. Will the people whose incomes 
are reduced by the tax in this way work lbnger or shorter 
hours than they had done formerly ?
Professor Knight has argued that when an income tax 
is imposed, each individual, as a result of it, will nec­
essarily increase his supply of labour. His argument can 
be summarized as follows^* In the condition of affairs 
after the tax has been imposed, he says, each individual, if
* F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, pp.117-8.
This bird’s eye view' of Knight’s argument is due to 
R. Frisch, New Methods of Measuring Marginal Utility,
p. 100. Frisch1s work is the outstanding treatment of the whole problem.
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he continues to work the same number of hours as before 
will have a smaller net income. The marginal utility 
of a unit of this smaller income will therefore be greater 
than the marginal utility per unit in the initial state of 
affairs• Hence in the new situation the last unit of each 
commodity that he purchases will have to afford him a 
higher utility than the last unit of that commodity had 
done to begin with. This can only be the case if the 
individual purchases less of each commodity.
One commodity that the individual purchases, however, 
is leisure. The individual as a result of the tax there­
fore, must consume a smaller quantity of leisure than he 
had done to begin with. His hours of leisure are fewer; 
that is he works longer hours than he had done to begin 
with.
Knight’s argument, it is true, recognizes that when an 
income tax is imposed a change takes place in the utility 
of a unit of income to the individual. But it does not 
take into account that when the tax is imposed, among all 
the commodities consumed by the individual one, and one only 
has altered in price - the price of leisure has fallen. The 
doctor in the arithmetical example can now purchase leisure 
equal in amount to the time of one visit, for nine shillings 
and tenpence instead of ten shillings as formerly, bimilar- 
ljr, the price of leisure to the barrister and the workman 
has fallen. Because of this fall in the price of leisure 
the individual may possibly be induced to purchase not 
less but more leisure, after the tax, than he had done to 
begin with.
2. Work for the individual is fundamentally an exchange
of leisure in return for income. It is just as if he were
giving away some of the commodity A which he possesses,
(leisure), in return for the commodity B which he wishes 
to acquire, (income).
Now the price or exchange ratio at which the indi­
vidual is able to effect this interchange between leisure 
and (net) income, will depend on the gross wage rate that 
industry pays to him, wage per hour say, and the amount of 
this wage rate that the government absorbs by its income 
tax. We will neglect at this stage of the argument, dif- 
diculties arising from the fact that, in the real world, an 
individual finds it difficult to obtain work except for a 
definite length of working day, say an 8-hour day; and our 
supposition will be that it is open to him to work what­
ever length of day he may choose on the same conditions as 
to wages,etc., as he would do for the 8-hour day.
In these circumstances the individual’s gross rate of 
remuneration is a constant quantity, perhaps two shillings 
per hour, and is independent of the number of hours that 
he works. Yet his net rate of remuneration will vary with 
the number of hours per day that he works; because the 
rate at which he pays income tax, if it is a graduated tax, 
will depend on his size of income; which in turn depends 
on the number of hours per day that he works. When he is 
deciding the number of hours per day that he will work, it 
will be this net rate of remuneration that individual takes 
into account; in the same way as it is its net earnings 
and not its total receipts that matters to a firm in any 
line of business.
The effect of the tax on the number of hours per day 
that an individual works can be shown by means of indiffer­
ence curves. Let leisure be measured along the axis Oy; 
along the axis Ox let net income be measured. The diagram 
has reference to a day’s time. In it the indifference 
curves of the individual, showing his scale of preferences 
as between leisure and income,are drawn, (bee diagram I).
There are 24 hours in the day; so that the maximum 
possible quantity of leisure that the individual can enjoy
will be 24 hours = 0 M in the diagram
fif r  4a
A
Diagram I
In the initial state of affairs, at the existing wage 
rate if the individual were to devote the whole 24 hours of 
the day to labour,(supposing this to be physically possible), 
he would gain a total net remuneration per day equal to
tial state of affairs, if there be no income tax,* all of 
the possibilities of exchange for the individual between 
leisure and income are represented by points on the line 
A M, joining the given points A and M.® Of the choices 
that are open to him in this way the individual will select 
that one which he most desires by coming to rest at the 
point on the line A M at which this line becomes a tangent 
to an indifference curve. It can be shewn that there will 
be only one such point. When he comes to rest in this way 
the individual will then be choosing as between leisure and 
income in such a way as to reach the highest indifference
* The case where in the initial state of affairs an income 
tax, wither proportional or graduated, is in existence, 
can bevtalien' into -ascount-. See the next footnote.
1* In diagram I and also in diagram II the exchange ratio 
between leisure and net income is shown as the slope 
of a straight line. This corresponds to the case 
where a proportional income tax is levied, from which 
no income is exempt. In the case in which the mar­
ginal rate of the tax is progressive (or regressive), 
the ’line’ showing the exchange ratio between leisure 
and net income will be a curve that is concave, (or 
convex), to the x-axis. But the treatment will remain 
substantially unchanged.
0 A in the diagram. Now it can be shown that in the ini-
4
curve in the system that it is possible for him to reach.
The individual with the system of indifference curves of 
diagram I will attain equilibrium at the point P.
When he is in this position the number of hours workedby t h e  ind iv idua l  can be by
per dayA(24 hours - the quantity of leisure he consumes), 
that is (0 M - 0 P) = p.M. Initially the number of hours 
worked per day = p M.
The effect of the imposition of the tax is to alter the 
rate at which it is possible for the individual to exchange 
leisure for net income. The gross rate of remuneration, 
ex hypothesi, remains constant. He now pays income tax on 
such remuneration: net rate of remuneration is reduced
to-feim as a result of the tax; and if, in these new circum­
stances, he were to devote 24 hours of the day to labour, 
his total net income per day would be 0 B instead of 0 A 
as formerly. All possible positions of equilibrium open to 
the individual, now lie on the line B M. As before, the 
position of equilibrium that the individual will select 
will be that at which B M becomes a tangent to an indifference 
curve. This, for the system of indifference curves of 
diagram I, is at the point H.
After the tax the individual of diagram I will work h M 
hours instead of p M as initially. That is, as a result of 
the tax he will curtail his supply of labour by p h units.
Let us, however, draw another system of indifference 
curves, as in diagram II, corresponding, say, to the tastes 
of another individual in the community. And let the points 
A-*- and have the same significance as M, A and B respective­
ly in diagram I. In diagram II the initial position of 
equilibrium for the individual corresponding to the line ofh • h»urdt‘
exchange M^, between leisure and net income, would be 
the point P1. As before, the individual’s line of ex­
change after the tax would be B1 M1 and his position of 
equilibrium the point H1 .
In diagram II the individual had^to begin with^workeo. 
pi hours per day: after the tax he works M1 hi hours*
In the final situation after the tax has been imposed, he 
works hi pi hours per day more than to begin with.-*
Thus the individual whose indifference curves had 
the constellation of diagram I would contract his supply 
of labour when the tax was imposed: but the individual
of diagram II would extend his.
No general rule therefore, can be laid down* The 
outcome, whether towards a contraction or an expansion 
in the individual’s supply of labour, depends on the shape 
of the indifference curves for the individual concerned.
3* Prom an indifference curve diagram of the type that 
we have been considering, a further diagram can be derived 
in which only the two variables appear that directly inter­
est us, viz; number of hours of labour worked per day and 
wage rate. For example in diagram I if the point of 
equilibrium be P whose co-ordinates are (Oi, Op), we know 
that the number of hours worked per day » p M • Total 
income per‘day = Oi. The corresponding (net) wage rate
is therefore given by 2i-pM.
Let us construct a diagram along whose y-axis net
* The treatment we have given assumes that the system 
of indifference curves for each individual remains 
fixed and stationary: this is equivalent to the
assumption that no uncertainty exists. To take into 
account the effects of uncertainty we would recognise 
that when the tax is imposed experimentation is forced 
on the individual, as regards the consumption of 
indifferent combinations of leisure and other goods.
A consequence of this is that his scale of preferences,
i.e. his system of indifference curves will itself alter 
through time; and the direction in which, or the rate 
at which his labour supply tends to alter, will itself vary with time.
6 •
wage rate is measured, with number of hours worked per
day along the x-axis. This gives us a ourve of supply
of labour for the individual concerned, (See diagram III). 
f?l(r
l ienr .  *
A B is the supply curve of labour for one individual:
0 D that for another individual.
Our analysis relating to indifference curves has shown 
that when a tax produces a reduction in the net wage rate 
per hour, then the number of hours per day that the indi­
vidual works may either rise (curve A B ) or fall (dotted 
curve 0 D). Each of these cases is theoretically quite 
possible of occurrence. The case applying to the individual 
will depend on the shape of his indifference curves.
4o While it is theoretically possible that the labour 
supply curve for any individual should be either downsloping 
or upsloping, in fact, for people in the lotfer income strata, 
the curve is, on the average, downsloping. This has been 
shown by- Douglas for populations in the lower income 
strata, in the United States.-'*- Ho statistical information 
has yet been collected as to the response of people in the 
middle and upper ranges of income to changes in their rates 
of remuneration.
It need hardly be said that Douglas's findings in this 
regard apply only to industrial workers on the average, and
are not necessarily true for all workers. Individual 
* Paul Douglas, Theory of Wages. Chanter y t t . ~
c ^  to * of- U c u r s
Diagram III. W o r k e d  d a y
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persons, we should expect, will be affected by a given 
wage alteration to different extentss and some individuals 
may even react in an opposite way to the average.
Since on the average the curve of supply of labour for 
the lower income classes is downsloping, people in these 
classes will be willing to work longer hours when an income 
tax, ceteris paribus, is placed on their wages. In practice, 
however, the workers in most countries pay but little to­
wards the income tax. Exemption from the tax is usually 
granted until the person*s income attains a certain height: 
deductions in payment of the tax are permitted for children 
in the person’s family; and taxes are for the most part 
imposed at a less rate on "earned” income as compared with 
"unearned”. In this way it comes about that in a country 
whose tax and income distribution is similar to that of 
Great Britain or the United States, a majority of the workerD 
are exempted altogether from payment of income tax: and many
of those who do pay the tax on the wages that they earn, 
are affected to only a very small extent. The extension 
in the supply of labour of such workers on account of income 
tax therefore will be of small amount.
From the other side of the equation, when the government 
distributes the tax proceeds in its public expenditure, the 
benefits will go in some measure to the working classes, 
perhaps taking thSfr form of different kinds of subsidized 
insurance, cheaper medical services, cheaper houses, and 
pensions of various kinds. Each person who benefits from 
this expenditure, whether through the receipt of increased 
purchasing power, or through the cheapening of certain 
services^ to him, will be in possession of a larger real 
income than before. Money will now possess for him a lower 
marginal utility than it formerly had done. He will tend to 
increase his consumption of the different commodities that 
he enjoys, and one of these commodities is leisure. Most
8.
individuals in the community will, through the expenditure 
of the proceeds of the income tax, tend to diminish the 
number of hours that they work.*
On balance the income tax, taking into account both 
its collection and its expenditure, will tend, ceteris 
paribus, to reduce the supply of labour in the community.
5* Let us examine the further economic effects that will 
follow when a reduction in the supply of labour per indi­
vidual comes about in this way. Owing to a number of rigid­
ities, such as psychological inertia and the difficulty of 
altering existing wage and hour agreements, it is unlikely that 
the hours of labour worked in industry will be reduced from 
say, 8 to 7-J-, until a fairly considerable period of time has 
elapsed. Instead, to begin with, various methods of slowing 
down work and making it less intense, are likely to be adopted. 
Piece-work may be abandoned in favour of time-work; "bonus" 
systems may be abandoned and more holidays introduced as an 
indirect means of reducing hours of labour per day on the 
average. These changes will secure to the workers a fuller 
satisfaction of their desires in relation to income and 
leisure•
Acting over the long period, the reduced willingness on 
the part of the workers to sppply labour will succeed, 
through a gradual remodelling of the terms of bargaining, 
in bringing into existence a shorter working day. The 
workers will then take out a larger portion of their incomes 
in the form of leisure and a smaller portion in the consump­
tion of material goods.
In each industry there will be a number of workers 
probably, who will experience, when the tax is imposed, a
The effects of education and some other factors are 
neglected in this discussion.
change in their willingness to supply labour that is 
different from that of fcfes most other men in the industry* 
To such workers this new difference from their fellows 
will be a source of psychological strain: it will diminish
the attractiveness of their own industry to them and in­
crease the relative attractiveness of some others. This 
factor will tend to bring about a change in the personnel 
og each industry and will act as a tendency towards change 
in the numbers employed in each industry. Its quanti­
tative importance, however, is not likely to be great.
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C H A P T E R  XII.
The Effect of the Income Tax in Changing the Size 
of Population in Short Periods and in the 
Long Period.
1* The Income Tax will exercise an effect on population 
through the redistribution of purchasing power that it brings 
about in the community. Some classes are rendered richer 
by it, other classes poorer than they were before. The 
classes that are richer will on that account tend tfi> produce 
a larger or a smaller number of children than they had done 
formerly. There will be a reaction also on the numbers in 
the classes that are poorer.
The size of population of any given income class in the 
community, will depend on two factors, the birth rate and the 
death rate for that class. Its net fertility rate = (birth 
rate - death rate),;' and gives the rate at which the population 
of the class increases in size. Initially since the com­
munity that we are considering had been stationary in numbers 
and of a stable age composition, the birth rate for each 
income class must have been equal to the death rate for that 
class (neglecting possibilities of immigration into and 
emigration out of that class).
Let us examine the time-variation in population caused 
by the income tax, both by its collection and by the expendi­
ture of its proceeds, on the birth and death rates of the 
different income classes. For convenience we speak as if 
the community concerned were fairly similar in its government 
and state of development to England or the United States at 
the present day.
This time-variation of population is more complicated than 
the usual case in economics, in which the tendency for each 
variable is to move progressively from its initial level
1.
towards the long period adjustment. In the case of popula­
tion, we will see, the movement is not always in a straight 
line towards the final positions sometimes the movement is 
in one direction, sometimes in another, depending on the 
period of time that has elapsed since the imposition of the 
tax.
2. Effect on the Death Rate in the Short-and in the 
Long Period. fc7»X
The revenue that has been provided by the newAincrement 
that has been imposed, is used partly, we assume, to help to 
finance auch things as improved schemes of sanitation, wel­
fare clinics and other measures designed to improve the 
community^ health. They will produce an effect in lowering 
the death rate that will be felt gradually and will gain
slowly in strength. Over the long period the money devoted
bri«9to these schemes will h w « Tarougfafr about a determinate lowering 
in the death rate and a determinate increase in the average 
length of life of people in the community. Old age and other 
pensions, will also exercise some effect in lowering the 
death rate.
There will therefore in the short and in the long period 
be a movement, as a result of the income tax, towards a lower­
ing in the death rate. The movement in death rate will be 
continuous until the final position is reached when the 
death rate stands at a new level lower than that from which 
it set out.
3. Movements in the Birth Rate of the Lower Income Glasses 
in the Short Period immediately following on the imposition 
of the income tax.
The redistribution of purchasing power brought about by 
the income tax is equivalent in ito effects to an increase 
in the wage rates of the poorer sections of the population 
whom the expenditure of the tax proceeds largely benefits,
2.
coupled with a reduction in the net incomes of the richer 
sections of the community, on whom, to a large extent, the 
tax is levied, and who receive little direct benefit from it.
The effect in the short period of an increased purchasing 
power that had come into the hands of the lower income classes, 
either through* aay, higher wage rates, or through increased 
governmental expenditure favouring these classes, would appear 
likely to be to increase the number ofmarriages that take 
place in the income strata affected, and to increase the number 
of births per family for the couples who already are married.
It has been verified by Douglas that a positive correla­
tion exists between short period movements in wage rates and 
short period movements in the birth rate. He did this by 
fitting a straight line curve to the statistics of wage rates 
in the United Kingdom, traced over the period of time 1861- 
1912, and in Massachusetts for the period of 1889-1929.
The ratio of the actual value of the wage rate for any year, 
to the trend value for that year, he defined as the "trend 
ratio" of wages. In the same jffay he fitted a straight line 
curve to the statistics of the birth rate over the same 
period and obtained the series of trend ratios for the birth 
rate. He then found the following correlations to exist 
between the movements of the statistics in the two series.
Table I .
Coefficients of Correlation between Trend Ratios of 
Relative Real Wages and of Birth Rate.*
Country. Period. No lag* Births lagged one year. Births lagged two years.
England 1861-1877 + • 23 1 +  .28 .22& Wales. 1878-1912 - .38 | Sr .05 -4- .36
Massachu­
setts . 1889-1929. *+ • 01 0° ■V *55
* Douglas, The Theory of Wages, p.391 and pp.396-7.
This confirms our expectation that short period rises in 
wage rates would be followed by short period increases in the 
birth rate. Thus we may take it that in the analagous case 
of an increase in the income tax, when its proceeds are partly 
expended so as to benefit the economic position of the poor, 
there will likewise be an increase in the birth rate of these 
classes•
. in the initial state of equilibrium the number of births 
per year had been equal to the number of deaths per year for 
each income class, in the short period immediately following 
the imposition of the income tax, the death rate will have 
changed but little, while the birth rate of the lower income 
classes has increased. The population of these classes, 
therefore, will be increasing.
Even though the birth rate of the richer classes were, 
during the short period immediately following on the imposi­
tion of the tax, to fall somewhat, these classes are not so 
important numerically as the lower income classes. On balance 
therefore the population of the country as a whole in the 
short period immediately following on the imposition of the 
tax, will show an increase.
4. Effects on the Birth Rate of the Lower Income Classes, 
and of the Higher Income Glasses, after the lapse of a
Further Period of Time and in the Long Period.
It is a well known feature of modern vital statistics 
that the birth rate for different social classes is negatively 
correlated with the income or social rank of these classes.
The explanation of this falling off in birth rate, as income
increases, appears to be that a family, when its income is
increased, .comes to appreciate more keenly the advantages that 
attach to an improved standard of living. it comes also to h_ 
more ambitious to extend a better education and a better start 
in life generally to its offspring. To achieve this the
4.
parents limit the size of their family, either by the exer­
cise of moral restraint, or by an increased use of the
methods of contraception.
The increase in the welfare of the lower income classes 
as a result of the tax, has the same effect as a displacement 
of these classes upwards on the scale of income; and, given 
a longer period then we had initially envisaged, there is 
reason, both from the side of statistics and from general 
reasoning to expect a fall in the birth rate of these classes 
to set in.
An historical digression, in elaboration of this view, 
may here be of some assistance. Investigations that have been 
made inV®¥ population show that in England before 1877, rich 
people and poor people had approximately the same number of 
children in their families.* ±n that year the trial of 
Bradlaugh and Besant on a charge of publishing a piece of in­
decent literature caused it to be known among the reading 
public, which was considerably narrower then than it is now, 
that methods of contraception existed. To begin with this 
knowledge was confined for the most part to the rich and 
well-to-do classes; only gradually did the knowledge filter 
downwards to the poorer classes; with the result that even 
at the present day the richer the class of people concerned 
the more use does it make of contracepti)^ methods. This isA
well brought out by a table of statistics quoted by Hiffles 
and based on conditions in the U.S., English experience may 
be presumed to be fairly similar. The table shows the percen­
tage of the very poor, the poor etc., out of a large sample, 
who make use of contraception.
* G.U. Yule, The Fall in the Birth Kate, p.22*
5.
Table II.*
The Practice of Contraception in relation to Economic 
Status.
Very Poor. Moderate Rich
Poor. Circumstances•
No contracep­
tion. 67% 61% 49% 2 2 %
Using contra­
ception. 33 % 39% 51% 7Q%
Totals: 100% 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 %
The table shov/s e.g., that two thirds of the very poor 
people in the sample were making no use of contraception 
and only a fifth of the rich in it were not using it. Of 
the imtermediate groups in the sample, it was true, that, the 
higher the economic status of the group, the more the use did 
it make of contraception.
As a result of this feature of social life it has come 
about that in the period following 1877, the richer the class 
of people and the higher its economic status the smaller has 
been the average size of family. Stevenson gives the follow­
ing table based on the figures of the Population Census of 
1911. Social status descends as we move from Class I in 
the table to Class V. At the top Glass I comprises the 
rich and middle class; and at the foot of the scale Class V 
represents unskilled labour.
Table III.1
Fertility of marriage distinguished by social 
Class, for England and Wales.
Social Children born per






* N.Himes, "New Light on the causes of the Declining Birth
In f f  the Modern world Essayser, edited bv N.Himes, p.314
The higher the social class and the higher the income 
the smaller the number of children born to the average 
family, in it.
Let us now apply this knowledge to the theory of the 
effects of the income tax over the long period. When, 
through the collection of the tax and the expenditure of its 
proceeds, the poorer classes in the community benefit, the
O MCfifigures that we have cited strongly suggest that ainoe they 
odahteo4 *have become adjustea to the new higher standard of living, 
extended to them by the income tax, the poorer classes will 
tend to restrict the number of children in their families 
more than they had done in the equilibrium position from which 
the population had started out.
Hence we consider that although in the short period im­
mediately following on the imposition of the tax there will be 
a rise in the birth rate of the population, after the lapse 
of a further period of time this rise in the birth rate will 
be more than annulled by the opposite effect of a fall in the 
birth rate. And it seems that the fall in the birth rate 
will, in all probability, carry sufficiently far to cause, 
even taking into account the slight downward movement in the 
death rate, a fall, on balance^in the size of the population.*
It is of some interest to trace the probable course of 
the birth rate for the richer classes during the same period
1. Footnote from previous page:
Stevenson, "The Fertility of Various social Classes in 
England and Wales from the Middle of the Nineteenth 
Century to 1911", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
1920, p.410.
* In view of the emphasis with which the Classical economists 
reiterated that the social services - then the Poor Law 
—  would increase population, it is interesting that 
neither Griffith nor Blackmore and Mellonie can find 
evidence of it having in fact led to such increase.
See W.T. Griffith, Population Problems of the Ase of 
Maithus, pp.151-165* and Blackmore and Mellonie, """ 
family Endowment_ and the Birth Rate in the Early lgth 
Century”, two articles in the History Supplement of the
Economic Journal f0r Hay 1927, and January lg28. s^T~ 
Vol?i°ia54am’ A*1 Economic History of Modem Britain,
of time. These classes will he in receipt of lower incomes 
than they had been formerly. Table III. again shows that 
a negative correlation exists between income and the birth 
rate. Would this lead us to expect a rise in the birth rate 
for those classes whose incomes, due to the income tax, have 
now fallen ? The answer would seem to be No. The existing 
negative correlation has come to hold good in a community in 
which all classes, including the higher income classes, have 
been coming into possession of continuously increased incomes, 
and have been coming to possess a wider knowledge of the 
methods of birth control. But the process is not a reversi­
ble one. If, as now, we envisage the incomes of the rich as 
being diminished by the imposition of the income tax, the 
knowledge of birth control of these richer classes will not 
on that account, tend to diminish and become closer to that 
of the class next in order below them in the social scale.
Thus we cannot accept the correlation between class and birth 
rate given in Table III as holding good in the case of
taxation of income of these richer classes. Indeed neither 
statistical nor historical investigation affords any direct 
parallel. Thus as regards the effect on population in the 
upper income classes whose money income has been reduced, 
we feel that we must shun the existing correlations and 
rather rely, for our estimate of the future, on general reas­
oning .
If we consider the notions and feelings of the rich 
people concerned, they have suffered a fall in standard of 
living of which they will be acutely aware. We should expect 
them to endeavour so far as possible to attempt to conserve 
their standard of living; and this would lead them to further 
restrict the number of their children. Knowledge of the
methods of birth control is certainly widely enough diffused 
among the rich classes at the present day to enable them to 
give effect to any desire they have to restrict numbers.
Our conclusion therefore is^that when an income tax is im­
posed, both in the short period and in the long period after 
the imposition of the tax, numbers among the richer classes 
should be expected to fall.
5. Summary of the Movements in Birth Rate, Death Rate and 
Size of Population.
The movement that will take place in the death rate of 
the community as a result of the imposition of the tax and 
the expenditure of its proceeds, will be a slow fall. The 
movement that will take place in the birth rate will be, in 
the initial stages a rise: after that a fall will set in.
For a time we envisage birth rate as being below death rate 
in the population and the total population as declining.
In the long period, however, size of population must be 
constant: birth rate must then be equal to death rate. Hence 
in the intervening period either birth rate must fall to a 
sufficient extent as to be equal to death rate, and this
seems improbable of occurrence in practice: or else birth
/
rate must, after a time, rise so as to be equal to death 
rate. We accept this, which seems the more likely of 
occurrence, as being what actually does happen in our commu­
nity. We give in diagram I a sketch of the movements in 
birth rate, death rate and total population that we expect to
£ I 9 gtake place. In particular the total of population in 
the final situation is smaller than that from which it had 
started out; and the average length of life in the new state 
of affairs is longer than it had been to begin with.
# An assumption that we have made is that the population 
starts out from a certain stable size and finally 
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The horizontal straight line dsawn through the point Ri 
meets the curve of birth rate at time 0 A. Birth rate has 
then falleii again to its initial height.
Population reaches its maximum at time 0 B, the point 
at which birth rate is equal to death rate.
The view that we take in regard to the effect produced 
on population in the long period agrees with that expressed 
by W r i g h t 7who says that^apart from direct propaganda in favour 
of birth control,if it were desired to bring about a reduction 
in the numbers of the class of unskilled labourers then "the 
most effective means towards that end appears to be a rise 
in the standard of life, improved social conditions and 
better housing accommodation, as long as these benefits are 
not obtained at the expense of parental responsibility
When we estimate that the behaviour of the size of pop­
ulation will be of the fashion described we are being, of 
course, purely empirical* we are stating the result that 
appears most likely to occur in a country about the present 
stage of economic and cultural development as Great Britain 
and which is ruled by a democratic government. The manner in 
which the tax proceeds are spent as well as the stage of 
cultural development of the country will influence the size 
and nature of the population change. In countries subject to
* H. Wright, Population, p,165»
10.
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dictatorships a rise in population might even take place 
over a considerable period of time, owing to the nature of 
the public expenditure financed by the tax. Such a popu­
lation increase is likely at any rate to be an aim of the 
dictators,though their instruments for carrying out this aim 
may prove inadequate.*
6. In the period during which the size of the population 
is altering, the age composition of the population will be 
altering as well; and from the point of view of the economic 
results it produces, the altering age composition of the pop­
ulation, while it is taking place, may be hardly less important 
than the altering total size. In the initial stages after the 
tax has been imposed, babies and young people will be more 
plentiful in relation to people in the other age groups, than 
had been the case to begin with. Producers whose goods are 
purchased or used mainly by young people will experience to 
begin with an expansion in the market for their goods. Later 
they will find their markets contract. In particular where 
these goods are durable and not readily put to other uses, the 
fall in the incomes of the people concerned will be heavy. If in
the early stages there had been correct adjustment/, then in j
the later stages there will be "excess capacity" in the plant 
of such industries. Such industries will include the school- 
teaching profession and others that cater for the needs of 
babies, nursing mothers and young people.1
* See D.V. Glass, The Struggle for population, especially
Chapters II - IV*  ̂ ' ~ !Glass mentions that the earliest Act of the German 
Government to stimulate birth and marriage rates, the 
Marriage Loan Act of 1935, was financed by an income 
tax. Op. cit., p.22.
Robbins "Some Probable Consequences of the Advent 




The Effect of the Income Tax on the Quantity of Capital 
in the Short and in the Long Period.
1. In order to analyse the effect on capital of the 
increment of tax that has been imposed, we make the following 
assumptions.
(i) We assume that no unit of the labour force in 
the community is unemployed; in the sense that if any unit 
of labour is willing to accept work at a certain weekly wage 
and if an employer is willing to hire it at that wage, then 
it is open to both labourer and employer to contract accord­
ingly.
This hypothesis, on account of certain trade union 
regulations, would not be quite true of the situation as it 
exists in Great Britain today.
(ii) In order to render the conditions of the 
problem definite and get a determinate solution, we must make 
certain assumptions as to the nature of the policy pursued by 
the banking system in the community. The banking system 
might quite logically be supposed to pursue any definite policy 
whatever. The price movements, capital and population move­
ments would differ with each different policy that was assumed.
Let us in fact make the supposition, that the banking system of 
the community maintainjjSf, the volume of money, constant. We 
suppose, that is, that the banking system always lends out to 
industry just that quantity of money that its depositors entrust 
to its keeping.
2. Let us choose any individual whatever in the community. 
He will have definite tastes and definite family responsibilities. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that, if the individual's income 
had been greater, then in the long period and given time for
his assumption and expenditure to become adapted to their
A
equilibrium level, he would have saved either the same amount 
or else more than he actually does do at his present level of
1.
income; and that of all the individuals in the community there
£ t 4 c h  c i r c u i t s  t a i c e s  „will at any rate he some who will save more in thio way i
Hence if net income he measured along the k - axis,
i.e. income net of all expenses necessarily entailed in the earning 
of it, and total savings per year along the -axis, then the long 
period curve of supply of savings s« for any individual will either 
he horizontal or else slope unwards, and for some individuals at 
any rate at their present level of income the curve will he upward- 
sloping. For the individual in the diagram, (see diagram 1), the 
long period curve of savings 3% is shown with a horizontal patch.
the person on whom the increment of income tax has been imposed.
He has, for a number of years before the levy, been in receipt of 
an income QIj say, (diagraml). He has become accustomed to living 
at a certain standard and saving a certain sum per year. His tastes 
and his mode of life have become adapted to that level of expenditure. 
In the early stages after the imposition of the tax the person will 
find it difficult to contract his standard of expenditure. He will
tend to postpone the day of a reduced standard, and at this early 
stage after the imposition of the tax will prefer to meet his tax 
payment by a reduction in his rate of saving. Only gradually and 
as further time passes will he curtail the amount of his customary 
expenditure and restore the level of his savings nearer to its 
former level. That is the move of supply of savings, Ss, of the 
individual for any short period, will, to the left of the point I|, 
lie below the long period curve S^. The greater the length of the 
short period of time that has been allowed to elapse, the nearer will 
the position of the curve Ss be to that of the curve S^.
Let us now consider the situation in the short period of
O Zdiagram 1.
»  tote  m e # * *  / i c r  y e a r  .
3. In these circumstances let us consider the influence 
that the tax will have on the short period supply of savings.
The tax assessment on the particular individual 
concerned, reduces, let us suppose, his net income from the 
level 0I]_ the short period of time to which the
curve Ss has reference, the individual^ savings will fall 
from the level I^A to I2 B.
Total savings in the community had been initially 
at the rate XIlA. After the lapse of the short period to 
which the curve Ss has reference, the total rate of savings 
of the community - Z I2B> whi^h is below the initial rate. 
Hence as a result of the imposition of the income tax the 
communityTs rate of saving will decline.
It is true that as a result of the expenditure of the 
proceeds of the tax, incomes inthe lower income strata of 
the population will have increased. The money incomes of 
the people in these classes will have been increased by 
sums distributed to them directly e.g. as pensions or 
insurance payments, by the government: their real incomes
will have been further increased by services rendered to 
them by the government either free or below their competitive 
market pricesj e.g., medical or educational services.
On account of the$e increases in their incomes the poorer 
classes will now tend to save more than they had done fornesrl|fy
H1 An assumption underlying this method of reasoning 
is that gross rate of remuneration of each individual in 
the community remains unchanged, as between the date when 
the tax was imposed and the point in time to which the 
curve refers. The treatment only holds good for the length 
of time for which this assumption can be made with fair 
accuracy. The shorter the period the more nearly fulfilled 
will the assumption be•
Yet the movement from this source, towards restor­
ation of the level of savings of the community, as compared 
with the movement towards a decline, will he small: because
in a community situated like Great Britain or the United 
States, say, the poorer classes make only a comparatively 
small fraction of the community's total saving. Increased 
savings by the poorer classes will only annul in small part 
the tendency we have found towards a reduction in the savings 
made by the richer classes.
As a result of this contraction in the rate of saving 
there will be, in the short period, a contraction in the 
volume of the community's capital and a rise in the rate of 
interest •
In calculating the extent by which the rate of interest will
rise in the short period owing to the reduced flow of savings,
two further factors must be taken into account. The current
savings of a country form only a small position of the
country's capital and the rate of interest is determined
by the intersection of the community's supply curve of capital
'thus $and its demand curve for capital. -Thfrcr^tamp has calculated that
A
the national wealth of Great Britain amounts to about £21,000
*1 *2 millions, while the annual savings are about £500 millions;
2i%9 that is of the national wealth. But it is,broadly speak­
ing, the national wealth that constitutes the supply of capital: 
so that even though the irf. were to cut down the flow of savingsA
by say 10%, it would not on that account cut down the supply of 
capital by anything like the same percentage; but instead only
*1 Sir J.G. Stamp, "The National Capital",
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society^ 1931, p. 21.
*2 Adopting the estimate of Mr. Coates. See Oolwyn Report.
by l/lO th of 2 s%f that is by *25%, At the same time the 
reduction in savings will, ceteris paribus. act in a
a.cumulative fashion, the effect brought about say, in 5 yearA
period, being roughly 5 times as great as that in a one year 
period.
The second factor in the situation is that owing 
to the changes in demand conditions brought about and the 
uncertainty created in the new situation the is is likely to
A
be, in the period before equilibrium is re-established a 
considerable wastage of capital. The older capital instruments 
and durable goods, (whose value in the arithmetical example 
was £Sfc,000 millions), will, many of them, be less well 
adapted to the new system of production and demand, than they 
had been to the old. On this account their value will fall*
In the new conditions too, producers'fore casts will undergo 
a long period of variation and gradual correction before each 
producer achieves the optimum adjustment of his productive 
resources to the demand and cost conditions of the market.
The demands exercized in the market by individuals for goods 
will also be undergoing change as part of the wide system of 
variation set in the movement by the tax. Even if producers* 
forecasts had always been correct and producers had been 
endowed with perfectly accurate foresight, the changing numbers 
and changing age compositMfif of the population would often 
have rendered machinery valueless after it had been in use for 
some time, though it was still physically in good condition. 
Because of this and because it renders forecasting more 
difficult, the changing numbers and age composition of the 
population will be a potent force, additional to the falling 
off in savings, towards a reduction in the supply of capital.
See Douglas 0]3, cit. t PP • 421-2; Galandra,
La ripereussione dell' impost's sul reddito, pp, 52—3
We have thus shown that the supply schedule of* capital 
in the community at the end of the short period will he raised 
above its initial position; and on this account the rate of
A
Mtr«reslr Ŝ /y interest at the end of the short period
will tend to be raised. The extent of 
the resultant rise in the rate of inter­
est however, will depend further onI L'i
1  z --- ZTctitxal whether or not a change has taken placeDiagram l£ . r
in the shape of the demand curve for capital in the community.
If the demand curve should have fa lie n ? through people after the
tax concentrating their demand to a greater extent on commodities
whe$e manufacture requires but little capital, then this would tend
to reduce the resultant rise in the rate of interest. But the
|0*rcri*achance of induced changes reioirfg the demand curve for capital in
P»iS i n a
this way would appear to be no greater than their chance of lowom  
it. We will therefore suppose that the alteration in the 
height of the demand curve for capital is sufficiently small for 
it to be neglected. Demand conditions for capital are the same 
as before: the supply?-of capital has fallen off as compared with
the(initial situation. Hence the rate of interest in the newi
state of affairs will be higher than it had been initially.
4. The longer the period of time allowed to elapse, the less 
satisfactory does a partial equilibrium treatment of the kind we 
have given, become. This treatment would suggest that over the 
long period the rate of saving of the community is equal to 2  Ig C. 
Initially it had been£l2A. But for every individual in the 
community IgC is either equal to or less than I2A* And for some 
individuals at least IgC is less than IgA . Hence £  IgC is less 
than £ l 2A and the rate of saving in the community is lower than 
to begin with. The rate of saving in the long period is less 
than the initial rate but greater than that ( 2  I^b) of the short 
Period.
C'
Too many other changes however have taken place 
in the community, of which no account is taken, for a theory 
of this kind to be very meaningful. Peoples* gross incomes 
(before deduction of income tax) have changed as a result 
of the tax: the number of persons over whom the summation
is made has altered as a result of the tax: their scales
of preference, in regard, among other things, to savings, 
have undergone alteration as compared with the initial 
equilibrium state . And a partial equilibrium treatment is 
no longer a satisfactory one.
Yet I think that in this case also, save in very
unusual circumstances, we may be satisfied that the total
rate of the community*s saving and the total volume of its
capital, will have declined. Of the incomes that people
receive they pay away to the government, a larger amount in
taxation than they had done initially: over the intervening
period capital wastage has been taking place through a
changing size of population and a changing age grouping.
Both of these population changes tend to upset producers*
expectations, and reduce the quantity of the community*s
capital. Even if producers in these circumstances, had had
a
perfect foresight there would have been^certain loss in 
capital values from this source: because a piece of capital
that is adapted to satisfy the demands of a population of a 
given size and of a given age grouping must, in many cases, 
lose value when the population from whom the demand comes, 
undergoes a change with the lapse of time. Even had 
producers been gifted with perfect foresight, the value 
of the community*s capital would have been reduced on this 
account •
We accept the conclusion therefore, that in the 
long period as well as in the short, a fall in the quanity 
of the community*s capital will have come about.
7.
(3?)
Yet what matters from the point of view of wages rate 
and real income per head of population, is not the total 
quantity of capital in the community, but the quantity of 
capital per head. The total quantity of capital it is 
true, has declined. But so also has the population of the 
community. Hence although total capital has declined it is 
not necessarily the case that capital per head has declined: 
this may have declined, have remained constant or increased.
What matters is the percentage amount of decline in the total 
capital of the community in relation to the percentage decline 
in population. If the proportionate fall in population has 
been the greater, then even though the total quantity of capital 
is less, the quantity of capital per head will be greater than 
it had been initially.
Which of the pair, capital or population, will have declined
the more? It is not possible, on the basis of the reasoning
given, to return a definite answer to this question. The
quantity of the community's capital had begun to decline
immediately after the tax was imposed: and the decline had been
continuous until the position of final equilibrium was reached.
The numbers in the population had increased to begin with after
the tax and then had begun to decline. The decline in numbers
may have continued so far as to leave the quantity of capital
initialper head greater than it had been in the^position of equilibrium: 
or the decline in population may have been less great than this, 
leaving the quantity of capital per head in the community on a 
reduced level from initially. Both cases are theoretically 
possible of occurrence .
5. Einaudi, although he is not at the time discussing 
specifically the question of the income tax, has arrived at
3? 1certain conclusions bearing on the point under discussion
fiinaudi ”Osservazioni critiche intorno alia teoria dell1 
amortamento dell1 imports", 1919.
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A highly important question, he says, is that of the use made 
by the State of the financial means that the tax has placed at 
its disposal. The use that it made of these financial means may be 
K*) just as advantageous and no more,
(W more advantageous,
(r) less advantageous, 
than the use that would have been made of the funds by the private 
individuals concerned.
Case <P-), Einaudi thinks, ought to be envisaged as a possible 
case in economic analysis. When it is realized9then althougjh in 
the short period the tax may cause the flow of goods and services 
in the community to contract, still, over the long period, owing 
to the building of streets, bridge s, schools and railways it will 
cause the national income to expand. He envisages population 
as remaining constant the while . Thus his conclusion is one 
opposed to that at which we have arrived. tlffe do not envisage 
an expansion of the national income as a result of a tax, as 
being possible of occurrence .
The source of our difference of opinion from Einaudi in 
this regard arises partly from a different conception of the 
State/ that we entertain;and partly from our following a 
methodology that has more explicitly reference to the conditions 
of the stationary state. Einaudi's conception of the State is 
the same as that of his great teacher, De Viti. De Viti in 
fin important passage of his work says that a tax instead of 
raising cost of production may lower it.
1 Let us take as an example an association of proprietors 
who at their own expense maintain a private road for the 
transportation of their merchandise. The transportation is a 
part of the cost of production.
let us now suppose that these proprietors agree to pay the 
State, in the form of a tax, as much as or less than they used to
spend for their private road, and that the State builds and 
maintains a better road, on which transportation is more 
convenient and faster.
It could not be said in such a case, that the tax increased 
the previous cost of transportation. it must be said to have 
decreased it.
Prom this special example we may pass to the general case--
namely, that the introduction of public services and their growth 
and improvement have reduced the cost of all the productive 
activities of the country. Hence it is necessary to discuss the 
problem on the most general hypothesis that the substitution of 
public enterprise for private enterprise results in advantages 
for the taxpayers. But even if the contrary hypothesis is 
adopted, it will always have to be admitted that it is not the 
tax paid by the producer that decides, but the nature of the public 
services produced and the degree to which each individual enterprise 
can in fact make use of these services .
To sum up: the previous cost of production may have been
increased, left as it was, or diminished by an increase in taxes.
tf- -iIn pure theory it must be said to have decreased."
In a later work of his, Einaudi, after quoting from this
passage, speaks thus in the same vien as it:
"When the tax is in fact what it is in theory, it inevitably 
increases and does not diminish the flow of social income; it 
increases saving and increases capital values. And when the tax 
is truly such, the discussion of incidence and of losses is a 
figurative way of speaking, which confuses ideas, because it applies 
to the affairs of perfect States, words which men rightly used at 
those times when governments were enemies, oppressors,spoilers and
De Viti, op .cit., P* 151
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xlplunderers of the populations ."
6 . As opposed to this view of De Viti and Einaudi, it 
appears to us that there are only three sets of circumstances 
worthy of mention in which the imposition of a tax could lead to 
an increase in the national income.
The first of these is where the government is wiser than the 
people from whose pockets the tax extracts the money, so that it 
makes better or "more productive" use of the money. An example 
of this would be where, in the example of De Viti, the government 
drew up a better plan of a road than would have been drawn up by 
the private individuals in the country, had they been left to 
themse lve s .
Under the conception of perfect competition, which is used 
for example by Knight ,* in which it is assumed that each individual 
knows the prices of all factors and of all commodities in the 
market, such a contingency as this viz .? that the government is 
wiser than the individuals in the community - would not be possible 
of occurrence. Because, to take the example given by De Viti, 
why should not the manufacturers in the industry concerned^ come 
together and decide to maintain the road in the way eventually 
done by the State? Ex/ hypothesi they must have had sufficient 
knowledge to enable them to do so. Or else why should not another 
company have undertaken the provision of such road services, either 
making lump-sum charges on the manufacturers concerned or else 
charging tolls to the traffic that used it? The example chosen 
by De Viti in fact, when we make the assumption of the existence 
of the type of perfect competition that involves perfect knowledge, 
seems sufficient to establish the opposite conclusion from what 
De Viti arrives at: it establishes the conclusion, namely, that
the proceeds of a tax, when employed by the government, could 
never, in these circumstances, be more productive of an income of
* Einaudi, "ottima Impoyta", p.. 81. footnote.
Knight, Risk Uncertainty and Profit., pp. 76-80#
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divisible commodities, than if it had been employed in industry 
by the persons who had paid the tax.
The assumption regarding knowledge which we ourselves have 
made in this book, is not so far-reaching as the one we have 
mentioned. We do not assume that each individual has a perfect 
knowledge of all market prices: but only that "when stationary
conditions have emerged i.e. both initially and finally in
the analysis that we make the knowledge of ea<sh individual
relating to prices is also taken to be stationary, bteer?̂ not
A
necessarily, even then, perfect."*1 Thus on our assumption it 
is not formally impossible that the government should be wiser in 
regard td matters like road-building^etc., than are the private 
individuals in the community: though it is impossible, we have
on o u r  aS suml / t k io * *$  j
shown, on the assumption of perfect knowledge. yet while^the 
possibility is not formally ruled out by auuiBHptilTmj^ that the 
government should be wiser in these matters than the people 
directly concerned, we consider that the likelihood of this being
true in practice is so remote that the possibility can be
disregarded in our analysis also.
The second set of circumstances m  which the productiea type
A
of State action envisaged by Einaudi and De Viti might come about,
would be where the imposition of the tax in question caused an
increase in the net investment of the community. This might come 
about say, partly because the government had used the proceeds of 
the tax in a way that was productive, directly or indirectly, of 
divisible commodities, and partly because the tax had induced 
people to cut down their consumption expenditure, giving as the 
upshot of the whole process, the equivalent of a greater amount 
of yearly investment than then would have been had there been no tax.
Now if we were considering the imposition of an extra increment 
of one tax to replace an increment of another tax—  e .g. if an
*7,1 Supra, Chapter 8, •
additional increment of the income tax were imposed in order to
enable the government to abolish a portion of the tax on inherited
estates then it seems not improbable that as a result of the
adjustment the net investment of the community would be increased.
asBut if the problem, in this book, is that of the imposition of an 
increment of the income tax, in addition to the rest of the 
existing system of taxation, the possibility that the effect of 
this additional increment of income tax should cause an increase 
in net investment seems sufficiently remote in most circumstances 
to make it convenient that it should be disregarded in theory.
One type of public expenditure however, does appear to exist 
which may prove very productive and which only a government and 
not private individuals could well undertake : we refer to the
case of public expenditure on education. For special reasons, 
although expenditure on education may prove very productive from 
the point of view of the national income of a country, it is not 
likely to be undertaken by private enterprise. The reasons are 
that in the case of juveniles who had been educated, difficulties 
would arise in regard to the ascertainment of the value of the 
improvement or the increased productivity that had taken place in 
the individual, through the education. As well difficulties of 
legal contract would arise, which would render private enterprise 
rather impotent in this matter.
In this, the case where the tax proceeds are spent on 
education, and in this case only,it appears to us, would it be 
useful to introduce the conception (in our own analysis), that 
it is possible that the imposition of a tax might lead to an
increase in the national income of the community. At most^however,
the occurrence of the particular points in the expansion of the 
public expenditure of a country at which the money raised by
taxation is going to be devoted in sufficient proportion to
education, and where this education is going to be sufficiently
13
productive of income in the form of divisible goods and services 
as to cause the national income to rise, will be rare in practice. 
This possibility, it is true, has not been included in the analysis 
we have given in the earlier paragraphs of this chapter, in which 
we state that a necessary consequence of the tax will be to 
reduce the total national capital and the total national income .
The criticism we have given of the views expressed by 
De Viti and Einaudi goes to strengthen the conclusion arrived at 
earlier, that the national capital will be reduced as a result of
the tax save possibly in one instance, that in which the
proceeds of the tax are devoted in part to education. The 
dynamic phenomena that would result in this case are complex 
and would be difficult to deal with in exact economic terms.
CHAPTER 1U.
Some Conclusions in regard to the Incidence of* a General Income Tax.
a
1• To present^synthetie picture of the incidence of a 
general income tax, we require to combine the effects from the
three sources of change on the side of supply --  change in
labour supply per individual, change in size of population and
change in capital structure ---  and to take along with these
the changes that are going on in the demand schedules of the 
government and of the different income classes in the community. 
Further it is the moving picture of the variation of change 
through time that is important.
Let us take first in conjunction with each other, the 
movements in population and capital in the community. The 
movement in population after the tax has been imposed, is first 
an increase and then a decline until a new stable level of popu­
lation is reached, lower than that from which the population 
had set out. In the meantime after the tax is imposed, a fall 
in the total volume of capital sets in that continues into the 
long period.
If we refer to diagram I on page ius- gUPRA, birth rate 
is higher than the- old rate, as a result of the income tax, 
during the period of time between zero and OA. Let us suppose 
that the school education of most children covers the period of their 
lives between uheir 5th and 15th years. Then between the date 
zero and the date (OA + 15) years**^ there will be a tendency to
.1 Thl. end other d.tee
“  rsss s to d..a  .dui..
and among children respectively, etc.
decline in average standard of living through people having to 
maintain a larger number of children per family than they had 
in the initial equilibrium state of affairs. During this period 
of time, standard of living will also be falling on account of 
the gradually contracting total volume of capital.
On the other hand in this short period of time between years £ei 
and (OA + 15) years after the imposition of the tax, the govern­
mental expenditure of the tax proceeds will be acting in the 
opposite direction towards an increase in the standard of living 
of the poorer people in the community; and if a considerable 
portion of the tax proceeds is spent in social services and in 
other ways benefitting the poor^the forces towards a rise in 
standard of living will outweigt those towards a decline. 
Particularly will this be so in the early stages after the 
imposition of the tax when the forces towards decline in standard 
are only commencing to operate and those of assistance to the 
poorer classes are strong.
After the date (OA + 15) approximately,the standard of living 
of the lower income classes will show a tendency to rise, through 
the smaller number of children per family; governmental 
expenditure of the tax proceeds will act in the same direction.
The force of a smaller quantity of capital per head of population 
still acts in the opposite direction towards a fall in the standard 
of living; and the force by this time, through the smaller 
quantity of savings over a period of years and the capital wastage 
taking place in these years, will nave gained in strength.
The years following tne date 15 years after the imposition 
of the tax, will witness the arrival of the increased labour force 
(through the increased oirth rate between dates zero to OA*, on 
the labour market. The total labour supply in the community in
fact, will nave begun to increase before this, through the gradual 
lowering tnat had set in in tne death rate.
Tne increase in labour supply will tend to increase tne 
productivity of capital. But it is improbable tnat tne volume 
of savings will attain to its old level: because tne period after
tne imposition of tne tax is one of a changing size and age composition 
of population, of changing demand schedules, of entrepreneurial « 
uncertainty and reduced savings. During this period there must 
be a contraction in the total amount of the community1 s capital. 
Although tne productivity per unit of capital will be higher at, 
say, the date (OA •* 15) years than it nad been initially, tne 
total quantity of capital on which this higher rate of interest ;
is earned will be smaller: and total savings will be lower than
it had been initially.
During this time there will be two independent forces tending j
to reduce tne value of capital goods as compared with what they 
had been before the tax was imposed. The change in demand j
schedules through the altered distribution of income, through the 
changing size and age-grouping of the population, will on the 
average, render plant less suitable to the new state of affairs 
than it had been in the past. Again in the short period, we 
have seen, the rate of interest will tend to increase: capital |
values will therefore, be reckoned at a smaller number of years 
purchase of annual income. Both these causes will act so as to 
reduce tne capital value of plant that nad been in existence wnen
the tax was imposed.
Probably shortly after tne date (OA -f 15) years the total j
quantity of labour in tne community will attain its peak and 
thereafter will begin to decline. Tne decline will continue 
until it comes down to its initial quantity, then it will fall 
below that. This fall in the labour force will tend to cause a !
3.
fall in the marginal productivity of capital and will entail a 
reduction in the incomes of the rich.
A much more important aspect of the contraction in labour
force that sets in, is that it tends to increase the quantity of 
capital that is being combined with the labour of each worker. 
Thus it tends to increase wage rate per head of the population.
How far will the fall in numbers carry in relation to the
fall that has taken place in capital? Will it carry far enough 
to raise quantity of capital per head to its initial figure, or 
will it not go as far? This, we said, is the crucial question ' 
to which no definite answer can be given.
2. Now let us take in conjunction with capital and popu­
lation movements, the movement in supply of labour per individual 
in the population. The analysis that we gave, taken along with 
the existing statistical evidence, was sufficient to establish 
that, in the short period, there would be, due to the expenditure 
of the tax proceeds, a tendency towards reduction in the number 
of hours worked by the average individual in the lower income 
strata. In the short period following on the imposition of the 
tax, we should expect probably, not actual reductions in hours of 
labour worked, but instead various tendencies towards a slowing 
down o£ the pace of work, hours of labour themselves, because of 
various frictions, remaining unchanged.
For the higher income strata, which would include works 
managers, higher administrative staff, company directors^etc. , as 
well as professional men like lawyers, doctors, authors, no 
statistical material exists on which to base a judgment of fact. 
Since our analytical treatment had shown that the reaction on the
part of any individual might he towards either a lengthening or 
towards a shortening of working hours, in the absence of statistical 
evidence for these higher income classes, no judgment as to the 
probable direction of change in their supply of labour can be 
expressed.
Over the longer period, when population and capital both 
alter, if quantity of capital per head of population alters in 
such a way that, taken in conjunction with the altered distribution 
of the national income more in favour of the lower income classes, 
the real income per head for the classes is greater than before, 
then the supply of labour per head 'for these classes will be less 
than before, so introducing a tendency towards reduction in standard 
of living. Vice versa, if it should be the case that taken by them­
selves, the movements in capital per head combined with the 
distributional effects of the income tax, would be such as to tend 
to a reduction in standard of living per head, then members of the 
industrial classes will tend to work longer hours. This will help 
to counteract the fall in the standard of living.
3. As to the part played by changing demand schedules in
the community, the disbursement of a greater proportion of the 
national income on the goods and services consumed by the poor, 
will involve a rise in the short period in the prices of these
vnatetk<t.
goods, and positive quasi-rents for the factors engaged in worlin&g 
them. The factors catering for the wants of the rich will, at 
the same time, be getting negative quasi-rents• With the lapse 
of a further period of time, factors off production will gradually 
transfer from the one set of industries towards the other. New 
factories will be built that cater for the wants of the poor.
Certain firms that had catered for the wants of the rich will not 
renew machinery as it wears out and will go out of production. 
Gradually a larger proportion of the community* s plant will come 
to fo© concentrated in the one set of industries than nad been 
the case to begin with. Gradually also, as the transfer takes
place, the price rises that nad taken place in the goods consumed 
by the poor will subside: the positive quasi-rents of the factors
engaged in the manufacture of these goods will likewise subside. 
Similarly in the case of goods consumed by the rich, the prices 
of these goods and the rates of remuneration of the factors making 
them will, in the short period immediately following the imposition 
of the tax, fall below their previous levels. But with the lapse 
of a further period of time the prices of these goods and the 
rewards of these factors, will begin to move upwards towards their 
former heights. The pnice movements upwards, for both goods and 
factors, will be the quicker,
(a) the less durable are the goods concerned, and
(b) the more readily are the factors engaged in making them^ 
transferable to other industries.
A corresponding system of transfers of income and capital 
among the individuals in the community will be set up. Some 
individuals will profit in a way that had not been foreseen, from 
the changes that take place: others will lose. The talents and
capital of some men will be better adapted to take advantage of 
the new state of affairs than they had been to take advantage of 
the old; of others, less w£ll adapted.
4. Finally a laxger proportion of the community*s income 
"ill no. be consumed in the form of indivisible goods such as justice, 
defence against an external enemy (if the community be not an isolated
one,) as compared with divisible goods, tnan had initially been the 
case.
In the short period of time the factors of production engaged
directly and indirectly in the manufacture of State goods of this
kind will reap positive quasi-rents. Given the lapse of a
sufficient period of time the rewards of these factors will reach
newthe level normal to the long period condition of equilibrium.
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CH&PTER 15.
THE IHCOME TAX, PROFITS AHD UHCERTAINITY.
J l̂g
1. There are two kinds of rioSos that a company is
confronted with, predictable and unpredictable risks. To begin
with let us consider predictable risks.
Against these predictable risks a company may or may not
have insured before the imposition of the additional increment of
income tax • The risks being predictable, the manufacturer knows
beforehand what their average weight is going to be: but a period
of weeks or months or of years may be required to elapse, before
the process will have worked itself out sufficiently to permit him
to regard the average weight of the risk as having been attained.
In the last case the risk becomes a known cost or expense of
production, but only over a period of working of the firm covering
several years. 1‘or example breakages of plate glass in a chain of
retail establishments owned by a firm, or danger; due to fire in the
small country stations of a railway company, or compensation paid
by a firm to its workmen on account of accidents, may work out at a
very stable figure in a period of time of some years. In the case
of a risk or expense of production of this type it may be more
profitable for the company concerned not to insure against the risk
* 1
but to bear the risk itself._______ ___________________________________
at 1 1 If a business has a large enough number of risks and
if the risks are independent of one another, it is likely to be 
cheaper not to insure, for unless the insurance company receives 
a great deal more in premiums than it pays out ior losses it
cannot continue to do business." Hardy, Risk and Risk-bearing.P. 68
Let us suppose that in a given firm the assessment to income 
tax is made on the income of one year .and that the weight of 
a certain predictable risk does not attain its average until 
after the lapse of several years .SupposeTfor example,that to 
iTcertaan manufacturer a risk of this kind amounts on an 
average to £500 a year,but only approximates closely to this 
average after a series of about 20 years.Let the manufacturer's 
income,apart from this risk,be £X a year.She risk,we suppose,is 
the only source of variation in his income.On the average his 
income works out at £(X-500),per yearsbut in the first year 
his income may be £X,in the second year £(X-I000) ,and so on.
In the diagrams I and II this manufacturer's income is taken 
to be measured along the x-axis and the rate at which the 
additional new increment of income tax is imposed,
along the y-axis....
Let the successive amounts by which the person's income falls 
short of the average £(X-500) ,be £ ,£*x , ••• and so on;
and the successive amounts by which it exceeds its average be 
£ fit ,£/St ,£ySj and so on.




->  Income ** £ 5 .
TH=ar.=m t rera-esents the ease where the additional increment 
of i n S  is imposed at a flat rate of say,2per cent.
In the years when the manufacturerT s income falls "below $fy~tS*o)
total amount of taxation that the individual escapes in such years
Exchequer more than he would have done had his income been steady.
If the additional increment of income tax that has been imposed 
is progressive in amount, being higher the higher the size of income 
concerned, then the curve of ' marginal, rate of the tax will be 
upward sloping as in diagram II, Let the rate of tax which 
corresponds to the persons average size of income be R, which 
is equal to P 11 in diagram, II. When his income falls below its 
average size £( x-500 ), he will escape payment of income tax on 
the amount by which it is deficient. If we adopt the ^.ame 
terminology in regard to the meanings o f # * a n d ^ a s  before, then 
the total amount of tax payment that the person will avoid paying 
in these years when his income falls below its average, will be a 
payment on a total amount Joe, £ r s of income. The rate of tax 
Payable on each unit of this income is at a rate less than ft.
The total tax payment that the person avoids therefore, will be
less than £'s«
he will pay an amount of income tax less than he would, have done 
had his income remained at a steady level of £(x-500 ). The
jZZ 9 £ rs. On the other hand in these years when his 
ceeds its average figure, he will pay to 'the ...income
The amount extra that he pays in such years will be in all
Hence it will be just as if on the average 
the person paid income tax on an income of £( x-500 ).
rati
n ew  i h 6n  ‘





In the years in which his income exceeds its average amount, 
he will make a tax payment on an additional amount of income equal 
in all to • The rate at which tax is paid on every unit of such
amount is greater than . His total tax payment on such amount of 
income therefore, is greater than a,
Wevice.
the amount of tax payment that the person makes in these years 
when his income exceeds its average size is greater than the amount 
of tax payment that he escapes in the years when his income falls 
below its average size. That is, as a result of the fluctuation in 
his income the person pays income tax at a higher average rate than 
he would have done had his income been of constant size.
If the tax increment imposed be progressive therefore, it will 
tend to become more strongly to the interest of the individual to 
insure against this fluctuating but predictable risk than it had been 
formerly: because if he do not insure against the risk, the
individual will suffer, as before, a risk of an average weight of 
£500; and in addition he will bear a payment of income tax higher 
than that corresponding to his average size of income, £(X-a^. if 
he does insure against risk he will be able to avoid any income tax 
payment above that corresponding to his average size of income 
£(X-sr«). because insurance will have rendered his income steady.
Hence a person who, before the imposition of the additional increment
h  f €  rr f dof income tax, had ^oAormed not to insure against this predictable 
risk, may, after the tax has been imposed, choose to insure, if the 
additional tax increment be progressive in amount. Thus the 
imposition of an increment of income tax that is progressive in amount 
will tend to increase the amount of insurance taken out against risks 
whose average weight is predictable for the individual business. If 
the increment of tax be at a flat rate, such tendency to increase in
(4)
the insurance of predictable risks will not be present s l
2. The other type of predictable risk is one whose average weight 
per yaar is predictable not only for the individual business*only" A
but^for a group consisting of a large number of such businesses.
This is the type of risk par excellence dealt in by insurance 
companies, net us speak as if the insurance of this type being made
were against fire. If we consider the cases of a large number of
similar businesses, we will oe able to state, using information 
collected in the past, that uhe loss through fire for the group as a
whole over a period of a certain length, will be of a certain and
fairly definite, amount. This is an instance of the "f.aw of inertia 
of large numbers," the principle lying at the basis of all insurance.
The amount of loss for the group as a whole may be the same from
, alyear to year, or it may perhaps vary as between one year and another,
but have a certain fairly steady average value per year when the
averaging is S&aue over a 1C or 15 year period, say. It be the
case that the weight of the risk for the whole group of businesses
f r y to y-caf f t h e *  f-otieius our f i r c « s e * i ^  <c fh e  yrrt? \  ^usin-esses"
/̂ as a whole, will succeedgtf in battering its position, by taking 
out, should the additional tax increment be progressive in amount^ 
a greater quantity of insurance against the risk than it had 
formerly done. Hence if the tax increment is progressive there 
will tend to be an increase in the amount of insurance taken out
* 1 The rise or fall in the charge for insurance in the period 
after, as compared with the period before, the tax, will, of course, 
also be relevant,
1 A year is the period of assessment of income for purposes of 
35 income tax. If income assessment be reckoned in regard to a 
length of time of a mont^. , or of 3 years say, then it is then in 
^S&rd to this period that the weight of the risk for the group must 
considered.
oy the community against fire, "burglary, marine risks, etc, “5
provided the cost of insurance has remained constant, if the tax
38 2  •mcremeuo is at a flat rate there will he no such tendency,
3 In addition to risks of this kind whose weight, either for the 
individual or the group, is known, there exist also in business 
unpredictable risks. The probable burden of these, people may guess 
at ; but they cannot know what the burden will eventually run out to 
be. Unpredictable risks of this kind are referred to as uncertain­
ties; and such uncertainties are mainly borne by the purchasers of 
ordinary shares, or of other shares whose yield is not of a g*ar>tnteed 
amount, but fluctuates according to the degree of success or failure 
attained by the company which had issued them.* 1
Let us consider the process that goes on when a company makes a 
new issue of ordinary shares. The success of the firm lies in the
future, and in the present can only be guessed at. Each person
likely
concerned will form a different estimate of what its success isAto be. 
It is as if each person formed an estimate of the chance that the 
share had of each different rate of return in the future. The set of 
estimates of any given individual in relation to any given chare can 
be represented in the form of an uncertainty - curve as shown*
See in regard to the following, Hicks, "The Theory of 
Uncertainty and Profit,” Economic^, 1931.
* 2. Stamp suggests that an increase in the amount of industrial 
insurance has been taking place. 1 Taxation, Risk-tuning and the 




or uncertainty schedule, in relation to a given share will differ 
for each individual in the community. Some may,for example,he 
optimistic ahout a certain share for which others entertain hut 
little hope. Uncertainty schedules that is, are subjective in nature 
Owing to the views that they take °f the chances of the
different degrees of success of any given share, and as well owing to
their scales of preference for uncertainty schedules of different 
types, the people in the community will be willing to absorhe a 
certain definite quantity of that share when it appears in the market, 
By varying the terms of issue of the share a demand schedule for it
similar in nature to a demand curve, can be obtained.
How suppose that in the circumstances we envisage, an additional 
faxincrement of income is imposed. The course of events at eachA
subsequent moment of time will be different from what it otherwise
would have iieen. But for shortness let us speak as if we pictured
a * ythe same firm as before, issuing at ^ 'particular moment in time, the
wo .same share as it would have done had there been aq£ income tax.A
When the income tax is imposed it alters the whole complex of 
business conditions at all subsequent times. Each individual 
will form an estimate of the companyrs chances of gain, different
^  h o  addition mi
from what would have done had there been an a Florence tax.A
KL±y - .■■nmrerponding i i n -t-ha mind-of th»—permnnJ -hn -h^
The scheme of chances + 4*  ■
Chance A 
Heturn on share 
(net of income tax)
ESTIMATE OF INDIVIDUAL A.
(7)
(1*2
■̂ arveir-'-ahnrQ, will,-that ia, -Tac diff'eront i-n- chape from what it would 
have-been had thorc been no increase or additional tax. Also, part 
of each gross return on the share is absorbed by the new tax* This 
causes a further distortion in the shape of the uncertainty - curve 
of net return, corresponding to the giveh share*
the distribution of income and of capital, and
/V
therefore the ability of individuals in the community to purchase 
shares, will have altered as a result of the tax imposed. The
i
alteration so endured will be one which varies throughout subsequent 
time. Since peopled incomes are different, their scales of relative 
preferences for uncertainty - curves of given shapes, will also be 
different.
As a result of these changes, an alteration will have been 
brought about in the demand schedule for the shares of thewgiven 
company” at each subsequent moment of time. The company will find it 
either easier or more difficult to issue shares. Through the tax its 
business will come to be on a different scale from what it would have 
been otherwise. The pools of capital available for the different 
types of businesses in the community will have altered as a result of 
the tax,both in absolute and in relative size. Some kinds of 
business will find it relatively easier to get capital, others will 
find it relatively more difficult. The relative size and development 
of different kinds of businesses will therefore be altered as a result
of the tax.
A formal analysis of the kind we have given however, does nothing
to suggest whether, in relation to safe businesses, businesses that
involvA# considerable risk will find capital easier or more difficult A
to get in a given income tax regime.
(S)
CHAPTER 16.
The Theory of Double Taxation of Savings.
1. The author of this theory was John Stuart Mill. The 
theory tries to show that in the case of a general income tax 
from which savings are not specifically exempted, savings are
taxed twice as compared with income spent, which is taxed once
_  %only. We quote the famous passage in which Mill sets out this
view.
"Unless savings are exempted from income tax, the 
contributors are taxed twice on what they save, and only once 
on what they spend. A person who spends all he receives pays 
3% to the tax, and no more; but if he saves part of the years 
income and buys stock, then in addition to the 3% which he pays 
on the principal, he pays 3% annually on the interest itself* 
which is equivalent to on immediate payment of a second 3% on 
the principal. So that while unproductive expenditure pays 
only 3%, savings pay 6%: or more correctly 3% on the whole,
and another 3% on the remaining 97"•
Irving Fisher gives the theory an interesting 
formulation by selecting the case of three brothers A, B, and
arpC, each of whom has a different attitude to saving. Each
brother inherits the same fortune, £10,000. A is a spend­
thrift: he spends his m o n e y  at the rate of £2,000 a year and 
so his fortune lasts only 6 years. B adopts the conservative
x1 J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, edited
Ashley, pp. 813 - U-*
*2 Irving Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income, p.250.
policy of* spending only the interest on his money, maintaining 
intact,the capital mtere-st. While G lets interest accumulate at 5% 
on his fortune 1h years, and thereafter is ahle to derive 
from it a perpetual income of £1,000 a year instead of £500 a 
year as does B.
If a flat rate tax of J\0% exists, of these 3 brothers, 
Fisher shows, A the spendthrift could compound for all his tax 
payments by making an initial payment of £157 at the time when 
he in herits the fortune. To compound similarly B would have 
to pay £1,000: and G, the most careful of the brothers would
require to offer a payment at the same date of £171U* Under 
such a system, says Fisher, savings are penalized.
Pigou also upholds the view set forth above. His 
treatment is directly in the tradition of Mill; and since the whole 
theory and discussion of it t6nd to revolve round sub(jletietf 
and the meanings of words we also quote from the passage in 
his works.
"An income tax ... differentiates against savings, by
striking savings both when they .are made and also when they yield
their fruits. Thus a general permanent income tax at the
rate of x  per cent strikes the part of income that is spent at
this rate. But i^ £100 of income is put away for saving, it
removes £X from it at the moment and, thereafter, removes also
some part of the fruits yielded by it ... Let us suppose that
the saver’s investment is a permanent; one, so that the principal
is never withdrawn. Then the secondary taxation amounts every
year to ^  of the fruit of the £ (10 0 - xj that are
100
actually turned into the investment. The total effective rate 
of tax per cent is therefore £ X + ( i o o - x ) J  ; that is
~ \oo) * Thus, the effective rate on saved income is 
practically double the rate on spent income when the tax is 
small.” *1
2. The theory which we have summarized however, would
seem to be unsatisfactory. If we accept the proposition that
money saved is taxed twice as compared with money spent on
consumption goods, then since taxation reduces a capital sura
of £100, if it be spent on consumption goods, to £ (i oo — x} ,
adopting Pigou’s terminology, we should expect that in the
case of money saved it would reduce the capital sum to £ (*oo ~ a.
or in the more exact form, to £ t to© - 4r) • ThisV. i <ro / —■— -
we know it does not do. £100 on which income tax has to be
paid has the same capital value whether the money taxed is
destined to be devoted to consumption purposes or to savings
If the money is to be devoted to consumption purposes, the 
net capital value of £100 to its owner will be £ (ioo-x^ 
and if the money is to be saved, the net capital value of £100 
to its owner will likewise be £ [too - k ) .
Thus the theory that money saved is double - taxed 
is unsatisfactory at this point.
It is mainly on this ground likewise, that Guillebaud 
dissents from the theory that savings is double - taxed. He 
puts it thus:
"If a man has saved £100 and placed it on deposit in 
his bank the value of his holding continues to be £100, 
irrespective of whether he pays no income tax at all, or 
income tax at the rate of 2s.6d. or 5s. on the £. The opposite 
view would lead to the absurd result that the investment of £100
*1 Pigou, a study in Public Finance, p.139-
is no longer worth £100 the day after it nas been made, but 
some smaller sum. "*-*•
Ricci nas said (if we put "£" in nis argument instead 
of Ha loaf of bread” so as to bring out the meaning of the 
passage): wnen a new tax nas been levied, "Nothing nas 
altered as regards tne rates of exchange between £»s tnat 
are to be consumed and £*s that are to be saved: one £ that
is to be consumed immediately is always worth one £ tnat is 
to be saved."*2
3. Can a more satisfactory view of tne facts be advanced 
in place of the of double taxation of savings? A theoryA
in tne following terms would seem to be a preferable way of 
Regarding the whole matter*3.
Suppose an individual to inherit the sum of £200,
£100 of which ne spent on consumption goods and the other £100 
he saves. Let the rate of income tax as before be X %, and 
let be the gross rate of interest. The net capital
value to him of the £100 which he spends on comsumption goods 
is £  ̂|oo — x̂  .
From what we nave said in criticism of the theory 
°f double taxation of savings this also must be the net capital 
value to him of the £100 gross which he saves. It comes 
about in this fashion. The gross rate of interest is * %  .
Guiliebaud, "Income tax and the Double Taxation of 
Savings," Economic Journal, 1935> P- 48b.
Ricci, "La taxation de lfepargne" Revue d1Economic
Pplitiqng I 1 9 2 7, p. 879*
*3) See Ricci art cit.; and more particularly his article
"Lfimposta unica sui crasumi non necessari,” Giornale degli
SRQnomisti . 1 9 1 3.
4.
<&>
But since of every £i tnat a person receives as interest on 
the money he saves ne must pay x 7 » , ie. £ ix, in the form
io o
of taxation, tne net rate of interest that ne receives after 
tne tax nas been imposed is (t - °(0 . Each year ne
will receive on the gross capital of £1 0 0, or net capital
of £ (\oo - tnat ne saves, a net revenue of -
(\Ot> -x) x l \  - JL. ) —  •-'I i o o )  iox>
A net revenue of tnis amount'capitalized at the net rate of
interest mentioned, will be, (since we are simply reversing
the last step in the reasoning), ,
/  (too -x) i (• —  i 7 5  I ioi
•°e if, -
This view of tne matter appears to be more self-consistent 
and more free from misleading implication tnan the tneory 
that saving is double-taxed.
Moreover different individuals in the community--
whether tnis community be tnat of real life and graduated
taxation, or else tne hypothetical community that we envisage--
will be required to pay income' tax at different rates. Another 
individual e.g. , may be required to pay tax at the rate of 
^ The net value of a gross income of £100 to nim,
whether he were to save it or spend it, would be f ( * o o - y j \ -  
the net rate of interest on it should he save it, is i(i - jbJ °(0 . 
But tnis introduces no new complication into the theory.
4. The view of the facts stated can be illustrated by 
a diagram*^*.
Ricci, fart, cit. , Giornal e 14.
5.
Still thinking in terms of tne individual who obtains 
an increment of income of £200, and pays income tax on it at 
tne rate of k /• , let OA, AB in the diagram each represent
£100. Let BC, AD each ■* £ x . Measuring time along tne 
horizontal axis let 01 equal one year, 12 equal another year, 
etc.
The capital value of the £100 which the person 
consumes is, after the tax, equal to AO.
>  T ‘ V e
DIAGRAM I
If the gross rate of interest is 5$ let DE be drawn 
parallel to the time axis. Let FE equal 5$ 00 and FG
equal x /• of FE. (We are assuming simple interst to be 
paid on the capital sum: tne case where interest is reckoned
at a compound rate needs only a small adjustment).
In the diagram the net capital value of the £100 which 
is saved, is, after the tax, equal to OD (whicn*is equal to 
AO). It is shown to be growing at the gross rate given by 
the of DF, but at a net rate given by the slope of DG.
At the end of the 1st. year, the person if he cnoose, 
may consume GE, the net interest on the capital, leaving the 
capital value IE at that moment of time, the same as it had
been to begin withj and the whole process can be repeated in
the 2nd, 3rd etc., years. Tnis would be represented by placing 
a succession of geometrical figures similar to the 1st in order** 
along the axis of time. (Of. diagram I in which one additional
such figure is shown.)
5. Pigou speaics of an income tax from which savings 
is not exempted, as differentiating against saving and in 
favour of spending*̂ -. He is envisaging a case such as tnat 
of a community in which a tax of 10$ is imposed, and in which 
prices and incomes remain unchanged. This reduces a gross 
income of £1,000 to £900 if the money be spent: but if the
money be saved it reduces the sum invested to £900 and as well 
reduces the interest on it from 5$ say, to 4.5$.
Yet even in this, the most definite instance that 
can be cited in favour of retaining tne title "double taxation 
of savings," the economic significance of what takes place is 
obscure; sufficiently vague and obscure indeed, as to render 
any title so definite as double taxation misleading in the 
definiteness of the phenomena that it suggests.
Let us consider the tax of 10$ just cited* As a 
result of it an individual will cut down both the amount of 
his saving and the amount of his expenditure. He may cut 
down the amount of his saving more than the amount of his 
expenditure: or the reverse may be the case. There is nothing 
in theory to suggest that either of these two alternatives 
is the more likely. As much as we can say is that it has 
been the prevalent view that the supply curve of saving, over 
the relevant portion, slopes upward: so that the average
individual will save less when there is a fall in the net . 
fate of interest on his savings. There will be some
individuals, it is true, who are in the opposite case from 
this; e.g. a person who is saving to purchase an annuity of 
given amount will now require to save a larger capital sum 
than he formerly would have done. But individuals of this 
kind, it is generally believed, will be the exception. Only, 
as we have said, theory does nothing to suggest whether for 
the average individual and for the community as a whole the 
contraction in the amount saved or in the amount spent on 
consumption goods will be the greater*1. If it were to be 
the case that when the tax is imposed the amount saved by the 
community as a whole falls in a less proportion than the 
amount spent on consumption goods, -Would it still be consid­
ered desirable to retain the title ”double taxation^ of 
savings as compared with income spent? One would at any 
rate use the title with less assurance than if the reverse 
had been the case.
6. Quite independently of the reasons given,a further 
set of reasons quite different in nature exist, some of which 
in themselves might well be considered of sufficient importance 
for discarding the theory that savings is double-taxed. This 
is because the theory of doiible taxation has a number of 
different aspects. The aspects of which we have just treated 
may be referred to as the accounting aspect and some portions 
of the theory in its economic aspect. Other portions of 
what may be broadly termed the economic aspect of the theory
Por a further
Mae Gregorr^Taxati on °and Savings" , Ec^oMca, Nov.. 1936 pp. 391-2
8.
nave been treated elsewhere in the text, e.g. where we consider
the effect of the income tax on savings and the volume of
capital, and the effect of the income tax on the savings made 
by joint stock companies^^
But as well the theory has what may be termed an
 ̂ ASfUcr . in t e r  (ireCWe a s p e c t  „C t-Ue t h e o r y ,
interpretive aspect and a moralAwhich is a logical or analyti­
cal aspect relating to the meaning of words, analyzes the 
nature of the capital, of the interest, and of the tax concerned 
in such a way as to bring out the manner in which saving is 
or is not double-taxed. Some writers put forward a very 
elaborate interpretive scheme. Einahdi does this to show 
that savings is double-taxed: De Viti does it to show that
savings is not double-taxed*?. Criticism of the interpretive 
aspect of these theories need not be given here. The 
interpretive aspect of the view we have put forward emphasizes 
that money saved is not taxed twice, but that what happens is 
that the savings is taxed once, and that then the interest on it, 
which represents new wealth produced at subsequent periods of 
time by means of the savings, is also taxed. This view is 
illustrated by diagram I, which shows the nature of the process 
that takes place through time, 5$s8: the amount of capital, the 
rate of gross interest and the rate of net interest, at each 
moment in time.
*1 See Einaudifs main writings on the subject, "Intomoal concetto di reddito imponible e di un si sterna d*imposte sul 
reddito consumato11, Memorie delle Reale Accademia delle gciengft .di Torinnj 1 9 1 9, and »>Contributo alia ricerca dell ottima 
imposta", Annali di Economia, 1929; a-nd De Viti de Marco, 
First Principles of Public Finance» Book II, Chapter 10.
7. Of the writers whose views we quoted, holding that 
savings is double-taxed, for example, Mill Fisher and Pigou 
agree that it is morally undesirable that savings should be 
taxed more heavily in this way than money spent.
J. S. Mill says "No income tax is really just from 
which savings are not exempted."
Fisher speaks of taxation of this kind being
"inequitable taxation double taxation to the saver and
remission of taxes to the spendthrift."*^
PignM says that an income tax from which saving is not 
exempted, is inferior from the standpoint of least sacrifice 
to one from which saving is exempted.*2 *4
On the other hand De Viti who considers, from the
tUat" tkere is no oioukie taxation? l ikewise considers
point of view of analysis,Athat there is no moral problem of 
how to exempt savings from taxation.
These and othert examples that might be given of this 
coincidence of economic and moral viewpoint, suggest that the 
two strands of reasoning, the moral and the analytical, nave 
not been held as clearly separate as would be desirable. 
ourselves wish to express no view on the moral aspect of the 
problem, but merely to point out that the moral aspect exists 
as something distinct and different from its purely economic 
aspect. It would be quite possible to take the view that no
Ofi. £LL-> P- 814 
*2 Op. cit. ,p.255
*3 .Op. cit. t p. 142
* 4 In the 0ase of Einaudi’s work it is not the aim of this
author to show that savings ought not to be taxed. Einaudi employs
the theory of double taxation of savings as a means to a general 
discussion of the problem of taxation. See Fasiani, "Sulla ireoria 
dell’esenzione del risparmio dall imposta", Memorie della Keale 
Apoadevyiia. Hoiif ani^nse di Torino, 1926,p. 1, footnote; and 
Benham, "tfbtes on tne Pure Theory of Public Finance," Economica.
*934, P.445 et se<|.
10.
double taxation exists, and yet to affirm that savings ought to be 
less heavily taxed than under a certain given system of taxation: 
or vice .versa to hold from the analytical point of view that 
double taxation of savings does exist, but that morally the 
situation is quite satisfactory. The coincidence of the economic 
and moral judgment in most discussions suggests some confusion 
between the two aspects. In itself the title "double taxation 
of savings" is far from being the purely neutral and scientific 
term which it is so needful to have in economic analysis. The 
term suggests ethical implications to the mind: this in itself
is an argument against its use.
8. The formulation alternative to accepting the theory that 
savings is double taxed, which we have given in the preceeding
tficc *pages, is due to RICOS; r e t in the most recent article in which 
he sets forward his views on the matter, he leaves himself open to 
certain criticisms.
In this RICCI speaks as if the State aided in the creation of 
the new wealth produced by means of the savings and therefore as 
of right claimed a share in such new wealth, by way of the income 
tax.*”* He commences his analysis with the supposititious case 
where a railway is conducted by private enterprise and chafrges 
traders for the services it renders. Then the railway is taken 
over by the State, which charges the same amount as before for the 
same services as beforej but this time the charge is made by 
means of the income tax* This tends to introduce the implication 
that it is right that the State should levy such a tax, including a
tax on the yield of savings.
Argumentation of this kind is unnecessary, and when introduced 
°an hardly help being misleading. It would be desirable that all
* 1 Art. cit., Revue, 1927, p*86i+
the relationships pointed out in economic analysis should be 
purely neutral or scientific; that is, they should be statements 
of quantitative relationships existing between different economic 
variables.
The second objection to RICCIfS argument would relate to its 
form but not to its substance: sometime moral aspects of the
question are introduced in the middle of a piece of economic 
analysis. The effect on the mind of the reader is not clarifying.
Both of these objections attach also to the discussion of 
double taxation given by Guillebattd, who after some argumentation, 
states the conclusion that Hto exempt savings from taxation would 
be to differentiate unfairly against the non-savers, whose burden 
of taxation would become correspondingly heavier*M
It might be argued in favour of Guillebafcd*s treatment that 
he has already, earlier in the article, dealt with the economic 
analysis of the problem; and that having thus examined the issue 
he now states his moral judgment upon it. To some extent this 
may be true and would afford some justification of Guillebattd1 s 
treatment. Yet on -ohe whole, I thin* it would fall short of a 
complete justification. The aim of economic analysis, as Robbin's 
points out, should be to show all the implications of each choice 
of policy.* 2 And it is only after he has expressed this moral 
judgment that Guillebaijid goes on to consider the effects of an 
income taxes on total income and on income spent respectively, on 
the rate of interest, and by implication, on prices and on 
distribution. Logically such analysis, designed to show some of 
the major implications of the different possible lines of policy, 
should, I think, come before the expression of the moral judgment 
on the question. This criticism may appear to be hair-splitting. 
But in practice the admixture of economics and ethics, that is so
Art. cit.,, p.U90
*2 Cf. Robbins, Nature and Significance ̂ E c o n o m i c
Science, Chapter VI, Section 5-
12
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frequent in the subject is undoubtedly retarding the progress of the 
science of f?bblic Finance.
Guillebattd introduces a conception of the State similar to 
that held by RTGGf, both authors in frhmoajr point following De Viti.
"The State”, says Guillebattd, ”through the exercise of its 
general function as a cO-operating factor in the productityj^ 
organization of ohe community, and through the expenditure of the 
revenue which it receives from the taxpayers, will increase the 
productivity of the capital accumulated by the action of the 
savers above what it would have been in the absence of the State.
3£1The State is accordingly entitled to a share in this additional income. 
This conception of the State in public finance is not a tenable 
one. Reasons for rejection of the concept need not be given 
here, beyond showing its unsuitability by a single example.
Suppose that the State raises the rate of income tax in order to 
increase the pensions given to old people. No necessary increase 
in the productivity of the factors employed in production need 
result. A more purely scientific view of the State is needed 
thajt that advanced by De Viti and accepted in this regard by RICCI 
and Guillebattd.
Finally some criticism may be attempted of Professor MacGregor’s 
paper ’’The Taxation of Savings”, in particular as regards his 
interpretation of the argument of J. S. Mi,11. To quote from
Mac Gregor’s argument;
j
’’Mill says that if a tax of R per cent is imposed on an income, j
;i
part of which is going to be saved, the result will be that the 
tax payer will reduce both his expenditure and his savings by j
exactly R per cent. This assumption is essential to his argument . . . ;i
I do not understand why none of his critics have pointed out j
this obvious and quite disqualifying objection to his formula,
am
which is thereby at once dissolved."
After a perusal of the relevant portion of Mill’s worlc I 
unable to agree that Mill either states or suggests that when a 
tax is imposed on income each person will cut down the amount of 
his saving and the amount of his consumption by the same percentage. 
Nor does Mill s argument appear to me to rest on such an assumption, 
any more say, than Professor pigou’s does.
I think, in this same regard, that Professor Mac Gregor is
rather unfair to RICCI* In the article of RICCI’S that Mac Gregor 
• x2cites, it is true that a long algebraic example is used in which 
each one of a large number of persons is assumed to cut down his 
saving by 10% and his consumption by 10%, owing to the imposition 
of a tax. The reason for this however, if I understand it rightly,
Vis not because the assumption is necessary to the argument but 
only because it simplifies the arithmetic. Later in the article 
RICCI says, before proceeding to discuss an arithmetical example 
that had been given by Einaudi:
"Si un nouvel impot general sur lei revenus de 10 p. 100
/
survient, il frappe Titus en lui enlevent 1,000 francs ou pains.
Quelle repercussion exercess ce nouvel impot sur la distribution 
que fait Titus entre consommation et epargne? La question est 
importante et sera analysee tout a 1’ heure, mais ici, pour la
» ,,, + t,*2adiscussion de 1’exemple d’ Einaudi, elle n a pas d interet.
Later he points out that
"Dans une e^tude que j’ai recemment publiee, j’ai Knontre' 
comment, sous certaines conditions, une diminution dans le taux 
d’ interet peut induire un homo eceonomicus a augmenter son eparg)»e''*3 
When we are d e a l i n g  with a large number of people, however, he 
considers it probable that the imposition of a tax will lead to a
*?a eit- P. 391-.(Author's own italics)
x Mac Gregor art. cit., pp«
3  i ^ . r i : ’88M M t h o r ' s  o m  italics in both quotations)
fall in the amount of savings supplied and so cause a rise in 
the rate of interest.
Moreover in the earlier article*1 in which RICCI kad developed 
his views on double taxation more fully than he does in the later 
article, he makes no reference whatever to the assumption to which 
MacGregor refers* RICCI’S investigation therefore appears to be 
more general in its scope than Professor MacGregor considers it.
MacGregor further criticising Mill says:
’’Mill’s formula leaves unanswered a serious inference from it.
That inference is that the government must be getting more 
taxation than it requires. For if the rate of taxation is R per 
cent, and this represents the cost of the public services, then R 
per cent of the expenditure, plus nearly twice that proportion of 
the savings, is more than R per cent of the whole income.
I see no escape from an impossible conclusion, so long as we
5
adhere to what Mill and other supporters of his argument actually say.
Again I would be unable to agree that Mill anywhere expresses 
this meaning. Rather what he has in mind, it appears to me, is 
that the government raises by taxation just as much money as its 
public expenditure requires; but that a larger portion of its 
revenue is traceable to moneys that have been saved than is 
traceable to moneys that have been spent;(that is in so far as its 
revenue is derived from a general income tax)* Di i in mm' Ifllbney 
earned at the present moment say, and spent at the present moment, 
is only taxed once, viz., at the present moment; yet if this 
money had been saved it would have yielded fruits whicn would have 
been taxed again at later dates. Thus in this sense money saved 
seems to bear more taxation than money spent. ■ If this in fact be 
Mill’s meaning then he does not commit the confusion in thought to
*13f
vo G-iornale, 19^3MacGregor, art. cit*, p . 393
to which Professor MacGregor alludes.
Frequently in the course of his discussion MacGregor alternates 
"between arguments that are economic in their nature and others 
that are moral. This alternation we have held, has an obscuring 
effect, and we have made a plea for separation.
■' - ■ : - 1: \ -
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C H A P T E R  XVII.
The British Income Tax and Company Reserves.
1. A Joint stock company in Great Britain pays only the 
standard rate of income tax on the portion of profit which, 
instead of distributing as dividends to its shareholders, 
it places to the company^ reserve.
The Colwyn Committee was gratified at the extent to 
which it was found that company reserves had been maintained 
in the years following the Great War. "On the whole question" 
it saidjf,we agree with the view expressed by more than one 
witness • . • that, when a concern is well managed, it will 
not be deflected by high Income Tax from a sound policy 
in the matter of reserves.”
As we have already seen in our general review of savings 
. . • the statistical evidence available does not show any 
sign bf reserves having been sacrificed to dividends. It 
tends rather in the opposite direction; for it indicates 
that companies, regarded en bloc, have maintained their 
reserves even at the expense of dividends".#
2. To see the consequences of this rule in British income 
tax legislation, let us consider the position of a person who 
is an ordinary shareholder in a Joint stock company. The 
company after meeting the outgoings necessarily associated 
with its trading over the year, comes into possession of a 
given amount of profits, part of which it will distribute as 
dividends to its ordinary shareholders and the remainder it 
will place to reserve. There is a certain region of play
*■ Report of the (GQlwyn) Oommitteeon National Debt and 
Taxation, g 395, pp.146-7.
For statistics showing the percentage of undistributed profits in recent years, see Colin Clark, National 
income and Outlay, p#l87* “ "
within which one of these amounts may be increased and 
the other correspondingly diminished.
If a shareholder A say, is a rich shareholder who 
pays income tax on his yearly earnings at a higher rate 
than the standard rate —  in the language of the Inland
Revenue Department, he pays surtax as well as income t a x_
then he will be keener to see an increase in the portion of 
the company’s profits that is allocated to reserve. If 
the standard rate of income tax be, say, five shillings in 
the £, and the rate at which he himself pays income tax be 
.eight shillings in the £, then after payment of the tax on 
£1 that accrues to him as payment of dividend, he will be 
left with a net amount available for investment -of only 
twelve shillings. If the company were to have invested this 
£1 for him, however, it would pay five shillings of it to 
the Government as standard rate of income tax, and invest 
the remaining fifteen shillings in the development of its 
business. The shareholder A, therefore, will, so far as . 
this aspect of the matter is concerned, benefit through 
the company’s placing money to reserve.
Let us suppose that no uncertainty exists and that the 
market rate of interest is Ilf0. The individual A will be 
content to get a lesser rate of interest than R on the 
larger amount of income that he is able to invest via the 
company’s reserves. Indeed he will be content that his 
money should be placed to reserve in this way, so long as 
the rate of interest accruing from its investment is not 
less than an amount Lfo, where
15 = 12 —lOO 100
4that is L - g" B
If the curve of marginal productivity of capital of 
the company he only gently downsloping, this represents an
2
advantage to a rich shareholder of this type, in so far as 
the ability of the company to employ additional capital 
at profit is increased. If this curve of productivity of 
capital be steeply downsloping, the company can use less 
capital in placements to reserve, with profit to its richer 
shareholders. The fact however, that companies are legally 
entitled to purchase the shares of others out of these re­
serves, or to purchase government securities, tends to make 
the curve of productivity of capital more gently down- 
sloping for each of them.
The above deals with the case of the shareholder who pays 
surtax on his income as well as the standard rate of income 
tax. The case of the shareholder who pays income tax at a 
rate less than the standard rate can be similarly dealt 
with. Suppose that such a shareholder, B, pays income 
tax on the moneys that accrue to him at the rate of two 
shillings and six pence in the £, five shillings being as 
before the standard rate of income tax. Before this share­
holder will desire £1 of the companyfs profits to be placed 
to reserve, rather than distributed as dividends, he will 
require to expect a rate of return on it not less than 
which is greater than R%, the normal rate of interest. G 
will be given by the equation
15 &  ■ i7/6a- ™
7that is G = 0 R«
If it were always possible for the company to raise
fresh capital in the market at zero cost over and above 
the normal rate of interest R ~  i.e. if the cost to issue 
houses, to underwriting of a share issue, etci, were zero 
then the individual B would desire the company's entire 
business to be financed by hiring capital in the market.
He would desire the whole of the company's profits to be
( mV
distributed as dividends and no portion of them to be 
placed to reserve.
In practice companies only find it possible to raise 
fresh capital by incurring money and trouble costs addi­
tional to the fnormal rate of interest1 that they pay 4>n this 
capital. This necessitates modification in our last con­
clusion; and the company through the existence of such 
additional costs of raising capital will tend to find it 
profitable, even though all the shareholders pay income tax 
at a rate less than the standard rate, to maintained a certain 
financial reserve.
The example we have given, although it is cast in the 
most simplified of terms, suffices to show that the amount of 
profits that the company places to reserve, will depend on the 
incomes and rates of income tax of the shareholders in it.
If everything else in connection with the company were to 
remain unchanged, but the composition of the body of its 
shareholders were to alter, then the company’s policy in 
regard to dividend payments and reserves would likewise be 
required to alter, in order that a position of maximum pro­
fitability to its shareholders should be maintained.
3. The foregoing examples show that in the matter of allo­
cation of profits to reserve, the interests of the poor and 
of the rich shareholders, andAdifferent individuals among the 
poor and of different individuals among the rich shareholders, 
are in conflict. If the company has shareholders in both 
categories rich and poor, then whichever policy it pursues in 
regard to reserves will be opposed to the interests of at any 
rate one of these classes. If, after the lapse of a period, 
it becomes clear that the company’s policy is going to be 
dominated by the interests of the rich shareholders, then 
the poorer shareholders will tend to sell out their shares 
to richer persons, and will tend to purchase shares in other
4.
companies whose polic#, accord^ more with their own interests. 
Thus the existence of the provision in British income tax law, 
requiring companies to pay the standard rate of tax on moneys 
put to reserve, introdue e$ a force which tends to bring into 
existence a situation in which the shareholders in each 
company are people who pay the same rate of income tax.
Other forces, needless to say, are at work, which tend to 
lessen the importance of the force we mentions such as, for 
example, lack of clearness of knowledge and of foresight, 
industrial uncertainty, and difference of policies in regard 
to saving and investment pursued by individuals with the 
same incomes.
4. In order that a state of maximum productivity should be 
attained in a community, economic science shows, a necessary 
condition to be satisfied is that the investment of an addi­
tional £1 of capital should afford the same yield in every 
line of production. The above reasoning shows that the 
provision of British income tax law whereby a company pays 
income tax at standard rate on the moneys that it places to 
reserve, tends to frustrate this condition from being sat­
isfied. A result of the legal provision, we have shown, is 
that the interests of different individuals require the 
productivity of the same unit of capital, £1, to be different 
in different occupations; in some occupations the productivity 
of capital will be greater in the example we chose), and 
in others less (Lf0), than the normal rate of interest. A 
condition of maximum productivity in the country thus tends - 
to be frustrated.*
See R.F. Fowler, The Depreciation ofCapital, Chap.VI. on 
"The Effects of Joint stock Organization on the Mobility
°f ^further argument from the side of equity exists 
against the legal provision that we have been discussing, 
The earnings of the company are really the property of 
the shareholders: part of these earnings are ploughed
back into the business in the form of company reserves.
(footnote continued over page)
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(Continuation of footnote from previous page)
The fraction of the reserves belonging to the poor man, who 
pays income tax at only a very low rate, and the fraction 
belonging to the rich man who pays at a much higher rate, 
are both of them taxed at the same rate per £ when they 
are placed to reserve. This type of taxation is impersonal 
and contrary in nature to the principles underlying the rest 
of the British income tax which is a personal tax, afct empt- 
ing to adjust the weight of the burden on a person to his 
ability to bear it: to do so it takes into account his
family circumstances and raises the rate of the tax with 
increases in the size of the person’s income. The legal 
provision relating to company reserves abandons this 
principle.
CHAPTER 18
A Subsidy in respect of Income Tax granted to British Farming.
1. British farmers nave the privilege of being assessed 
for purposes of income tax in whichsoever of two ways they choose. 
They may cnoose to have tneir incomes assessed by the Department 
of Inland Revenue, as being the actual amount that they nave earned 
during the year. It is on this basis, viz. , actual earnings, 
that all other classes in the country are assessed. British 
farmers may however, if they so desire, nave tneir income assessed 
for purposes of taxation, as being of an amount different from this: 
they may choose to be assessed as if the amount of their earnings 
were equal to the rent that they pay for their farm lands and 
buildings. Should a farmer have chosen at some date in the past, 
to be assessed on the basis of the rent that he pays, and discover 
later that the income he has actually earned, e.g. , due to bad 
weather, fallen below this amount, then he may alter his decision, 
choose to be assessed on the basis of income he has actually earned 
and obtain a corresponding repayment of tax from the Department 
of Inland Revenue. It is always open to the farmers therefore, 
to choose whichever of the two bases has been the lower for the 
year in question*-*-. The effect is exactly the same as if farmers 
in Great Britain were paying income tax at a lower rate than other 
classes in the country*2. it acts as a kind of subsidy.
*1 The alternative basis of assessment came into existence in the 
• early nineteenth century, because it was felt at that time that 
farmers would be unable to keep books of account giving a record of 
their business profit. Today this reason has largely lost its force.
*2 The vast majority of farmers choose to be assessed on a rental 
basis rather than on the actual income that they earn.
The owners of land who let it out to tenant farmers will 
derive no direct benefit: because these owners are assessed for
purposes of income tax on the amount of whatever income is trans­
mitted to them by the tenants*1. The people who benefit directly 
(viz., through omission of a portion of the tax), are those who 
engage in the farming of land, whether they own the land that they 
farm or have hired this land from others.
2. To see the effect of this privilege on those who carry 
on farming, let us represent in diagram I the cost conditions to a 
farmer who grows only one crop. In the diagram the horizontal 
line of price through Pis taken to be fixed, corresponding fairly 
well to the case where the farmer concerned produces a crop like 
wheat say, for which there is a world market. The curve MVC|
(ABHP), shows the farmer*s marginal variable cost of production 
for different outputs of the crop, where variable costs are taken 
to include all expenses of production, excepting the rent he pays 
for the fixed quantity of land that he occupies, excepting the 
return the farmer gets to the fixed capital he employs in the 
farm, and the return to the farmer*s own labour which, for simplicity 
we take also to be a factor whose quantity is fixed.
Technical coefficients of production we suppose to begin with, 
are fixed at each scale of output and independent of the height of 
the tax.
*1 In terms of the well-known schedules of the British income 
tax, property owners are assessed under Schedule A of the income 
tax and in this there is only one basis of assessment, viz. , income 
actually received. It is income arising from the occupation of 
land tnat is assessed on the alternative basis.
If there be no tax the amount of produce placed on the market 
annually by this farmer will be OM, given by the point of inte2>-
curv£section of the su» of marginal costs with tne horizontal line of






Area ABCD * area BHJC
» value of annual rental 
MVC-, is shown as a dotted line.
Area CBHP - return to farmers capital and labour if
there is no income tax.
Area CELP - his return if income tax is paid on 
assessment equal to income earned.
Area OELHP r his return if income tax is paid on 
assessment equal to rental value.
will be equal to the area ABPD. Out of this however, a rent 
payment equal to area ABCD: falls to be paid, leaving a net re­
muneration to the fixed factors, capital and labour, supplied 
by the farmer, equal to area CBHP.
Let us to begin with suppose that this farmer is required
to pay income tax on an amount of income assessed as being equal
to his total earnings. And let us suppose that the prices he
pays to the factors of production remain constant and independent 
of the income tax, so that MVC| continues to be the curve of
costs other than income tax. His income tax payment is now 
an expense necessary to production, just like any of his other 
variable expenses: and the curve of marginal variable costs
including tax to the farmer is MVC2 , ABELP in the diagram. Before 
he will be required to pay income tax nis income will nave to 
exceed an amount equal to his rent payment. In the diagram OG 
is the quantity of crop that the farmer must sell at the existing 
price level, before his total income becomes equal to his rent 
payment. Since the income tax absorbs a portion of each increment 
of income once the output OG nas been passed, the shape of the 
new curve of cost including tax will be as shown. Tne OMtn unit 
yields no return above variable costs of production: it therefore 
pays no income tax and tne curve MVCp will pass through the point 
P. After the tax,output will be OM units,as it had been before it.
Next if the farmer may choose to pay income tax either on 
the amount of income that he earns, or else on an amount of income 
equal to the annual value of his rental, then following the law 
of minimum cost he will choose to pay income tax to begin with on 
tne amount of income that he actually earns, and will do so until 
the amount of his earned income additional to his rent payment 
becomes equal to the value of his annual rental. After this point 
has been reached, when his earnings are greater than his rental 
value, he will choose to pay income tax on an assessment equal 
snly to the value of his rental. Thus he will always pay tax on 
whichever of tne two assessments is the lower.
In the diagram the rental value of the farmer*s land is taken 
to be equal to area CBHJ. Until the crop production corresponding 
to an income of this amount is reached, viz. , a crop production 
ON, the farmer chooses to be assessed on his actual income: over
the range 0 to N, therefore, the curve of marginal costs including 
tax to the farmer, MVC^, (when he pays income tax but is permitted
to do so on the alternative basis), is still ABEL, coinciding
over this range with the curve MVO2. After output passes an
amount ON, the farmer will choose to pay income tax on an assessment
equal to the value of his annual rental. On units of output
between N and M, therefore, he will pay no additional income tax, 
curveand h i s o f  marginal costs including tqx will coincide, over 
this range, with the curve MVOi, (HP). At the point L there will 
be a discontinuity in the curve of marginal costs, including tax,
MVC3. is shown in the diagram as a dotted curve. Output
as in each of the two previous cases, will be OM, given by the 
point of intersection of the curve of marginal costs with the price 
line.
3. The net profits of the farmer after payment of rent 
and of income tax, if he is assessed on his actual profits, will be 
equal to area OELP. When he is offered the alternative basis of 
assessment his net profits become equal to area OELHP; that is, 
equal to his previous profits plus an additional profit LHP. The 
farmer*s capital and labour, therefore, is more highly remunerated 
in tnis line of production as a result of the alternative basis of 
assessment than it would have been otherwise. But if we assume 
meantime tha.t labour and capital are in perfectly elastic supply 
to the industry this will not represent a possible equilibrium 
state of affair^?.
Instead, if it were to be the oase that the technical coeffi­
cients of production on this farm and every other farm were fixed 
and definite, and if the price of the commodity being produced on 
the one hand and of the faotors labour and capital being hired on 
the other, were also fixed, then the only factor that would be able
to alter in price would be land; and the price of land would be 
bid up so that each farmer just got the normal rate of remuneration 
on the capital and labour involved. When rent had reached its 
new equilibrium level, the farmer would be indifferent whether he 
paid income tax to the government on the basis of ^rental value 
or on the basis of income actually earned.
Since in these circumstances rents of land have risen, there­
fore land that was formerly below the margin of cultivation will 
now come into production: the area of land cultivated will have
increased.
The long period curve of supply Jof labour to Britisto. 
agriculture will not, in fact, be perfectly elastic: it will be
upward sloping. Since more land is in use as a result of the 
double basis of tax assessment, and since the price of land has 
risen, therefore labour and capital will be substituted for land 
in the productive process. Hence the demand for labour must have 
risen: more of it will be employed at a higher wage rate.
Our assumption hitherto has been that capital is in perfectly 
elastic supply to the industry. Now the amount of tax remission 
enjoyed by any farmer as a result of the alternative basis of 
assessment will be greater, the greater the rate at which he is 
liable to payment of income tax: that is, the tax remission is
greater the richer he is. If the farmer's income is sufficiently 
low for him to pay no income tax then he gains no direct benefit 
from the provision. It will be the rich people who will benefit 
most, and these rich people will tend to be induced to enter the 
farming industry in greater numbers than they otherwise would have 
been.
A person tends to invest vapital in each line of production 
until he receives from it tne same net return in each line. The
tax remission that ne in fact gets on interest accruing from 
agriculture, will induce a rich person to invest money in agricul­
ture beyond the margin at which it fetches the normal gross rate 
of return, and up to a further margin at which the gross rate of 
return is less than normal.
Clearly also the demand curves for most products of British 
farming are down-sloping. (Wheat is the case that approaches
most closely to an exception to this rule). As a result of tne 
double basis of assessment for farming profits, the quantities of 
these products produced will be greater and therefore their prices 
lower. Tne rise in the rents of farm lands, owing to this fall 
in the prices of the commodities that they produce, will be less 
great than if, as we had supposed initially, the prices of these 
products nad been perfectly rigid. The area of sub-marginal
fir<? Auction,land actually coming into saiotoaoe will be lowered, through theA
fall that ta&es place in the price^ of farm produce.
The richer farmers will have bid up the price of land: herein
the small entrepreneur-farmer suffers. As well these small f&rmeis 
sell their output in competition with that raised by the richer 
farmers, who as a result of the alternative basis in tax assessment 
have increased their output. This again will react to the dis­
advantage of the small farmers. The more rigid is the demand for 
the crops raised by tne particular small farmer concerned, and the 
greater the increase in output of these crops by nis ricn competit­
ors, the more disadvantageous to him will the alternative basis of 
assessment turn out to nave been. Hence on balance the position 
of the smaller farmers will nave been worsened through tne 
existence of the alternative basis of assessment.
Consider the case of the small farmers who own the land that 
they till. Their capital good, land, will have increased in 
rental value. Through the increased output of produce by the
ricner farmers, tnese small owner-farmers may find the income that 
tney derive from the husbandry of their lands, reduced. As veil, 
the wages paid to farming labour will nave increased. A not 
unlikely outcome will be for a number of tne small owner-faraers 
to find it more profitable to sell or let their land to others 
and hire out their labour services to other farmers.
Thus tne effects of the existence of the alternative basis 
of tax assessment in British farming can be sumarized as follows:-
Rich farmers get an increased return on their capital. This 
acts as a subsidy. There is a consequent tendency for richer 
persons liable to income tax at the higher rates to be induced to 
enter the farming industry.
There is an increased production of farm products in the 
country.
isA higher priceApaid for land.
There is a worsening of the position of poorer farmers through 
the increased competition that they meet both in renting tneir 
land and in selling their crops. Those farmers suffer most, for 
whose commodities demand is most rigid.
A higher price is paid for farming labour.
There is a tendency to a fall in the numbers of small outer-* 
farmers.
